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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no consti-
tutional value in false statements of fact.'
The Supreme Court uttered this dictum in 1974 in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.2 For the next sixteen years, lower courts construed it as articu-
lating a broad, First Amendment immunity for the expression of opinion,3
and the doctrine became "the fastest growing body of defamation law in the
1980s."4 Courts employed various analytical approaches to identify the types
of language that qualify for immunity as opinion,5 but the approach adopted
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Oilman v. Evans6 predominated.7 Under that approach, the courts have
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (citation omitted).
2 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
3 E.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
4 David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487,
507 (1991).
' The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described several
of these approaches:
Some courts have, in effect, eschewed any effort to construct a theory and simply
treated the distinction between fact and opinion as a judgment call. See, e.g.,
Shiver v. Apalachee Publishing Co., 425 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
Other courts have concentrated on a single factor, such as the verifiability vel non
of the allegedly defamatory statement. See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551
F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co.,
434 U.S. 834, 98 S.Ct. 120, 54 L.Ed.2d 95 (1977). Still others have adopted a
multi-factor test, attempting to assess the allegedly defamatory proposition in the
totality of the circumstances in which it appeared. See, e.g., Information Control
Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).
Oilman, 750 F.2d at 977 (footnote omitted).
In addition, some courts have employed the analysis of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). See, e.g., Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 913; Bums v. McGraw-
Hill Broadcasting Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1358-61 (Colo. 1983) (en banc); Yancey v.
Hamilton, 786 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Ky. 1989); Kotlikoff v. Community News, 444
A.2d 1086, 1089 (N.J. 1982); see also Eileen Finan, Note, The Fact-Opinion Determi-
nation in Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 817-18 (1988). For a description of the
Restatement approach, see infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
6 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
' See, e.g., Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280,
1286-90 (4th Cir. 1987); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d
1119, 1129-31 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988); McCabe v. Rattiner,
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considered four factors to determine whether, in the totality of the circum-
stances in which the statement was made, the average recipient of the com-
munication would view the statement as fact or opinion.8 The four factors
are (1) "the common usage or meaning of the specific language of the chal-
lenged statement itself," (2) "the statement's verifiability-is the statement
capable of being objectively characterized as true or false?," (3) "the full
context of the statement-the entire article or column, for example," and (4)
"the broader context or setting in which the statement appears." 9
Although the Olman approach gained wide adherence, it failed to pro-
duce predictable outcomes.'" Its major flaw is the absence of a definition of
opinion that might guide the courts in weighing the factors." One judge has
observed that courts "have come up with buckets full of factors to consider
but no useful guidance on what to do when they look in opposite directions,
as they always do."' 2 Judges have vehemently disagreed on the results of
applying the Olman analysis to the facts of particular cases, 3 and some
814 F.2d 839, 840-42 (1st Cir. 1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300,
1302-05 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Dodson v. Dicker, 812
S.W.2d 97 (Ark. 1991); Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1209 (D.C.
1991); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129, 132-33 (N.Y. 1989), recons.
denied, 552 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y.), vacated, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990), adhered to, 567 N.E.2d
1270 (N.Y.) (employing, under state law, the same standard used in the court's previous
opinion), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699,
705-08 (Ohio 1986).
' Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979.
9 Id.
0 One analysis of decisions following the Oilman approach concluded:
Two approaches, both relying on Oilman, disagree about the relative emphasis
that should be granted to the first set of factors (precision and verifiability) or to
the second set (literary and social context). Courts stressing precision and verifi-
ability tend to examine the statement for these factors first, and then turn to con-
text as a possible exculpatory factor. Conversely, courts that treat context as for-
mative rarely make an initial finding of factuality. Instead, they emphasize the
literary and social setting, and often declare the statement an opinion despite its
abstract precision or verifiability.
Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative
Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 781 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see also
Finan, supra note 5, at 826-30 (regarding the patterns of decisions using the Oilman
approach).
" Professor Post has stated that "[s]uch tests fail to specify in any theoretically use-
ful manner exactly what a court should look for in the 'words' or 'medium' employed."
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 601,
650 (1990). Professor Phillips has stated that "the contextual approach appears capable
of being manipulated in an infinite number of ways." Jerry J. Phillips, Opinion and
Defamation: The Camel in the Tent, 57 TENN. L. REv. 647, 661 (1990).
12 Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.).
"3Oilman itself is a prime example. In that case, heard en banc, three judges who
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judges have been caustic in their criticisms of the malleability of the analy-
sis. '
Complicating the opinion issue are the related matters of vituperation
and rhetoric.15 Vituperation, or verbal abuse, is not considered defamato-
ry.'6 Rhetorical hyperbole is not actionable when the plaintiff relies on the
literal meaning of the language as defamatory, but the language is not rea-
sonably susceptible to a literal construction.'" Opinion, vituperation, and
accepted the four-factor analysis disagreed with the court's conclusion that the statement
"[Professor] Olman has no status within the profession" was opinion. Olman, 750 F.2d
at 1032 (Wald, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1035 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part); id. at
1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); see also Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 699, a case involving
the same newspaper article as that involved in Milkovich, in which three justices crit-
icized the majority's adoption of the Olman approach and also disagreed that, under its
four-factor test, the statement at issue was opinion; see id. at 716 (Celebrezze, J., dis-
senting in part); id. at 718 (Sweeney, J., dissenting in part); id. at 721 (Brown, J., dis-
senting in part).
'" See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir.) (Bowman,
J., dissenting) ("Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and it would appear that the result
to be obtained through application of the Olman factors is in the eye of the judge."),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 716 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting
in part) (finding the test "unworkable"); id. at 719 (Sweeney, J., dissenting in part)
("[T]he majority's new 'test' is in reality no test at all, because its components can be
juxtaposed to forge any interpretation that the user of the 'test' desires. I believe that
the majority's 'test' is patently arbitrary, and too unreliable to be given this court's
imprimatur.").
" For a discussion of such speech, see BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY
162-69 (2d ed. 1991).
6 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
There are some statements that are in form statements of opinion, or even of fact,
which cannot reasonably be understood to be meant literally and seriously and are
obviously mere vituperation and abuse. A certain amount of vulgar name-calling
is frequently resorted to by angry people without any real intent to make a defam-
atory assertion, and it is properly understood by reasonable listeners to amount to
nothing more. This is true particularly when it is obvious that the speaker has lost
his temper and is merely giving vent to insult. Thus when, in the course of an
altercation, the defendant loudly and angrily calls the plaintiff a bastard in the
presence of others, he is ordinarily not reasonably to be understood as asserting
the fact that the plaintiff is of illegitimate birth but only to be abusing him to his
face. No action for defamation will lie in this case. The circumstances under
which verbal abuse is uttered affect the determination of how it is reasonably to
be understood. Words uttered face to face during an altercation may well be un-
derstood merely as abuse or insult, while words written after time for thought or
published in a newspaper may be taken to express the defamatory charge and to
be intended to be taken seriously.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. e (1977).
'" See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)
(holding that defendants' use of the word "blackmail" could not support a finding that
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rhetoric are not mutually exclusive speech categories;'" moreover, they all
raise issues concerning the reasonable construction of the defendant's
charge, and all three may be construed as nonfactual assertions. 9 Accord-
ingly, the Olman multifactor analysis has been used in support of conclu-
sions not only that statements are opinion, but also that they are mere vitu-
peration or rhetoric.20
Prior to its 1990 decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,2 the Su-
preme Court had ruled on the issues of verbal abuse and rhetoric, holding
that such speech is protected under the First Amendment when it is nonfac-
tual.22 Until its decision in Milkovich, however, the Supreme Court had said
little about the significance of its influential dictum on opinion in Gertz and
had not defined the scope of constitutional protection for defamatory opin-
ion.2" In Milkovich, the Court addressed those issues. Its decision in
Milkovich, however, has not provided lower courts with a clear and predict-
able method of resolving opinion cases, and the decision is subject to more
than one interpretation. The major test employed by the Court in
Milkovich-whether a statement is provable as false on the basis of objec-
tive evidence 24-has produced widely divergent results in its application."
In an opinion narrowly tailored to fit the case at hand, the Court in
Milkovich rejected the defendants' proposal for the adoption of a multifactor
analysis.2" It held instead that under pre-existing constitutional doctrine, a
defamatory opinion on a matter of public concern is not actionable if the
opinion does not contain a provably false factual connotation, at least when
a media defendant is involved.27 However, the succinct, twenty-one page
defendants had charged plaintiff with the crime of blackmail, when the only reasonable
construction of the word was that it charged plaintiff with taking an unreasonable bar-
gaining position).
8 See, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 396
N.E.2d 996, 1000-02 (Mass. 1979) (holding that charge that union faced an "inroad of
communism" was nonactionable because it was pure opinion based on disclosed facts,
and because it was "mere pejorative rhetoric"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980); see
also SANFORD, supra note 15, at 167-69 (discussing Central Broadcasting).
19 See SANFORD, supra note 15, at 162-69.
20 See discussion infra part IV.A.7.
21 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
22 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
23 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-19 (reviewing Supreme Court's previous decisions
relating to the types of speech that are not actionable).
24 Id. at 19, 21-22.
25 See discussion infra part IV.A.
26 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
27 Id. at 19-20. This Article does not address the difficulties created by the Court's
potential limitation of its holding to matters of public concern and to media defendants.
For discussion of the problematic limitation to matters of public concern, see Phillips,
supra note 11, at 663-66. For cases holding that state common law opinion rules apply
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opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist"8 with Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissenting,29 failed to set forth a comprehensive definition of the
distinction between fact and opinion, and is subject to at least two reason-
able interpretations.
One interpretation is that the Court followed the approach of section 566
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under that approach, a "pure" expres-
sion of opinion is not actionable.3" A "pure" opinion has two components:
(1) an assertion that reasonably is understood to express the comment of the
speaker, rather than an assertion of fact; and (2) a factual basis for the com-
ment that is stated along with the comment, or is known or available to the
recipient.3' Thus, a "pure" statement of opinion does not imply the asser-
to statements that are not on a matter of public concern, see, e.g., Weissman v. Sri Lan-
ka Curry House, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that state
common law principles apply to speech of purely private concern, that state common
law "makes no distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion,"' and that defendant's state-
ments were only conditionally privileged under common law rules); Lutz v. Royal Ins.
Co. of Am., 586 A.2d 278, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (predicting that, if
faced with the issue, the New Jersey Supreme Court would not immunize an opinion on
a matter of private concern). But see Lund v. Chicago and Northwestern Transp. Co.,
467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
We find unpersuasive the dissent's limitation of constitutional opinion protection
to statements about public officials or public figures, or regarding matters of pub-
lic concern .... [W]hen the statements, such as those made here during a meet-
ing regarding employee grievances, are clearly opinions, the state's interest fades
and the first amendment predominates.
Id. at 369 n.1.
Regarding the tentative limitation of Milkovich to cases involving media defendants,
suffice it to say that different constitutional protections for media and nonmedia defen-
dants would be untenable. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
780 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[S]uch a distinction is 'irreconcilable with the
fundamental First Amendment principle that "[t]he inherent worth of ... speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual."'), quoted in Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 23 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 1.
29 Id. at 23 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) ("A defamatory communication
may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is
actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis
for the opinion.").
3' See id. § 566 cmt. b.
There are two kinds of expression of opinion. The simple expression of opin-
ion, or the pure type, occurs when the maker of the comment states the facts on
which he bases his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses a comment as to
the plaintiff's conduct, qualifications or character. The statement of facts and the
expression of opinion based on them are separate matters in this case, and at com-
mon law either or both could be defamatory and the basis for an action for libel
472 [Vol. 3:2
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tion of undisclosed or unknown facts as the basis for the opinion.32 Justice
Brennan and others have construed the Court's opinion in Milkovich as con-
sistent with the Restatement position.33
The more plausible interpretation of the Court's opinion is that it
adopted the Restatement approach only in part, holding that constitutional
immunity for the expression of a defamatory opinion on a matter of public
concern exists only if (1) the speaker does not imply the existence of undis-
closed facts as the basis for the opinion, and (2) the opinion itself-that is,
the comment on the facts-is not provable as true or false on the basis of
objective evidence.3" Conversely, a speaker is subject to liability for a de-
famatory charge, even if she couches the charge as her opinion and the
factual basis is known or available to the recipients, if (1) the recipient rea-
sonably construes the statement as an assertion of the charge, rather than as
mere figurative or pejorative language, and (2) the charge is provable as
or slander. The opinion may be ostensibly in the form of a factual statement if it
is clear from the context that the maker is not intending to assert another objec-
tive fact but only his personal comment on the facts which he has stated.
The pure type of expression of opinion may also occur when the maker of
the comment does not himself express the alleged facts on which he bases the ex-
pression of opinion. This happens when both parties to the communication know
the facts or assume their existence and the comment is clearly based on those as-
sumed facts and does not imply the existence of other facts in order to justify the
comment. The assumption of the facts may come about because someone else has
stated them or because they were assumed by both parties as a result of their
notoriety or otherwise.
The second kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type, is one which,
while an opinion in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding the
plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to
exist by the parties to the communication. Here the expression of the opinion
gives rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming
of the opinion expressed by the defendant. To say of a person that he is a thief
without explaining why, may, depending upon the circumstances, be found to
imply the assertion that he has committed acts that come within the common
connotation of thievery. To declare, without an indication of the basis for the
conclusion, that a person is utterly devoid of moral principles may be found to
imply the assertion that he has been guilty of conduct that would justify the
reaching of that conclusion.
Id.
32 Id.
31 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court today...
determines that a protection for statements of pure opinion is dictated by existing First
Amendment doctrine."); see also Phillips, supra note 11, at 673; Nat Stem, Defamation,
Epistemology, and the Erosion (But not Destruction) of the Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN.
L. REv. 595, 612 (1990); discussion infra part IV.A.2.
3 See discussion infra part III.B.
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false on the basis of objective evidence."
Stated another way, the Court immunized only pure, evaluative opinion.
Thus, a pure, deductive opinion, which is provable as true or false on the
basis of objective evidence, carries no immunity.a6 One asserting such an
opinion is subject to liability under the same constitutional protections that
apply to all factual assertions.
Beyond these two plausible interpretations of Milkovich, some courts
have construed it to immunize statements that are not pure opinion." Based
on a contextual or multifactor analysis, some courts treat as opinion any
statement reasonably understood as the speaker's point of view, even if
supporting facts are not stated or available to the recipients.38 Under this
interpretation, an assertion of the speaker's belief or conjecture that certain
facts are or may be true, as opposed to an assertion that the facts are true, is
a statement of opinion.a9 Another form of multifactor analysis immunizes
as opinion any statement that cannot be proved true or false by reliable evi-
dence.4" Yet a third immunizes statements that are imprecise or ambigu-
ous." These interpretations of Milkovich seem clearly erroneous.
If my interpretation is correct, the immediate significance of Milkovich
is to withhold immunity from a defamatory charge reasonably understood as
expressing the speaker's opinion that the plaintiff has committed a crime. 2
The broader significance of Milkovich is less than clear. One of the difficult
questions raised by the decision is how to determine whether a statement is
provable as false on the basis of objective evidence. A more basic question
is whether the decision strikes the proper balance between the interest in
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment and the interest in
reputation protected by the law of defamation. 3 Finally, what balance be-
3 See discussion infra part III.B.
36 See W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REv.
1221, 1249-59 (1976) (discussing the difference between deductive and evaluative opin-
ion). Dean Keeton's position is consistent with my interpretation of the Court's position
in Milkovich; see discussion infra part III.B.
" See discussion infra part IV.A.3.
38 See discussion infra part IV.A.3.
" See discussion infra part IV.A.3.
40 See discussion infra part IV.A.4.
41 See discussion infra part IV.A.5.
42 See discussion infra part III.B.
43 The Court's defamation decisions, beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), have not recognized absolute protection for defamatory speech;
rather they have balanced the interests of free speech and reputation. See discussion
infra part V.A.2. Professor Post has demonstrated, however, that the interest in reputa-
tion is not unitary. Rather, there are "three distinct concepts of reputation that the com-
mon law of defamation has at various times in its history attempted to protect: reputa-
tion as property, as honor, and as dignity." Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986).
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tween these interests should guide the Supreme Court and lower courts in
their further development of the rules regarding defamatory opinion? Al-
though some scholars argue that drawing any distinction between fact and
opinion is unsound policy," the better view is that First Amendment princi-
ples require the courts to make the distinction.4"
Commentators also decry the use of a balancing test in First Amendment
law.4' There is considerable justification for this position.47 Yet, unless one
advocates the abolition of defamation law, balancing is unavoidable." Bal-
ancing is defensible if the courts give proper priority to free speech interests
and, when there is room for error of judgment, provide adequate "breathing
Contemporary law gives little recognition to reputation as honor. Id. at 721-26. The
Gertz damages rules reflect a recognition of reputation as individual dignity, permitting
its rehabilitation. Id. at 738.
Demonstrating the difficulty of the balancing issue, at least one state court already
has extended broader protection to opinion than it believes Milkovich to require. See
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1989), recons. denied, 552
N.E.2d 179 (N.Y.), vacated, 497 U.S. 1021, adhered to, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1990)
(employing, under state law, the same standard used in the court's previous opinion),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). In its second opinion in Immuno, the New York
Court of Appeals stated: "[I]t is impossible to state with complete certainty that some of
the statements previously considered protected opinion, because of the language and
format of the speech, would not now be viewed as implied assertions of fact [under
Milkovich]." Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1277 n.3. The court held, however, that under the
broader protection for speech of New York law, all of the statements at issue were
either statements of fact not shown by the plaintiff to be false, or were statements of
opinion. Id. at 1280-82.
E.g., Phillips, supra note 11, at 648.
s See discussion infra part V.A.2.b.
46 See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 39-42 (1992).
41 Professor Smolla, for example, denounces balancing as a process in which
the weight of the speech interest is balanced against the weight of the competing
interest, and the conflict is resolved under a straightforward cost/benefit analy-
sis . . . . [T]he use of the balancing approach tends to result in relatively low
protection for speech, because when balancing is employed, speech tends to be
devalued as just another social interest to be considered in the mix. The market-
place, self-fulfillment, and self-governance rationales [for freedom of speech]
combine to make an overwhelmingly convincing case for treating freedom of
speech as a preferred value.
Id. at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
48 Professor Tribe observes: "[T]he 'balancers' are right in concluding that it is im-
possible to escape the task of weighing the competing considerations." LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 793 (2d ed. 1988). He also notes that "[tihe
question is whether the 'balance' should be struck for all cases in the process of fram-
ing particular categorical definitions, or whether the 'balance' should be calibrated anew
on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 793. Professor Tribe finds categorical rules preferable
"because they leave less room for the prejudices of the factfinder to insinuate them-
selves into a decision." Id. (footnote omitted).
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space" for the protection of First Amendment concerns.49 In defamation
law, moreover, there are nuances in the kind of balancing that may be war-
ranted. Thus, when liability penalizes the content of speech, as it does when
it burdens the criticism of governmental officials,5" the courts must give
substantial breathing space for First Amendment values; but when the objec-
tive of liability is the compensation of injury to reputation, and does not rest
on speech content, then case-by-case balancing is more easily justified.5
The intransigent problem of differentiating between fact and opinion re-
quires particularly cautious attention to the nature of the balance to be struck
" In his "Model for Freedom of Speech," for example, Professor Smolla recognizes
that "modem First Amendment jurisprudence does permit speech to be penalized when
it causes harm." SMOLLA, supra note 46, at 48. Relational harms are among those that
warrant some intrusion on freedom of speech. Id. at 40. Professor Smolla also states:
Communication is often a blend of different types of speech, posing different
types of harms and meriting varying levels of constitutional protection. Whenever
speech receiving high levels of protection is intertwined with speech receiving
lower levels of protection, regulations must utilize "breathing space" devices that
are designed to prevent the inadvertent penalizing of the more highly protected
speech.
Id. at 51. He further notes that the "breathing space" principle is reflected in the Su-
preme Court's defamation rulings requiring the proof of fault and falsity. Id. at 51-52.
"O Professor Tribe has observed: "[O]ne teaching of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
is that reputational interests are attenuated for persons who become affiliated with gov-
ernment exactly because government itself, unlike individuals, has no legitimate
reputational interest: government cannot be defamed." TRIBE, supra note 48, at 880.
51 Professor Tribe has stated:
[W]hy should the plaintiffs vulnerability or deservingness make a difference if
the freedoms of speech and press occupy a "preferred position" in the constitu-
tional scheme? One response is to interpret Gertz in light of the two ways in
which government may abridge speech. Where government aims at the content of
speech, the first amendment demands an extraordinary justification. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan was clearly a case of this type, and the rule forged in that
decision accordingly reflected the primacy of first amendment values. But where
government aims at the non-communicative impact of expressive behavior, gov-
ernment may act so long as the flow of information and ideas is not unduly con-
stricted. And, as Dun & Bradstreet made clear, the Court is especially reluctant to
limit the common law of defamation when the subject matter of the speech is
"purely private." Where the law is closely confined to the narrow purpose of
compensating private individuals for injury to their reputational interests, the law
is aimed at something other than content, at least in the sense that the objective is
unrelated to whether government approves or disapproves the content of the mes-
sage. Defamation law in this sense is ideologically neutral, and therefore is appro-
priately remitted to a "balancing" test. Because the reputational interest of the
individual is significant, and may indeed be of federal constitutional dimension,
the crucial question is the degree to which the law of defamation actually con-
strains the communication of truthful information.
Id. at 878 (footnotes omitted).
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between the competing interests, as First Amendment values lie on both
sides of the equation.52 This Article explores these and related problems.
Part II of this Article presents the factual background of the Milkovich
case. Part III discusses the opinion of the Court, comparing it with the ana-
lytical approaches of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Judge Friendly's
opinion in Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.," and Justice Brennan's
dissent in Milkovich.54 Based upon these comparisons, this Article con-
strues the Court's decision as recognizing a constitutional immunity for
"pure" evaluative opinion, but not for deductive opinion. Part IV presents
the widely divergent approaches to opinion cases that lower courts have
employed since Milkovich.
Part V analyzes some of the major issues generated by the Milkovich
decision. Section A confronts the perplexing problem of how to distinguish
between fact and opinion. Section B addresses the question whether immu-
nity for evaluative but not deductive opinion strikes the proper balance be-
tween the interests in free speech and reputation, and concludes that it does.
Section C evaluates the decisions that immunize point-of-view assertions.
Section D deals with the problem of ambiguity, which presents conflicting
dangers to First Amendment interests. On the one hand, some courts have
immunized ambiguity by treating it as opinion; this approach may immunize
the clever defamer without advancing First Amendment interests. On the
other hand, the language of persuasion often is passionate, and there is dan-
ger to First Amendment interests in allowing juries to construe ambiguous
language as factual. Section D maintains that use of a stringent fault require-
ment regarding the meaning of language would help to protect against both
of these dangers. Section D further maintains that the Court's decision in
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc." is authority for the
sound proposition that in opinion cases, the plaintiff must prove not only
falsity and fault regarding falsity, but also fault regarding the factual conno-
tation of the defendant's assertion.56
Part VI, the concluding section, discusses the precarious accommoda-
tions between speech and reputational interests that the Supreme Court's
defamation decisions have made. This portion of the Article identifies two
shortcomings in current rules. The first is that the Court has created mini-
mum, but not maximum, protections for defamatory speech. Because exces-
sive protection for defamatory speech impairs public discourse, lower courts
52 See discussion infra part V.A.2.b.
639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
54 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
56 See Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation:
Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 834-51 (1984) (arguing in addi-
tion that the plaintiff in a defamation case should be required to prove that the defen-
dant was at fault concerning the defamatory meaning of his words).
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that extend protection beyond the minimum that the Court requires provide
inadequate protection to First Amendment interests. The second shortcoming
is the lack of a forum for the vindication of reputation by a determination of
truth or falsity. Current proposals for the reform of defamation law address
this problem, but they will not provide an adequate solution if judges inter-
pret too broadly what qualifies as "opinion." In conclusion, I join others in
deploring the complexity of the law of defamation, acknowledging, howev-
er, the reality that defamation law confronts conflicting interests of vital
importance in our society. Defamation law will remain complex as the
courts strive to make the right accommodations.
II. THE MILKOVICH CASE HISTORY
The facts giving rise to Milkovich began with a fight at a high-school
wrestling match in Maple Heights, Ohio." The state high school athletic
association imposed penalties on the Maple Heights wrestling team follow-
ing a hearing on the incident. Subsequently, some Maple Heights parents
and students obtained a restraining order against the association penalties on
due process grounds. Michael Milkovich, the coach of the Maple Heights
team, and H. Don Scott, the Superintendent of the Maple Heights Public
School System, testified during both the association proceedings and the
court hearing.5" Following the court's decision, J. Theodore Diadiun, a
sports writer for the News-Herald, a local newspaper, published a column
sharply criticizing the testimony of Milkovich and Scott at the court hearing.
The headline over the column stated, "Maple beat the law with the 'big
lie," ''59 and the headline on a carryover page stated, "Diadiun says Maple
told a lie."6 Diadiun's photograph appeared below the main headline,
along with the caption, "TD Says."'" The column asserted that the lesson
the Maple Heights students had learned from the court hearing was, "If you
get in a jam, lie your way out."'62 It also asserted that "[a]nyone who at-
tended the meet, whether he [was] from Maple Heights, Mentor, or [an] im-
partial observer, [knew] in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the
hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth."63
Milkovich brought a libel action against Diadiun and the newspaper,
alleging that the headline of the article and the passages quoted above de-
famed him in that they "accused plaintiff of committing the crime of perju-
57 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 4 (citing Milkovich v. The News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320,






63 Id. at 5.
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ry, an indictable offense in the State of Ohio, and damaged plaintiff directly
in his life-time occupation of coach and teacher, and constituted libel per
se." The litigation followed a circuitous route through the Ohio courts
over a period of fifteen years.6" Finally, an Ohio Court of Appeals granted
summary judgment to the defendants" on the basis of a 1986 decision of
the Ohio Supreme Court in a related case, Scott v. News-Herald,67 which
held that the Diadiun column was constitutionally protected as opinion. In
reaching that conclusion, the court in Scott determined that the proper analy-
sis for distinguishing between fact and opinion was the four-factor, totality-
of-the-circumstances test adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Olman v. Evans."
Applying the four-factor test, the court found that the first two factors
indicated that the article constituted a verifiable charge that the plaintiff had
committed perjury; however, the last two factors indicated that the average
reader would regard the article as opinion. With regard to the first factor,
the court stated: "[T]he clear impact in some nine sentences and a caption is
that appellant 'lied at the hearing after ... having given his solemn oath to
tell the truth."' 70 With regard to the second factor, the court stated: "Wheth-
er or not [the plaintiff] did indeed perjure himself is certainly verifiable...
" As to the third factor, the court found that, viewing the article as a
whole-including the caption, "TD Says," the second heading, "Diadiun
says Maple told a lie," and Diadiun's apparent view that any position taken
by Scott and Milkovich that was less than a full admission of culpability
was a lie-"the average reader viewing the words in their internal context
would be hard pressed to accept Diadiun's statements as an impartial report-
ing of perjury. '72 As to the fourth factor, the broader context of the article,
the court found that the appearance of the article on the sports page was
significant; the court described the sports page as "a traditional haven for
cajoling, invective, and hyperbole. ' The court stated that "[o]n bal-
ance,... a reader would not expect a sports writer on the sports page to be
particularly knowledgeable about procedural due process and perjury. It is
our belief that 'legal conclusions' in such a context would probably be con-
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
65 See id. at 7-10.
Milkovich, 545 N.E.2d at 1320.
67 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
68 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); see Scott, 496
N.E.2d at 706.
69 Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 708.
73 Id.
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strued as the writer's opinion." 4
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
A. The Court's Decision-An Expansion of Constitutional Doctrine
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the important ques-
tions raised by the Ohio courts' recognition of a constitutionally required
'opinion' exception to the application of its defamation laws."" Specifical-
ly, it considered the defendants' arguments that only statements of fact are
actionable and that the Oilman four-factor test should be employed in distin-
guishing between fact and opinion." The Court rejected the defendants'
invitation to adopt a multiple factor test, holding that opinions on matters of
public concern receive sufficient protection under existing constitutional
doctrine." The Court determined that "the 'breathing space' which 'free-
doms of expression require in order to survive,' . . . is adequately secured
by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an artificial di-
chotomy between 'opinion' and fact."7
The Court identified four existing constitutional rules that secure ade-
quate protection for the expression of opinions on matters of public con-
cern.79 The first was the rule adopted in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps,80 requiring the plaintiff to prove the falsity of a defamatory state-
ment on a matter of public concern."1 The Court in Milkovich stated:
74 Id.
" Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10 (1990).
76 Id. at 9.
17 Id. at 19.
78 Id. (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)).
79 Id. at 1.
80 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
s In Hepps, the Court held that "a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of
the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation." Id. at 775 (citing
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). Hepps further held that a private figure plaintiff must prove
the falsity of a defamatory newspaper article on a matter of public concern. Id. at 776.
In Hepps, the defendant had published a series of newspaper articles asserting that the
plaintiffs had links to organized crime and that the plaintiffs had used those ties to in-
fluence the state's governmental processes. Id. at 769. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
followed the common law presumption of falsity, holding that the defendant had the
burden of proving truth. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 485 A.2d 374, 387
(Pa. 1984). The United States Supreme Court held that "the common-law presumption
that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a
media defendant for speech of public concern." Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777.
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Foremost, we think Hepps stands for the proposition that a
statement on matters of public concern must be provable as
false before there can be liability under state defamation law,
at least in situations, like the present, where a media defen-
dant is involved ... . Hepps ensures that a statement of
opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection.82
The second rule identified by the Court was that of "the Bresler-Letter
Carriers-Falwell line of cases," which protects statements that cannot rea-
sonably be understood as asserting defamatory facts about the plaintiff.3
The third rule involved the "New York Times-Butts-Gertz culpability require-
ments," under which the plaintiff must prove fault with regard to falsity, the
level of fault depending upon the status of the plaintiff as public official,
public figure, or private figure.84 The fourth was the appellate review stan-
dard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5 and reaffirmed in
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,86 under which an
82 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted). Prior to Hepps, Franklin and
Bussel had interpreted New York Times and Gertz to require that plaintiffs prove falsity.
Franklin & Bussel, supra note 56, at 855-58. They concluded that the falsity require-
ment meant that "the courts [could] discard permanently the spurious distinction be-
tween fact and opinion." Id. at 869.
83 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; see Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6 (1970) (holding that the defendants' use of the word "blackmail" could not sup-
port a finding that defendants had charged the plaintiff with the crime of blackmail,
when the only reasonable construction of the word was that it charged the plaintiff with
taking an unreasonable bargaining position); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (holding that the defendant's
use of the word "traitor" in a literary definition of a "scab" could not form the basis of
a recovery for libel under federal labor law because the word could not be construed as
a representation of fact); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding
that the First Amendment precluded recovery for intentional infliction of emotional
distress by a public figure for an advertisement parody that could not reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff).
8 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (holding that a public official plaintiff must prove knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard of the truth to recover a libel judgment against a media defendant); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (holding that a public figure plaintiff also
must prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth to recover in a libel
action against a media defendant);-.Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(holding that a private figure plaintiff must prove negligence regarding falsity to recover
in a libel action against a media defendant).
"5 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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appellate court must make an independent review of the record to ensure
that clear and convincing evidence supports a finding of actual malice when
that standard is required by the First Amendment."
Although the Court asserted that existing constitutional doctrine secures
adequate protection for defamatory opinion, the Milkovich decision in fact
expanded constitutional doctrine in two significant respects. First, the Court
broke new ground in interpreting existing rules to prohibit liability for de-
famatory opinion, on a matter of public concern, that does not contain a
provably false factual connotation. None of the cases referred to by the
Court squarely presented issues regarding defamatory opinion. Hepps, New
York Times, Butts, and Gertz developed their requirements regarding the
proof ,of falsity and fault in cases involving defamatory fact."8 Bresler and
Letter Carriers raised the question of the reasonable construction of the
allegedly defamatory language at issue. 9 In both cases, the Court held that
the language used was rhetorical hyperbole not capable of the literal mean-
ing that the plaintiffs alleged to be defamatory. Similarly in Falwell, the
jury had found for the defendants on the plaintiffs libel claim because the
ad parody at issue could not reasonably be construed in a literal sense.9'
The Court held that a public figure may not recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress without showing that the publication contained a false
statement of fact made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth.92 Although Letter Carriers and Falwell contained language recog-
nizing First Amendment protection of defamatory opinion,93 those cases
87 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
88 Hepps, 475 U.S. at 769; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 257; Butts, 388 U.S. at
135; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326.
89 Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14; Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 286.
0 See supra note 83.
9, Falwell, 485 U.S. at 49.
92 Id. at 56.
9' See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 46.
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
concern. "[T]he freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual
liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest
for truth and the vitality of society as a whole." . . . We have therefore been par-
ticularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from
governmentally imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such
thing as a "false" idea.
Id. at 50-5 1; see also Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 264.
Such words [as traitor and treason] were obviously used here in a loose, figurative
sense to demonstrate the union's strong disagreement with the views of those
workers who oppose unionization. Expression of such an opinion, even in the
most pejorative terms, is protected under federal labor law. Here, too, "there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
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involved the kind of insulting or pejorative "name calling" that traditionally
has not been regarded as defamatory. 94 Thus, the application of these deci-
sions to preclude liability for defamatory opinion extends their reach.
Second, the Court delineated, to a degree, the line between fact and
opinion.9' Milkovich did not draw a very bright line; however, it is clear
enough to indicate that the Court's standard for holding that a statement is
protected opinion, as a matter of law, is narrower than that of Olman v.
Evans.96 The relevant portion of the Court's opinion began with the much-
quoted dictum in Gertz.9' The Court rejected the notion that this language
was intended to create a broad immunity for opinion.98 Adopting Judge
Friendly's interpretation of this dictum in Cianci v. New Times Publishing
Co.," the Court stated that the language was merely an expression of Jus-
tice Holmes's "market place of ideas" theory.'00 This origin of the passage,
Judge Friendly said, "points strongly to the view that the 'opinions' held to
be constitutionally protected were the sort of thing that could be corrected
by discussion. '"'0 The Court stated:
Thus, we do not think this passage from Gertz was intended
to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that
might be labeled "opinion" . . . . Not only would such an
interpretation be contrary to the tenor and context of the
passage, but it would also ignore the fact that expressions of
"opinion" may often imply an assertion of objective fact.0 2
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the compe-
tition of other ideas."
Id. at 284.
94 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 776
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. e (1977).
" Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
96 Of course, state courts are free to immunize statements they regard as opinion
under state constitutional or common law rules, even if the statements would not be
protected opinion under Milkovich. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42
(1983) ("The principle that we will not review judgments of state courts that rest on
adequate and independent state grounds is based, in part, on 'the limitations of our own
jurisdiction."'). In Milkovich, the Court rejected the defendants' argument "that certain
statements made by the court evidenced an intent to independently rest the decision on
state law grounds... ." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 11 n.5. The Court noted "that the Ohio
Supreme Court remains free, of course, to address all of the foregoing [state law] issues
on remand." Id. at 12.
9' Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-18; see supra text accompanying note 1.
98 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
99 639 F.2d 54, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980).
1- Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
1o1 Cianci, 639 F.2d at 62 n.10, quoted in Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
12 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
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In what may be its most important passage on the fact-opinion distinction,
the Court next addressed what language, couched as opinion, may involve
an assertion of fact:
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he
implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion
that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts
upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either in-
correct or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is errone-
ous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact.
Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does
not dispel these implications; and the statement, "In my
opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to repu-
tation as the statement, "Jones is a liar." As Judge Friendly
aptly stated: "[It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a
writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory
conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words
'I think."' . . . . It is worthy of note that at common law,
even the privilege of fair comment did not extend to "a false
statement of fact, whether it was expressly stated or implied
from an expression of opinion." ''"3
The Court compared the statement, "In my opinion Jones is a liar," with a
statement that would be protected as opinion:
[U]nlike the statement, "In my opinion Mayor Jones is a
liar," the statement, "In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his
abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and
Lenin," would not be actionable. Hepps ensures that a state-
ment of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will
receive full constitutional protection) °4
Turning to the facts of Milkovich, the Court employed a two-step anal-
ysis. First the Court stated: "The dispositive question in the present case ...
[is] whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the
Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured him-
self in a judicial proceeding." ' 5 The Court resolved this issue in the
plaintiffs favor, relying on the Ohio Supreme Court's finding that "the clear
03 Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
566 cmt. a).
4 Id. at 20.
"05 Id. at 21.
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impact in some nine sentences and a caption is that [Milkovich] 'lied at the
hearing after ... having given his solemn oath to tell the truth."" 6 The
Court added that "[t]his is not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously
maintaining petitioner committed the crime of perjury. Nor does the general
tenor of the article negate this impression.' 0 7
The second question the Court addressed was whether "the connotation
that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of
being proved true or false."'0 8 Again, the Court resolved the issue in the
plaintiffs favor:
A determination of whether petitioner lied in this instance
can be made on a core of objective evidence by comparing,
inter alia, petitioner's testimony before the OHSAA board
with his subsequent testimony before the trial court. As the
Scott court noted regarding the plaintiff in that case:
"[W]hether or not H. Don Scott did indeed perjure himself is
certainly verifiable in a perjury action with evidence adduced
from the transcripts and witnesses present at the hearing.
Unlike a subjective assertion the averred defamatory lan-
guage is an articulation of an objectively verifiable event."
So too with petitioner Milkovich. °9
The Court did not expound on the justifications for its holding. It merely
noted that its decisions have recognized both "the [First] Amendment's vital
guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues" and the "'im-
portant social values which underlie the law of defamation,' [recognizing]
that '[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redress-
ing attacks upon reputation.""'0 The Court determined that its "decision in
Id. (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio 1986)).
17 Id. at 21.
108 Id.
"o Id. at 21-22 (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707).
"o Id. at 22 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966)). The Court contin-
ued:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified inva-
sion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty . . . . The destruction that defamatory falsehood can
bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to redeem. Yet, imper-
fect though it is, an action for damages is the only hope for vindication or redress
the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely dishonored.
Id. at 22-23 (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92-93 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
1994] 485
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the present case holds the balance true."' ..
The Court reversed and remanded the case "for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion."". On remand, the Court of Appeals of
Ohio remanded the case for trial, holding that "the Ohio Constitution does
not afford greater protection to 'opinion' than the [F]ederal Constitu-
tion. '
B. The Meaning of the Fact/Opinion Distinction in Milkovich
The Court's demarcation between fact and opinion in Milkovich may
raise as many questions as it answers. Three sources, however, help to clari-
fy the Court's general statements about the fact/opinion dichotomy and its
application of those generalities to the facts of Milkovich. First, section 566
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, cited by the Court,"4 is useful be-
cause in one respect the Court's analysis resembles that of the Restatement;
in other respects, however, it differs. Second, Judge Friendly's decision in
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.," 5 cited several times in
Milkovich,"6 dealt with the fact/opinion distinction in a case somewhat
similar to Milkovich. The key to understanding the fact/opinion distinction
adopted by the Court in Milkovich appears to lie in Judge Friendly's anal-
ysis in Cianci. Third, Justice Brennan's dissent in Milkovich is instructive
because his analysis contrasts with that of the majority. Justice Brennan
stated that he agreed with the Court on the rules that should be applied in
the case, but disagreed on how those rules applied to the facts.' More
likely, however, the real disagreement was over the rules; Justice Brennan
followed the analytical scheme of the Restatement, while the majority fol-
lowed that of Judge Friendly in Cianci.
1. The Court's Analysis Compared with that of the Restatement
Under section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, opinion is ac-
tionable "only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as
" Id. at 23.
112 Id.
13 Milkovich v. News-Herald, 591 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
,14 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
"5 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
16 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
"7 Id. at 23-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the basis for the opinion.""' 8 The drafters of this section assumed that the
Gertz dictum established First Amendment immunity for defamatory opin-
ion."9 Although Milkovich took a narrow view of that dictum, the Restate-
ment provision is instructive, given the holding in Milkovich that opinion is
actionable if it "contain[s] a provably false factual connotation."'' 0 The Re-
statement provision is useful, too, because it reflects a long-standing com-
mon law concept that is a part of traditional fair-comment doctrine.'
Thus, in 1933 Professor Fowler Harper noted that "[e]ven opinion is sus-
ceptible of being stated in such a manner as to directly imply a factual basis
and if it is so stated, the defense of fair comment is not applicable."'2
The protection of defamatory opinion stated with its factual predicate
derives from cogent policy considerations:
If the actual facts are accurately stated, an opinion based
thereon will be understood as such and taken for what it is
worth. In such a case the writer may, by expressing his opin-
ion, "libel himself rather than the subject of his remarks."
But if the facts are misstated, the subject of his remarks is at
the writer's mercy, and a defamatory opinion, unless proper-
ly labeled, may have the effect of a statement of fact.
As a corollary to the foregoing rule, it follows that to
"8 Entitled "Expressions of Opinion," section 566 states, "[a] defamatory commu-
nication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this
nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as
the basis for the opinion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
"' See id. § 566 cmt. c.
120 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
,21 There are two views on the common law requirement for a disclosed factual pred-
icate. Under one view, the requirement constitutes the "fairness" element of the privi-
lege of fair comment. Whether there is a sufficient relation between the facts and the
inference stated is tested by asking the factfinder whether "a fair minded man in good
faith [could] have held the opinion expressed having regard to such of the facts referred
to in [the defendant's statement] as proved." See Broadway Approvals, Ltd. v. Odhams
Press, Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 805, 811 (Court of Appeal, 1965); see also Coleman v. Newark
Morning Ledger Co., 149 A.2d 193, 206 (N.J. 1959) ("[T]he relevant questions [are]
whether (a) the subject matter was indicated with sufficient clarity to justify comment
being made, and (b) the comment actually made was such as an honest, though preju-
diced, man might make."). The Restatement approach, however, reflects the view of
Professor Fowler Harper, the Associate Reporter for the defamation portion of the Re-
statement, that, unless the speaker states the factual predicate for the viewpoint ex-
pressed, the speaker's statement is not comment or opinion at all. See infra note 123.
However the requirement for a factual predicate is characterized, it is a long-standing
requirement of the fair comment privilege.
122 FOWLER HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 543 (1933) (footnote omit-
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constitute genuine comment, criticism or expression of opin-
ion must give the facts upon which it is based. Otherwise,
the opinion would directly imply facts to reasonably and
fairly support it and thus amount to a false statement of fact.
To determine whether a writer is libeling himself or someone
else by his expression of opinion, it is. obviously necessary to
know the facts upon which his comment or opinion is
based.'23
2 Id. at 543-44 (quoting Popham v. Pickbum (1862), 7 H. & N. 891, 158 Eng. Rep.
730, 733, per Wilde, B.). Harper elaborates on this point in the following passages:
And the facts must not be so confused and mixed with opinion and com-
ment that the reader can not distinguish them. "The justice of this rule is obvi-
ous," said Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in an English case, "if the facts are stated sepa-
rately and the comment appears as an inference drawn from these facts, any in-
justice that it might do will be to some extent negatived by the reader seeing the
grounds upon which the unfavorable inference is based. But if the fact and com-
ment be intermingled so that it is not reasonably clear what portion purports to be
inference, he will naturally suppose that the injurious statements are based on
adequate grounds known to the writer though not necessarily set out by him. In
the one case the insufficiency of the facts to support the inference will lead
fairminded men to reject the inference. In the other case it merely-points to the
existence of extrinsic facts which the writer considers to warrant the language he
uses.
Again, there must be a satisfactory relation between the facts, truly and
accurately stated, and the inference or comment made thereon. This requirement
is a bit vague and has been formulated in various ways by the judges. Cockbum,
C.J., in a leading case, said that the comment must be such that "a jury shall say
that the criticism was not only honest, but also well founded." Kennedy, J., said
that the criticism must be "warranted" by the facts. A "reasonable inference" from
those facts is the formula laid down by Lord Atkinson. According to Buckley,
L.J., the test is whether the comment was, in the opinion of the jury, "beyond that
which a fair man, however extreme might be his views in the matter, might make
honestly and without malice, and was not without foundation."
It seems clear that the jury is not to substitute its judgment on the matter in
controversy for that of the defendant, and exclude from the immunity of "fair"
comment all criticism with which it disagrees. The only requirement that seems
necessary is that the inference or criticism be susceptible, as a matter of logic and
experience in the view of the jurors, of being drawn from the facts stated. "That
is to say, it must not introduce new and independent defamatory matter, or draw
inferences or conclusions wholly irrelevant, or out of all proportion to the given
facts which supply the basis of comment." It is thus seen that whether the infer-
ences are related to the facts stated sufficiently to make them fair comment, really
goes to the question of whether or not they constitute comment at all, for if the
inferences are not so deducible from the facts, they are, so far as their effect upon
the mind of the reader is concerned, imputations of such a character as to consti-
tute communications of fact and not criticism. "In so far as facts are assumed as
the basis of the criticism, or untrue allegations of fact are introduced in the course
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Thus, the policy justification for immunizing "fair" comment is that the
expression of opinion on matters of public concern has social value in dem-
ocratic discourse when the opinion-an inference from facts-is stated
along with its factual predicate. In this situation, the recipients of the com-
munication can judge for themselves the soundness of the speaker's view-
point; on these terms, the values of intelligent debate are sufficiently ad-
vanced to outweigh any damage to the subject of the remarks. In addition,
the damage inflicted is only in proportion to the recipients' judgment on the
soundness of the opinion, given its factual basis; consequently, the speaker
may "libel himself rather than the subject of his remarks.' 24 In contrast, a
defamatory opinion unaccompanied by a factual predicate lacks sufficient
social value in advancing intelligent debate to offset the reputational damage
it may inflict.'25
Milkovich adopts the Restatement view that opinion is not protected if it
asserts or implies underlying defamatory facts.'26 Unlike the Restatement,
however, Milkovich does not state that the speaker's inference or conclusion
is protected as long as the factual predicate is given. Milkovich did not ana-
lyze Diadiun's article to determine (1) whether a reasonable reader would
understand his charge of perjury to be offered as his opinion, rather than an
assertion of fact, or (2) whether the author presented a sufficient factual
predicate to enable the readers to judge for themselves the soundness of
Diadiun's conclusion. Once the Court decided that Diadiun's statement
of it, or personal imputations are made out arising out of it, the pretended criti-
cism is not criticism at all. It is not a question of its title to the epithet 'fair,' or
to any other epithet; it does not answer to the description of comment, and is
defamation, pure and simple."
Id. at 544-45 (footnotes omitted).
24 Popham v. Pickburn (1862), 7 H. & N. 891, 898, 158 Eng. Rep. 730, 733, per
Wilde, B., quoted in HARPER, supra note 122, at 544.
'25 In Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985), the court took issue with the Restatement view that opinion is protected only if
the factual predicate for the opinion is made clear by the speaker:
[F]actors besides the disclosure of facts are relevant in determining whether a
statement implies factual allegations to the reasonable reader. Here, for in-
stance ... that the statements challenged by Professor Ollman were found in a
column on the Op-Ed page suggests, among other factors, that the statements
would be understood by the reasonable reader as opinion--even in the absence of
full disclosure of facts signalling to the reader that the allegedly defamatory state-
ment was a characterization. In a word, disclosure of facts in the surrounding text
is not the only signal that hard facts cannot reasonably be inferred from a state-
ment. We think that our four-factor test takes account of the insights provided by
section 566, while not rejecting the other factors that may signal that a statement
is to be read as opinion.
Id. at 985 (footnote omitted).
126 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14.
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could be understood as "an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured
himself in a judicial proceeding," rather than "the sort of loose, figurative,
or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the writer
was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the crime of perjury,"
the only question left to decide was whether the assertion was "sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false."'2 7
Clearly the Court did not intend to immunize the statement of an opin-
ion, even if the factual predicate were sufficient to permit the recipients to
judge the soundness of the inference, if the inference could be proved false
on the basis of objective evidence. Thus, the Court stated:
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he
implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion
that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts
upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either in-
correct or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is errone-
ous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact.
Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does
not dispel these implications; and the statement, "In my
opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to repu-
tation as the statement, "Jones is a liar." As Judge Friendly
aptly stated: "[It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a
writer could escape liability for accusations of [defamatory
conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words
'I think.""128
Here the Court seems to be saying that, even if the speaker made a defama-
tory charge couched as opinion and stated the facts upon which the opinion
was based, the speaker nevertheless is subject to liability if (1) the factfinder
reasonably could find that the speaker was not using merely figurative or
hyperbolic language, but was asserting his belief that the plaintiff had en-
gaged in the conduct charged, and (2) the speaker's assessment of the facts
(her inference from them) was erroneous. The assessment would be "errone-
ous" if it could be proved false on the basis of objective evidence. This
position differs from that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.19
127 Id. at 21.
28 Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
29 The commentary to section 566 does not state any requirement that the speaker's
comment must not be provable as true or false to qualify as opinion. Moreover, illustra-
tion four in the commentary suggests the contrary:
A writes to B about his neighbor C: "He moved in six months ago. He works
downtown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in his backyard
around 5:30 seated in a deck chair with a portable radio listening to a news
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The Court's illustration of the type of opinion that would receive First
Amendment protection is consistent with this view of the Court's approach.
The Court stated:
[U]nlike the statement, "In my opinion Mayor Jones is a
liar," the statement, "In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his
abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and
Lenin," would not be actionable. Hepps ensures that a state-
ment of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will
receive full constitutional protection. 30
The Court's example of protected opinion is the assertion that Mayor Jones
is abysmally ignorant. The factual predicate is that Mayor Jones accepts the
teachings of Marx and Lenin. The charge of abysmal ignorance is not
provably true or false. It is similar to the language at issue in Bresler, Letter
Carriers, and Falwell; in context, the charge is rhetorical hyperbole or mere
name-calling, rather than a literal charge of ignorance. It is different in
character from a charge of perjury, which has a "provably false factual con-
notation." 3'
2. The Court's Analysis Compared with that of Judge Friendly in Cianci v.
New Times Publishing Co.'32
The conclusion that Milkovich recognizes a narrower immunity for opin-
ion than does the Restatement finds support in the Court's references to
Judge Friendly's decision in Cianci. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a
newspaper article charged him with the crimes of rape and obstruction of
broadcast, and with a drink in his hand. I think he must be an alcoholic." The
statement indicates the facts on which the expression of opinion was based and
does not imply others. These facts are not defamatory and A is not liable for defa-
mation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 4 (1977). Arguably at least, whether
one is an alcoholic is provable as true or false. See Olman, 750 F.2d at 986 n.31
("Whether A is an 'alcoholic,' as the term is commonly understood, is capable of being
proven true or false through the submission to a trier of fact of evidence of A's actions
and conditions at various times in A's life, coupled presumably with expert testimo-
ny."); Haworth v. Feigon, 623 A.2d 150, 156-57 (Me. 1993) (holding jury could find
that the statement, "I hear you hired the drunk," had a factual connotation and bore the
defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff).
3' Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
131 Id.
132 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
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justice."3 At the time of publication, the plaintiff was seeking reelection as
mayor. 4 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground, among
others, that any defamatory implications in the article were protected as
opinion.3 In an opinion written by Judge Friendly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.'36 Judge
Friendly first rejected the contention that immunity was conferred by the
dictum in Gertz: "A statement that Cianci raped Redlick at gunpoint twelve
years ago and then paid her in an effort to obstruct justice falls within the
Court's explication of false statements of fact rather than its illustrations of
false ideas where public debate is the best solvent."'3 7 He stated that
"when an 'opinion' is something more than a generally derogatory remark
but is laden with factual content, such as charging the commission of seri-
ous crimes, the First Amendment confers no absolute immunity."'38 He
further stated:
Almost any charge of crime, unless made by an observer and
sometimes even by him ... is by necessity a statement of
opinion. It would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer
could escape liability for accusations of crime simply by
using, explicitly or implicitly, the words "I think."'39
... Id. at 57.
134 Id. at 58.
'3' Id. at 59.
136 Id. at 54.
'3" Id. at 62.
138 Id. at 63. Judge Friendly observed that decisions by the highest courts of both
New York and California were consistent with this conclusion. He stated:
In Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., [366 N.E.2d 1299 (N.Y. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977)], plaintiff, a state court judge, charged defen-
dants with libel in writing and publishing a book which charged the judge with
being corrupt and incompetent and advocated his removal from office. The court
ruled that the charge of incompetence and the advocacy of the judge's removal
were protected as statements of opinion, but the charge of corruption was not:
Accusations of criminal activity, even in the form of opinion, are not con-
stitutionally protected. . . . While inquiry into motivation is within the
scope of absolute privilege, outright charges of illegal conduct, if false, are
protected solely by the actual malice test; As noted by the Supreme Court
of California, there is a critical distinction between opinions which attribute
improper motives to a public officer and accusation, in whatever form, that
an individual has committed a crime or is personally dishonest. No First
Amendment protection enfolds false charges of criminal behavior. [Id. at
1307 (citing Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 552 P.2d 425 (Cal.
1976))].
Cianci, 639 F.2d at 63.
"' Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64 (footnote omitted).
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In passages resembling the Court's analysis in Milkovich, Judge Friendly
then elaborated on the limits upon any First Amendment immunity for opin-
ion:
The principle of the Greenbelt-Letter Carriers-Gertz
trilogy, of our own Buckley decision, and of the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Rinaldi is (1) that a pejorative
statement of opinion concerning a public figure generally is
constitutionally protected, quite apart from Sullivan, no mat-
ter how vigorously expressed; (2) that this principle applies
even when the statement includes a term which could refer
to criminal conduct if the term could not reasonably be so
understood in context; but (3) that the principle does not
cover a charge which could reasonably be understood as
imputing specific criminal or other wrongful acts.
It is clear from the foregoing that even if the article were
to be read as only expressing the "opinion" that Cianci com-
mitted the crimes of rape and obstruction of justice, it is not
absolutely protected as distinguished from the protection
afforded by Sullivan. The charges of rape and obstruction of
justice were not employed in a "loose, figurative sense" or as
"rhetorical hyperbole." A jury could find that the effect of
the article was not simply to convey the idea that Cianci was
a bad man unworthy of the confidence of the voters of Prov-
idence but rather to produce a specific image of depraved
conduct.... To call such charges merely an expression of
"opinion" would be to indulge in Humpty-Dumpty's use of
language. We see not the slightest indication that the Su-
preme Court or this court ever intended anything of this sort
and much to demonstrate the contrary. 4°
Further rejecting the defendant's argument that the opinion should be
protected under the rule stated in section 566 of the Restatement, Judge
Friendly stated:
While the disclosure of factual background may indicate
whether a particular word constituted a direct charge of
crime or a looser protected opinion, as with "blackmail" in
Greenbelt or "traitor" in Letter Carriers, nothing in those
cases nor in our own Buckley and Hotchner decisions sug-
gests that such disclosure would protect as opinion a direct
'~ Id. (emphasis added).
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accusation of criminal misconduct.'4'
He also rejected the contention that the common law privilege of fair com-
ment warranted dismissal of the complaint, because that privilege applied
only if the stated factual basis for the opinion were true or privileged. 42
The plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to prove his claims that the
article contained numerous defamatory facts that were made with knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. In addition, however, Judge
Friendly went on to state:
Moreover it is unlikely that an expression in the form of
"I think Cianci raped Redick at gunpoint" would be consid-
ered a "comment" so as to come within the fair comment
privilege. It is far from the usual sort of evaluative judgment
with which the privilege has traditionally been concerned.
Contrast Restatement, First, Torts § 607, illustration 1 (police
chief unfit for office); illustration 2 (magistrate criticized for
fixing high bail); illustration 3 (quality of work by contractor
on public streets criticized); illustration 4 (European dictator
criticized for acts which impair world peace). The problems
with an extension of the privilege of fair comment to include
specific allegations of fact were articulated long ago and
have not lost their validity:
Were such an objection to be sustained to an action
for slanderous words, it would be easy for one who de-
signed to injure the character of another to effect his
malicious purpose without incurring any responsibility.
By circulating the slander, clothed in expression of opin-
ion or belief, he might destroy the fairest reputation with
impunity. But the law will not permit an injury to charac-
ter to be without remedy by such an artifice as this.
Whatever may be the mode of expression used, if an
assertion of guilt is implied or intended, the words will
be actionable. Logan v. Steele, 1 Bibb. 593, 595 (Ky.
1809) .... See also P. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom
of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1221, 1254 (1976) (arguing
that when fault with respect to the truth or falsity of the
defamatory matter published is a prerequisite to recovery
"[a]ny charge of specific misconduct or defamatory fact
should be treated as a statement of fact regardless of
whether the publisher conveys his deductive opinion
14 Id. at 65.
142 Id. at 66.
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alone or with the information to support it."). 43
In summary, Judge Friendly took the position that a statement asserting
as an opinion that another has engaged in criminal conduct does not qualify
as opinion for the purpose of a First Amendment immunity or the common
law privilege of fair comment, whether or not the factual basis for the opin-
ion is stated along with the opinion. Judge Friendly's justification for this
conclusion was that immunizing an opinion that another has committed a
crime would be "destructive of the law of libel;" virtually all criminal accu-
sations could be immunized under this approach.'" The basic implications
are that a charge of criminal conduct, whether couched as a statement of
fact or an expression of opinion, has the potential for great damage to repu-
tation, and the policies underlying the immunization of opinion do not out-
weigh the plaintiffs interest in reputation when an "opinion" of this sort is
expressed. Essentially, Judge Friendly's analysis is based on Dean Keeton's
distinction between pure evaluative opinion, which carries immunity, and
deductive opinion, which does not.4 '
Judge Friendly's analysis in Cianci is consistent with my interpretation
of the Court's opinion in Milkovich. The opinion of the Court in Milkovich
is not as clear as Judge Friendly's opinion in Cianci. Nevertheless, the
Court's reliance on Cianci reinforces the conclusion that the Court did not
intend to immunize a statement of a belief that the plaintiff had committed
perjury, even if the factual predicate for the belief was stated along with the
,,opinion. '
143 Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added).
'4 Id. at 64.
145 See Keeton, supra note 36, at 1221.
'" In Milkovich, the Court referred to Cianci on two points. First, the Court adopted
the view expressed by Judge Friendly in Cianci that the Gertz dictum was not "intended
to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opin-
ion."' Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990). The Court agreed with
Judge Friendly that the dictum "was merely a reiteration of Justice Holmes' classic
'marketplace of ideas' concept." Id. Second, the Court cited Cianci in the following
passage:
Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts
are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the
statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such state-
ments in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement,
"In my opinion Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to reputation as the
statement, "Jones is a liar." As Judge Friendly aptly stated: "[It] would be de-
structive of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of
[defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I
think."'
Id. at 18-19; see Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64. Citation to Cianci in this passage at least sug-
gests approval of Cianci's holding that an expression of an opinion that the plaintiff has
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3. The Court's Analysis Compared with that of Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined, employed an
analysis consistent with that of the Restatement and inconsistent with that of
Judge Friendly in Cianci. Justice Brennan cited with approval section 566 of
the Restatement and an illustration set forth in the commentary.'47 That
illustration involved the speaker's stated conclusion that C "must be an
alcoholic," together with the factual basis for the conclusion. 48 The Re-
statement took the position that A's opinion or conclusion that C "must be
an alcoholic" is protected opinion. Arguably, however, whether C is an
alcoholic is provable as true or false. 49 In addition, Justice Brennan pre-
sented a hypothetical of his own in which the speaker states "I think Jones
lied about his age just now," as well as the factual predicate for his be-
lief.50 Clearly, whether Jones lied about his age would be provable as true
or false. Justice Brennan, however, regarded this statement as protected
opinion. He took the position that the only fact implied by the speaker was,
not that Jones had lied, but rather that the speaker had drawn the inference
that Jones had lied.' He further stated that "Jones cannot recover for def-
amation for the statement 'I think Jones lied about his age just now' by pro-
committed a crime is not immune just because the factual predicate for the opinion is
disclosed.
147 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 27 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the illustration, see supra note 129.
9 See supra note 129.
150 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he statement that "Jones is a liar," or the example given by the majority, "In
my opinion John Jones is a liar"-standing alone-can reasonably be interpreted
as implying that there are facts known to the speaker to cause him to form such
an opinion .... But a different result must obtain if the speaker's comments had
instead been as follows: "Jones' brother once lied to me; Jones just told me he
was 25; I've never met Jones before and I don't actually know how old he is or
anything else about him, but he looks 16; I think Jones lied about his age just
now." In the latter case, there are at least six statements, two of which may argu-
ably be actionable. The first such statement is factual and defamatory and may
support a defamation action by Jones' brother. The second statement, however,
that "I think Jones lied about his age just now," can be reasonably interpreted in
context only as a statement that the speaker infers, from the facts stated, that
Jones told a particular lie. It is clear to the listener that the speaker does not actu-
ally know whether Jones lied and does not have any other reasons for thinking he
did. Thus, the only fact implied by the second statement is that the speaker drew
this inference. If the inference is sincere or nondefamatory, the speaker is not lia-
ble for damages.
Id., 497 U.S. at 26-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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ducing proof that he did not lie about his age because ... he would have
proved the wrong assertion false. The assertion Jones must prove false is
that the speaker had, in fact, drawn the inference that Jones lied."1"2 The
majority disagreed, taking the position that the issue of falsity relates to the
defamatory facts implied by a statement.'" The majority has the sounder
linguistic position on this issue.1
54
Turning to the facts of Milkovich, Justice Brennan thoroughly analyzed
Diadiun's column, concluding that reasonable readers could understand only
that Diadiun was expressing his belief that Milkovich lied at the court hear-
ing, and that the belief was based upon facts disclosed in the article."'
The readers could evaluate the merits of the author's conclusions; conse-
quently, there was no assertion or implication of fact that Milkovich had
committed perjury.5 6
This analysis is consistent with that of the Restatement but inconsistent
with that of the Court.'57 It appears, however, that Justice Brennan miscon-
strued the thrust of the Court's opinion. In the following passage, he noted
the point at which he believed that he and the Court had diverged:
The majority does not rest its decision today on any
finding that the statements at issue explicitly state a false and
defamatory fact. Nor could it. Diadiun's assumption that
Milkovich must have lied at the court hearing is patently
conjecture. The majority finds Diadiun's statements action-
able, however, because it concludes that these statements
imply a factual assertion that Milkovich perjured himself at
the judicial proceeding. I disagree. Diadiun not only reveals
the facts upon which he is relying but he makes it clear at
which point he runs out of facts and is simply guessing.
Read in context, the statements cannot reasonably be inter-
152 Id. at 27-28 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
... The Court stated:
We note that the issue of falsity relates to the defamatory facts implied by a state-
ment. For instance, the statement, "I think Jones lied," may be provable as false
on two levels. First, that the speaker really did not think Jones had lied but said it
anyway, and second that Jones really had not lied. It is, of course, the second
level of falsity which would ordinarily serve as the basis for a defamation action,
though falsity at the first level may serve to establish malice where that is re-
quired for recovery.
Id. at 20 n.7.
" See discussion infra part V.C.
'" Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 28-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5 See discussion supra part III.B. 1.
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preted as implying such an assertion as fact.158
This passage suggests that Justice Brennan thought that the Court agreed
with him that the assertion of a belief that Milkovich committed perjury, to-
gether with the factual basis for that belief, would be protected speech.
More likely, however, the Court held that a statement of a belief that one
committed perjury is simply not protected as opinion, whether or not the
factual predicate was stated; as long as the statement was understood as "an
assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceed-
ing,"'59 it did not matter whether the "assertion" was one of belief or
known fact. Diadiun would be immune from liability only if the statement
was "the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would ne-
gate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining [his beliefj that
petitioner committed the crime of pejury.'"'6
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that Milkovich held that constitu-
tional immunity for the expression of a defamatory opinion on a matter of
public concern exists only if (1) the speaker does not imply the existence of
undisclosed facts as the basis for the opinion, and (2) the opinion itself is
not provable as true or false on the basis of objective evidence. Conversely,
a speaker is subject to liability for a defamatory charge, even if she couches
the charge as her opinion and the factual basis is known or available to the
recipients, if (1) the recipient reasonably construes the statement as an as-
sertion of the charge, rather than as mere figurative or pejorative language,
and (2) the charge is provable as false on the basis of objective evidence.
IV. THE LOWER COURTS' TREATMENT OF OPINION SINCE MILKOVICH
Since Milkovich, the lower courts' decisions in opinion cases fall
roughly into eight categories: (1) applications of the Milkovich holding that
statements are actionable if they state or imply false statements of fact; (2)
applications of the Restatement pure opinion rule, without distinguishing
between deductive and evaluative opinions; (3) the use of a multifactor
analysis that, expressly or by implication, immunizes statements reasonably
understood as expressing the speaker's point of view, even if supporting
facts are not stated or available to the recipients; (4) use of a multifactor
analysis that immunizes statements because reliable evidence is unavailable
on the issue of falsity; (5) use of a multifactor analysis that immunizes am-
biguous statements; (6) use of a multifactor analysis to hold that statements
are factual; (7) the immunization of hyperbole and invective; and, (8)
conclusory holdings that statements are opinion, without accompanying anal-
15 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 21.
160 Id.
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ysis. Some cases fall into more than one of these categories, and for some
the category is uncertain because of the brevity of the analysis. In addition,
a given state's decisions may fall into more than one category.
A. The Eight Categories of Lower Court Decisions Since Milkovich
1. Applications of the Milkovich Holding that Statements are Actionable if
they State or Imply False Statements of Fact
Some of the lower court decisions are uncontroversial applications of the
Milkovich holding that statements are actionable if they state or imply false
statements of fact.16' In addition, an Illinois intermediate appellate court
and the Supreme Court of Maine have rendered decisions consistent with
Milkovich by applying state law. 62 A United States District Court appears
to have held that a pure deductive opinion is actionable under
Milkovich.63 Finally, the Supreme Courts of Arizona and Wyoming have
made questionable holdings that the statements at issue were factual under
Milkovich.'
In Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 6 ' relying on
Milkovich,'" the Texas Court of Appeals stated:
Wilde's statements that Tucker was going to lose his
stockbroker's license, was in big trouble with the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and would never work
again as a stockbroker are statements of fact which were
.61 Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
961 (1991); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990); In re
Thompson, 162 B.R. 748 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993); Edwards v. Hall, 285 Cal. Rptr.
810 (Ct. App. 1991); Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos., 283 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Ct.
App. 1991); Gill v. Hughes, 278 Cal. Rptr. 306 (Ct. App. 1991); Florida Medical Cen-
ter, Inc. v. New York Post Co., 568 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Eidson v.
Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Beasley v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Centralia,
558 N.E.2d 677 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Benner v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 16
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Wellman v. Fox, 825 P.2d 208 (Nev.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68
(1992); Jacobs v. Frank, 573 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1991); Petula v. Mellody, 588 A.2d 103
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
162 Rosner v. Field Enters., Inc., 564 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Lester v. Pow-
ers, 596 A.2d 65 (Me. 1991).
163 Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
'" Yetman v. English, 811 P.2d 323 (Ariz. 1991) (en banc); Spence v. Flynt, 816
P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992).
165 806 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
'" See id. at 920.
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capable of damaging Tucker's reputation as a stock broker.
Even assuming, that the statements could be character-
ized as opinion, the statements clearly imply the existence of
undisclosed facts that Tucker had engaged in serious miscon-
duct, which adversely reflected upon his reputation and fit-
ness as a stockbroker.
16 7
In Unelko Corp. v. Rooney,'68 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Andy Rooney's statements on "60 Minutes" that defendant's
product "didn't work" were statements of fact susceptible of being proved
true or false under Milkovich, despite the humorous tenor of the broad-
cast.'69 The court further held, however, that plaintiff had produced insuffi-
cient evidence of substantial falsity to survive the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 7 1
In Gill v. Hughes,'"' the California Court of Appeals, applying
Milkovich,77 held that the "statement that plaintiff 'is an incompetent sur-
geon and needs more training' implies a knowledge of facts which lead to
this conclusion and further is susceptible of being proved true or false.""'
The court further held, however, that the truth of the statement had been
determined in a separate writ proceeding; consequently, the trial court did
not err in dismissing the complaint.' 7
Other cases fall into this category as well. ' At least two cases holding
167 Id. at 921.
'" 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
'69 Id. at 1052-55.
170 Id. at 1055-57.
' 278 Cal. Rptr. 306 (Ct. App. 1991).
172 Id. at 311.
173 Id.
174 Id.
"' See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The
assertions that someone used illegal drugs and that he engaged in illegal activity such as
bribery-whether express or implied-are 'articulation[s] of ... objectively verifiable
event[s]."') (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21); In re Thompson, 162 B.R. 748, 768-72
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that a charge of child abuse, unaccompanied by a
full and accurate account of the bases for the charge, is actionable and that failure to
provide an accurate account constituted negligence); Edwards v. Hall, 285 Cal. Rptr.
810, 818-20 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that assertions made by Arsenio Hall that the
president of a branch of the NAACP was an "extortionist" and that he had requested a
$40,000 donation in exchange for not criticizing employment practices of The Arsenio
Hall Show were actionable under Milkovich); Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
283 Cal. Rptr. 644, 648, 652 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that in broadcasts about
defendants' sale of antique candelabra to a museum, implications that defendant had
sold stolen goods, misrepresented their condition, and generally defrauded museum were
factual charges and unprotected even if couched in terms of conjecture or inquiry);
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that assertions state or imply defamatory facts rely on the Restatement rule
of pure opinion or state precedents consistent with Milkovich.176
A United States District Court has rendered a decision that some might
find controversial. Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,""
involved charges made by Patricia Ireland, then Vice-President of NOW, at
Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. New York Post Co., 568 So. 2d 454, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) ("[T]he statements that the hospital is robbing the insurance company attrib-
utes to the hospital dishonesty in taking the insurance company's money through im-
proper billing and other hospital procedures. This is also a statement subject to proof of
truth or falsity.") (applying Milkovich); Eidson v. Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that a charge that plaintiff city attorney had given tapes of private
conversation to newspaper and that consequently he should be prosecuted and barred
from practicing law "because he knowingly violated Federal law" was susceptible of
being proved false under Milkovich); Beasley v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Centralia, 558
N.E.2d 677, 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that charge that plaintiff, as an emergency
room physician, had failed to provide a "minimal amount of emergency intervention"
was a statement of fact under Milkovich); Benner v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d
16, 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that defendants' statement that plaintiff released
confidential information met the test established in Milkovich and clearly implied an
assertion of objective fact); see Wellman v. Fox, 825 P.2d 208, 210-11 (Nev.) (holding
that charges in flyer that defendant distributed prior to union election that "Dalton
gang" was led by member who had been thrown off the executive board for fraudulent-
ly obtaining union funds, was replete with nepotism, and included a strikebreaker were
factual under Milkovich, but were true and that characterization of plaintiffs as the
"Dalton gang" was rhetorical hyperbole and would not be construed in the context of
union election as charge of criminality), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992); Jacobs v.
Frank, 573 N.E.2d 609, 611, 617 (Ohio 1991) (upholding summary judgment for defen-
dant on privilege grounds, but rejecting defendant's claim that statements in question
were protected as opinion under Milkovich because defendant had stated, inter alia,
without supporting facts, that "he did not feel [plaintiff] was ethical and honest, he did
not get along well with others, and his character was poor although his professional
ability was adequate"); Petula v. Mellody, 588 A.2d 103, 106, 109 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991) (holding that criticisms of former school administrator to potential employers,
such as statement that plaintiff "had trouble getting along with other administrators
because he was physically present but emotionally absent," were not protected opinion
under Milkovich because they "tend to imply that they are based on defamatory facts").
176 See, e.g., Rosner v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 131, 154-55, 157 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990) (holding that newspaper articles implying that plaintiff podiatrist had partici-
pated in automobile accident insurance fraud either were not opinion or were opinion of
the "mixed" type) (referring to Milkovich only in a Supplemental Opinion on Denial of
Rehearing); Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 70-72, 71 n.9 (Me. 1991) (relying on state
precedent, which court said comports with Milkovich, to hold that letter written by
former student of college professor incident to tenure review process was conditionally
privileged, the record did not show abuse of the privilege, and letter stated defendant's
opinions, but if it implied undisclosed defamatory facts, plaintiff nevertheless failed to
produce evidence of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth).
... 739 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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a press conference. Ireland referred to several statements that had been
made by an anti-abortion activist and concluded that "[clertainly that is en-
couraging and aiding abetting [sic] the people who are involved in the
arson and bombings."'178 In a pre-Milkovich decision, the court held that
the "aiding and abetting" charge was protected under the pure opinion
rule.'79 The court stated that the charge was "supported by underlying facts
which she specifically states and which Scheidler has nowhere alleged are
false or defamatory." ' Subsequently the court reversed this holding,
agreeing with the plaintiff's argument that Milkovich required the court to
reinstate the claim against Ireland.'' Without elaboration, the court found
"that Ireland's statements [were] sufficiently factual to be susceptible of
being proved true or false,"' 2 and reversed its earlier decision in light of
Milkovich. Although the court did not discuss the question of what happens
to pure opinion under Milkovich, its decision is consistent with this Article's
contention that Milkovich does not provide immunity for pure deductive
opinion.
The foregoing decisions seem to be straightforward applications of
Milkovich, or of common-law rules consistent therewith. Two decisions
falling into this category, however, are debatable, raising the question
whether the statements were entitled to protection as opinion or mere hyper-
bole or invective. 83
One of these debatable decisions is Yetman v. English,'84 which pres-
ents the difficult issue whether it is actionable today to call another a "com-
munist."'85 In Yetman, the defendant, a Republican, was a member of the
Arizona House of Representatives, and the plaintiff, a Democrat, was a
member of the Pima County Board of Supervisors.'86 The defendant made
a speech to the Pima County Republican Club and then took questions from
the audience.'87 In response to a question about a proposed rural zoning
change, the defendant "specifically referred to Yetman's alleged refusal to
consider input from property owners and asked, 'What kind of communist
do we have up there that thinks it's improper to protect your interests?"" 88
In Yetman's libel action against English, the trial court ruled that the
178 Id. at 1214.
'" Id. at 1217.
180 Id.
181 Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 743, 745 (N.D. I11.
1990).
182 Id.
183 See discussion infra part IV.A.7.




188 Id. at 325.
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defendant's remark was libelous per se, and the jury awarded Yetman
$5,000 in damages." 9 In a three-to-two en banc opinion, the Arizona Su-
preme Court rejected the defendant's claim that, as a matter of law, his
remark was absolutely protected under the federal and state constitu-
tions.' 9° The court held that the statement reasonably could be interpreted
as an assertion of fact about the plaintiff, particularly given the defendant's
own deposition testimony that he intended to assert as a fact that Yetman
believed in a philosophy that English regarded as communist. 9' The court
also carefully reviewed decisions holding that a charge that another is a
communist is defamatory. The court "recognize[d] that standards of def-
amation necessarily fluctuate with the vicissitudes of time and public opin-
ion."193 It further noted, however, that "[w]hen English made his remarks
in 1985, then-President Reagan had recently characterized the Soviet Union
as the 'evil empire,' and the specter of communist domination was still very
real to a sizeable segment of the populace."' 94 As to the meaning of the
defendant's charge, the court doubted "that the average person would in-
terpret the remark as an assertion that Yetman was a card-carrying member
of the Communist Party or otherwise connected in some formal
capacity."' 95 It held, however, that "if a reasonable listener could have
taken English's comment as stating or implying factual assertions that
Yetman espoused and applied communist doctrine or ideology, then it was
not absolutely privileged."' 96 The court ruled that the remark was provably
false:
We believe that if English's remarks were interpreted to
convey actual facts, those facts do not fall within the zone of
unprovable statements. A reasonable fact-finder could deter-
mine from evidence presented whether Yetman did, in fact,
espouse and practice communist philosophy or tactics such
as denying citizens the opportunity to petition government
officials. Therefore, the requirement of proving falsity pro-
vides no additional protection to English. 9 '
The court, however, reversed and remanded on the ground that the defen-
189 Id.
190 Id.
,9 Id. at 332 & n.5.
'92 Id. at 328-29.
193 Id. at 329.
' Id.
191 Id. at 328.
'9 Id. at 329.
' Id. at 333 (footnote omitted).
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dant was entitled to a jury instruction "that if the comment is not interpreted
as asserting or implying actual fact, but only as 'mere opinion,' hyperbole,
parody, invective, or the like, then it is absolutely privileged and their ver-
dict must be for the defendant." '198  In a strong dissent, Justice Corcoran
stated:
This puerile generic invective has spawned a tempest in a
teapot ....
This kind of juvenile vituperation has been and is epi-
demic in politics. The law of defamation, however, should
not be used to impose a code of conduct on unruly politi-
cians in an attempt to elevate their discourse. This obnoxious
hyperbole, unfortunately, is here to stay.
The majority reverses and sends this case back for yet
another trial. To allow this lawsuit, which is here being re-
viewed by the third level of the judicial system, to start all
over again is to permit the misuse of principles of defama-
tion to intimidate and flog political opponents.1"
Yetman exemplifies two problems raised by a charge that one is a com-
munist. The first is whether the charge is merely hyperbolic or if it actually
implies that the person holds communist beliefs. If the answer is the latter,
the second problem is how one can prove he does not hold communist be-
liefs.
In some situations, a charge of communism or fascism is clearly invec-
tive or hyperbole, and the issue of the meaning of the language should not
reach the jury."'0 On the facts of Yetman, however, the evidence appeared
to support a finding that it was intended to be a factual charge and was
reasonably understood as such."0' Whether a charge that one is a commu-
nist can be proved false, however, appears to pose great difficulty in a case
such as Yetman. What evidence of falsity would suffice? Would the plaintiff
198 Id. at 332-33.
1 Id. at 335 (Corcoran, J., dissenting).
See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[T]he use of 'fascist,'
'fellow traveler,' and 'radical right' as political labels in Wild Tongues cannot be re-
garded as having been proved to be statements of fact, among other reasons, because of
the tremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage of these terms in the realm of po-
litical debate, an imprecision which is simply echoed in the book."), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Central Broadcasting Corp.,
396 N.E.2d 996, 1000-02 (Mass. 1979) (holding charge of "inroad of communism" into
union was nonactionable because it was pure opinion based on disclosed facts, and
because it was "mere pejorative rhetoric") (citing Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d
910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
201 See supra text accompanying note 191.
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need to prove that he holds no beliefs that communists share?2. 2 This issue
is addressed below, in a discussion of the problems posed by ambiguous
language. The short answer for present purposes is that, when defamatory
language is broad and ambiguous, the plaintiff must be cautious in his
pleadings. Although the plaintiff must prove falsity, the problem of proving
the falsity of a broad charge can be surmounted. The plaintiff controls the
truth/falsity issue by his allegation of the meaning of the language. Thus, on
the facts of Yetman, the plaintiff may have alleged that the defendant's
charge meant to those who heard it that Yetman refused property owners
any opportunity to express their views to him. Such an allegation can nar-
row the falsity issue to manageable proportions for the plaintiff.
The second debatable, indeed highly questionable, decision that falls into
this category is Spence v. Flynt.20 3 In Spence, Hustler Magazine named the
plaintiff lawyer, Gerry L. Spence, its "Asshole of the Month" for represent-
ing Andrea Dworkin in her invasion of privacy action against Hustler.2" A
majority of the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the implication that
Spence had sold out his personal values for a possible fee of $75 mil-
lion2 5 might be a false statement of fact, because Spence might be able to
prove that he had assigned his fee to a charitable organization.2"6 One jus-
tice, dissenting from this view, regarded the charge as mere nondefamatory
lawyer bashing. 7 The majority also held that Hustler's use of epithets
might be actionable.2 ' This holding seems clearly unsupportable. 9
202 See Turner v. Devlin, 848 P.2d 286, 296 (Ariz. 1993) (Martone, J., concurring in
the judgment and in the opinion in part) ("[H]ow can it be said that being a communist
is provably false? What litmus test does one use to test the label? Marx? Engels? Le-
nin? Gorbachev? Sartre? Kazantzakis?").
203 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668 (1992).
204 Id. at 772.
205 The article stated:
Many of the vermin-infested turd dispensers we name Asshole of the Month are
members of that group of parasitic scum-suckers often referred to as lawyers.
These shameless shitholes (whose main allegiance is to money) are eager to sell
out their personal values, truth, justice and our hard-won freedoms for a chance to
fatten their wallets. The latest of these hemorrhoidal types to make this page is
Jackson, Wyoming, attorney Gerry Spence, our Asshole of the Month for July.
Id. at 773. The article further implied that Spence was seeking $150 million in the
.Dworkin suit and stated, "Spence ... can demand as much as 50% of the take from his
cases. And a possible $75 million would buy a lot of country for this lawyer." Id.
206 Id. at 776.
207 Id. at 786-88 (Golden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20 The court stated:
Was Hustler exercising a privilege of "fair comment" for an honest expression of
opinion, on a matter of public concern, when Hustler stated that Spence was a
"vermin-infested turd dispenser," a "parasitic scum-sucker," a "shameless
shithole," a "reeking rectum," a "hemorrhoidal type" and "Asshole of the Month
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2. Applications of the Pure Opinion Rule, Without Distinguishing Between
Deductive and Evaluative Opinions
Several cases have found statements to be "pure opinion," without dis-
tinguishing between evaluative and deductive opinions.1 ° In Phantom
Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications,"' the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held nonactionable statements insinuating that the Phantom Touring
Company was deliberately marketing its version of "The Phantom of the
Opera" dishonestly, to confuse the public and to take advantage of the suc-
cess of Andrew Lloyd Weber's version of the "Phantom."2 2 The court em-
ployed a multifactor analysis," 3 but placed strong reliance upon the
articles' complete presentation of the facts underlying the author's conclu-
sion, and their presentation of "information from which readers might draw
for July?" Was that publication made solely for the purpose of causing harm? It is
at least questionable whether that was fair comment on a matter of public concern
not made solely for the purpose of causing harm .... The statements by Hustler
about Spence are clearly defamatory, for they are such as would hold him up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule. Unless they are protected defamatory criticism of a
public figure, they are actionable, and Spence should be allowed to pursue his
claim.
Id. at 775-76.
09 Justices dissenting from the court's view believed that these statements were
either expressions of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. Id. at 782 (Macy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Id. at 789 (Golden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see discussion infra part IV.A.7.
2"0 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993); Chapin v. Knight-
Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publi-
cations, 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992); Gehl Group v.
Koby, 838 F. Supp. 1409 (D. Colo. 1993); Maholick v. WNEP TV, 20 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1022 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd without published opinion, 981 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1992);
Miyata v. Bungei Shunju Ltd., 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Keohane v. Stewart, No. 93SC382, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 532 (July 11, 1994); Living Will
Center v. NBC Subsidiary (KCNC), Inc., No. 93SC214, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 527 (July
11, 1994); Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158 (Mass. 1993); Fortier v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2327, 605 A.2d 79 (Me. 1992); Miele v.
Rosenblum, 603 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Cassidy v. Merin, 582 A.2d
1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Park v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.,
585 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 1992); Gottfried v. Smithtown Tara Homeowner's Inc.,
21 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Mathias v. Carpenter, 587 A.2d 1
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
21 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992).
212 Id. at 729.
213 "[W]hile eschewing the fact/opinion terminology, Milkovich did not depart from
the multi-factored analysis that had been employed for some time by lower courts seek-
ing to distinguish between actionable fact and nonactionable opinion." Id. at 727.
506 [Vol. 3:2
A MATTER OF OPINION
contrary conclusions."2'1 4
Phantom Touring protects a deductive and not an evaluative opinion.
The court asserted that "[a]rguably, the connotation of deliberate deception
is sufficiently factual to be proved true or false, and therefore is vulnerable
under Milkovich. '2 5 The court held nevertheless that the context clearly
indicated that the author was expressing his "point of view only."2 6 The
court determined that "[b]ecause all sides of the issue, as well as the ratio-
nale for Kelly's view, were exposed, the assertion of deceit reasonably could
be understood only as Kelly's personal conclusion about the information
presented, not as a statement of fact." '217 Under Milkovich, however, a
statement susceptible of being proved true or false is actionable as long as
the charge was seriously maintained and was not mere figurative lan-
guage."' Pursuant to my interpretation of Milkovich, even if the assertion
of deceit was a deductive opinion based on stated facts, the defendant would
be subject to liability.
Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co.2"9 is a similar case in which the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that statements expressing "sus-
picion" about the motives of police union picketers who delayed the start of
a state party convention were pure opinion.22° Following the Restatement
opinion rule, the court held that the statements about motive were based on
fully disclosed facts.22 They qualified as expressions of opinion on those
facts because they were couched in terms of suspicion and thus "cautioned
the reader that the article referred to a theory rather than to facts." '222 Some
of the allegedly defamatory charges were "mere vituperation and verbal
abuse." '223 The court determined that its 'holding was consistent with
Milkovich, but also noted that the state's common law and Declaration of
Rights would lead to the same result.224
Two New Jersey intermediate appellate court decisions apply the Re-
114 Id. at 730.
2I Id. at 729.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 730.
218 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) ("This is not the sort of
loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the
writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the crime of perjury. Nor
does the general tenor of the article negate this impression.")
219 612 N.E.2d 1158 (Mass. 1993).
220 See, e.g., id. at 1167 ("Critics of [gubernatorial candidate] Silber also voiced sus-
picions that his supporters promoted the picket line to undercut the convention. The
Springfield police local is a member of the National Association of Government Em-
ployees, which is headed by Silber supporter Kenneth Lyons.")
221 Id. at 1161-63.
222 Id. at 1162.
223 Id. at 1162 n.6. For a discussion of this holding, see discussion infra part IV.A.7.
224 Lyons, 612 N.E.2d at 1163-65.
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statement rule of pure opinion, without distinguishing between evaluative
and deductive opinion. Both appear to immunize deductive opinions. One of
these decisions cites Milkovich, and both rely upon Kotlikoff v. The Commu-
nity News,225 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1982. Kotlikoff
adopted the Restatement's interpretation of Gertz as protecting pure opin-
ion.226
In Cassidy v. Merin,227 the defendant, the State Commissioner of Insur-
ance, informed reporters that he had asked for a determination by either the
courts or the Committee on Attorney Ethics whether the plaintiff attorneys
had engaged in unethical conduct by sending letters to their clients and
others warning that, under a new insurance law, their insurance agents might
not explain fully the options for coverage available to them.22' For the pur-
pose of appeal, the court assumed that the defendant's statements to the
press "were tantamount to his telling them that that letter writing campaign
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct or judicial decisions defining the
ethical practice of law. ' 229 Because all of the reporters had copies of the
plaintiffs' letters, the court held that the charge of unethical conduct was
pure opinion.230 The court relied on Kotlikoff and other New Jersey cases,
stating that Milkovich was consistent with those decisions.23' Cassidy did
not distinguish between deductive and evaluative opinion. The defendant's
assertion, however, appears to be deductive. It was not simply a charge that
the plaintiffs' conduct was unethical as a general matter, but that the plain-
tiffs had violated a professional code of ethics. 232 Like an accusation of
criminal conduct, such a charge would seem to be factual and not
evaluative.
In Miele v. Rosenblum,233 a community newspaper published two arti-
cles reporting that the mayor and borough council were negotiating a sale of
borough land to Miele Sanitation to permit the expansion of Miele's opera-
225 444 A.2d 1086 (N.J. 1982).
226 Id. at 1089-90.
227 582 A.2d 1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
228 Id. at 1041-42.
229 Id. at 1042 (citing Lawrence v. Bauer Publications & Printing Ltd., 446 A.2d 469,
473, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982) (holding statement that plaintiffs "may be"
charged with criminal conduct is little different from an assertion that plaintiffs have
actually been charged with certain crimes)).
230 Id. at 1047-48.
231 Id. at 1047 n.5.
232 "For the purpose of this appeal we assume that Commissioner Merin's ... state-
ments to the communications media were tantamount to his telling them that that letter
writing campaign violated the Rules of Professional Conduct or judicial decisions defin-
ing the ethical practice of law." Id. at 1042.
233 603 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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tions.234 The articles opposed the sale of land and any expansion of
Miele's business.235 Both articles closed with a notice of public meetings
on the matter.236 The complaint did not set forth specific language in the
articles that was alleged to be defamatory,237 and the court was unable to
"find anything in the complaint to justify a finding that any statement in the
two publications pleaded was defamatory as to Miele.""23 The court added,
however, that the charge that Miele was planning an expansion of its busi-
ness was pure opinion.239 The court relied on Kotlikoff and made no refer-
ence to Milkovich.24°
The court may well have been justified in holding that the publications
did not defame the plaintiff. The alternative holding on pure opinion, how-
ever, is inconsistent with my interpretation of Milkovich. If the statement
was a pure opinion, which seems doubtful,24" ' it was deductive and not
evaluative. Whether the plaintiff was planning a business expansion would
be subject to objective verification.
Another decision employed a doubtful application of the pure opinion
rule and an application of that rule to a deductive opinion. In Gotfried v.
Smithtown Tara Homeowner's Inc.,242 the defendants alleged, in a commu-
nication to the members of the homeowner's association, that the plaintiff's
lawsuit against the association was causing a "frivolous use of your hard-
earned money." '243 The court agreed with the defendants that "even if the
original law suit was not frivolous, the fact that their opinion may have been
erroneous does not make it actionable."2" The court determined that the
defendants had set forth the facts underlying the charge by stating in the
communication the legal theories used by the plaintiff in his action and
relating that the association's insurance company had advised the association




237 Id. at 44.
23 Id. at 47.
239 Id.
240 Id.
"4 The factual basis for the "opinion" was not stated by the defendant. The court
held, however, that the factual basis was available because the defendant concluded his
publications with a notice of a public meeting. "Assuming that any words in the two
publications were capable of being construed as damaging plaintiffs reputation, the
writer urged the reader to check by attending the public meeting. It is questionable that
such a suggestion did not negate any 'allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts."' Id.
at 48. The court did not state, however, that facts to support the conclusion that the
plaintiff was planning a business expansion were made available at the public meeting.
242 21 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
243 Id. at 167 1.
244 Id.
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damages.245 However, merely explaining the legal theories used in the
plaintiff's action would not present to the members of the association a
basis for the opinion that this action was frivolous; thus the use of the pure
opinion rule was inappropriate. Moreover, even if the communication quali-
fied as pure opinion, it was deductive and not evaluative. Whether an action
is groundless seems provable as true or false.
Other lower court decisions also have immunized pure deductive opin-
ion.246 Still others that have followed the pure opinion rule, and not distin-
guished between deductive and evaluative opinions, nevertheless seem con-
245 Id. at 1672.
246 See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993). The court
in Haynes held that statements in the book The Promised Land: The Great Black Mi-
gration and How It Changed America, by the former wife of the plaintiff Luthor
Haynes, blaming their child's defects on Luthor's drinking, and alleging that Luthor's
motives for leaving her were financial, were not actionable because they were not de-
famatory per se under Illinois law, and the plaintiff had not alleged special damages. Id.
at 1226. The court further stated that the facts about the child's condition and about the
relevant financial circumstances were uncontested, and the statements were subjective
interpretations of the facts. Id. at 1228. "[I]f it is plain that the speaker is expressing a
subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming
to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable." Id. at
1226-27 (citations omitted); see also Miyata v. Bungei Shunju Ltd., 19 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1400, 1402-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that italicized statement in news-
paper article about murder of woman whose husband discovered her body at 11:00 p.m.
and notified police at 11:21 p.m. that "[ilt is a little too long to take 21 minutes from
the discovery of the body to the notice to the police" was pure opinion and that the
article could not reasonably be interpreted to accuse husband of murdering wife);
Keohane v. Stewart, 859 P.2d 291 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, No. 93SC382, 1994
Colo. LEXIS 532 (July 11, 1994) (using a multifactor analysis and applying the pure
opinion rule to hold that letter published in newspaper charging that judge had taken
bribe stated or implied verifiable facts, but was not actionable because reasonable reader
would perceive that charges were author's personal conclusions based on generally
known facts and did not imply firsthand knowledge of other facts); Park v. Capital
Cities Communications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 902, 904-05 (App. Div. 1992), appeal dis-
missed, 607 N.E.2d 815 (N.Y. 1992), and leave to appeal dismissed in part, denied in
part, 613 N.E.2d 961 (N.Y. 1993). The court in Park held that the statement on news
broadcast that "I guess we all have what you might call a rotten apple" was "susceptible
of the defamatory meaning that Dr. Park is unfit or unethical in his profession" but the
statement was an opinion because it was "vague, ambiguous, indefinite and incapable of
being objectively characterized as true or false." Id. at 905. Furthermore, the opinion
was nonactionable because "[tihe bases for the 'rotten apple' remark, as set forth in the
broadcast, [were] the uncontested facts that plaintiff was the subject of a State Health
Department investigation and that local ophthalmologists expected to present evidence
against him." Id. The court also held that the public figure plaintiff had failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a finding of actual malice. Id.
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sistent with Milkovich, in that they immunized pure evaluative opinions.247
247 See Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Because
the bases for the 'hefty mark-up' conclusion are fully disclosed, no reasonable reader
would consider the term anything but the opinion of the author drawn from the circum-
stances related."); Gehl Group v. Koby, 838 F. Supp. 1409, 1416-17 (D. Colo. 1993)
(applying Colorado law) (holding that defendants' charge that Fraternal Order of Police
plaintiffs were "the prostitutes of the law enforcement profession" was pure opinion,
meaning that plaintiff F.O.P. organizations demeaned the law enforcement profession by
allowing charitable fundraising organization to profit off of F.O.P. name); Maholick v.
WNEP TV, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1022, 1024-25 (M.D. Pa.) (holding that caustic
editorial, including invective and hyperbole, critical of borough council member for re-
gaining seat of council by appointment after losing primary election was protected
opinion), aff'd without published opinion, 981 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1992); Living Will
Center v. NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc., No. 93SC214, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 527 at
* 19-*23 (July 11, 1994) (holding that telecast asserting that plaintiff's sale of living will
packets was "scam" and that purchasers were "totally taken" hyperbolically expressed
view that packet was not worth price of $29.95, given availability of essentials for
living will from other sources at little or no cost, and employing a multifactor analysis
along with pure opinion rule to hold that charges were based on facts disclosed in the
broadcast); Fortier v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2327, 605 A.2d 79, 80
(Me. 1992) ("[T]he flyer accuses Fortier of having no morals because he crossed the
picket line and characterizes that conduct as a betrayal of Fortier's fellow workers. The
reader is free to evaluate that characterization on the basis of disclosed facts that are
admittedly correct."); see also Mathias v. Carpenter, 587 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991),
appeal denied, 602 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1992). In Mathias, a newspaper column expressed
regret for having published a photograph of school board members smiling as they left
a hearing at which they had been found guilty of violating the Sunshine Law:
It's one thing to portray a hardened criminal smiling as he displays his contempt
for law. It's quite another when the people who are smiling-just after being
found guilty of breaking the law-are the supposed leaders of a community's
education establishment. What kind of message does that convey to the young
people they are responsible for educating?
Id. at 2. The plaintiff school board members alleged that the column "implied falsely
that they had committed heinous crimes and had demonstrated contempt for the law."
Id. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. Id. at 1. Applying the
Restatement pure opinion rule, the court held that the statement that the photograph
showed the board members smiling after being found guilty of violating the sunshine
law was factual. Id. at 3.
To regret publication of the picture because the persons depicted were leaders of
the community's educational establishment is purely the opinion of the writer. So,
too, is the implication that smiles under such circumstances had an even more
unfortunate message than the portrayal of a hardened criminal who displays con-
tempt for the law. The column, when carefully read, does not state, either ex-
pressly or by implication, that the school directors were hardened criminals or that
they had committed heinous crimes.
Id. at 3-4. The court added: "The reasonable reader, having access to the facts on which
the comparison was based, could decide for himself or herself whether the facts sup-
ported the writer's comparison." Id. at 4.
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3. Use of a Multifactor Analysis that Immunizes Expression of the Speaker's
Point of View, even if Supporting Facts are Not Stated or Available to the
Recipients
Some courts that follow a multifactor analysis interpret Milkovich as
immunizing statements reasonably understood as expressing the speaker's
point of view, even if supporting facts are not stated or available to the re-
cipients."' Under this approach, an assertion of the speaker's belief or con-
jecture that certain facts are true, as opposed to an assertion that the facts
are true, is a statement of opinion. Similarly, an evaluative conclusion,
without the statement or availability of supporting facts, is opinion.
In Piersall v. Sportsvision of Chicago,249 the defendant called the plain-
tiff, a former broadcast commentator, a liar, and said that the plaintiff "told
a lot of lies," and "said things on the air [he] knew were not true."250 The
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant
on the well supported ground that the public figure plaintiff had not pro-
duced evidence of actual malice.25" ' In addition, however, the court stated
that "the trial judge properly determined that Reinsdorf's statements were
opinion . "..."252 Applying a "totality of the circumstances" analysis,253
the court "agree[d] with the trial court that the general statement that some-
one is a liar, not being put in context of specific facts, is merely opin-
ion." '254 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that under Milkovich
such a charge is factual:
248 See, e.g., Henry v. National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists, 836 F. Supp. 1204
(D. Md. 1993), aff'd, 1994 WL 406550 (4th Cir., Aug. 4, 1994); Dodson v. Dicker, 812
S.W.2d 97 (Ark. 1991); George v. Iskcon of Cal., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473 (Ct. App. 1992);
Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Ct. App. 1991); Moyer v. Amador Valley Joint
Union High Sch. Dist., 275 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1990); Piersall v. Sportsvision of
Chicago, 595 N.E.2d 103 (I11. App. Ct. 1992); Huyen v. Driscoll, 479 N.W.2d 76
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 508 N.W.2d 917, 923-24
(Neb. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1835 (1994); see also, Lapkoff v. Wilks, 969 F.2d
78, 81-83 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying Virginia law); Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski,
567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991); McGill v. Parker, 582
N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 1992); Behr v. Weber, 568 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (App. Div.), ap-
peal denied, 582 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. 1991); Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415
(S.D. 1990).
249 595 N.E.2d 103 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
230 Id. at 104.
21 Id. at 105-07.
252 Id. at 108.
253 Id. at 107.
254 Id.
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Piersall relies on Milkovich for dicta wherein the Court
concludes that the sentence "Jones is a liar" may imply a
false assertion of fact, even if those specific facts are either
incorrect or incomplete, or if the speaker's assessment of
them is erroneous. However, in the present case, there are no
specific facts at the root of Reinsdorf' s statement, complete
or incomplete, capable of being objectively verified as true
or false.255
The defendant's charge that the plaintiff was a liar was not merely an
epithet. It implied the existence of defamatory facts to support the
charge-namely specific instances in which the plaintiff had made false
statements. The court apparently immunized the charge on the ground that it
was the expression of the defendant's viewpoint. The court's statement that
"there are no specific facts at the root of Reinsdorf's statement" is incongru-
ous, given the defendant's evidence in support of his motion for summary
judgment of specific instances in which the plaintiff had lied.256 Thus, the
court ignored the implication of the existence of supporting facts that arose
from the conclusionary charge that the plaintiff was a liar. Its immunization
of a charge of lying on the ground that the defendant stated no supporting
facts is patently inconsistent with Milkovich.
In George v. Iskcon of California,2" a Krishna group issued a press
release concerning Robin George, a former Krishna follower who had be-
come an anti-Krishna activist.258 The press release included a statement
that when Robin left home and joined the Krishnas, she complained of
beatings by her parents.259 It added: "For all we know now, her accounts
of brutality and beatings were exaggerated or totally fabricated."260 The
court upheld a libel verdict in favor of Robin's mother, on the ground that
the evidence supported findings that the charge that Robin's parents had
beaten her were false and defamatory.26" ' The court, however, reversed a
libel judgment in favor of Robin.262 The court held that the assertions that
Robin had been beaten by her parents "do not libel Robin even if she never
made those claims to the Krishna devotees." '263 The court also held that the
255 Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
256 Id. at 106.
257 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473 (Ct. App. 1992).
258 Id. at 488.
9 Id. at 489.
260 Id. at 501.
261 Id. at 502.
262 Id. at 479.
263 Id. at 503.
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suggestion that Robin may have fabricated her claims of beatings was "not a
provably false statement of fact about Robin."2 The court noted that
"[t]he use of the prefatory language '[flor all we know now' alerted readers
that defendants were merely expressing their opinion regarding the truth of
Robin's supposed earlier accounts of brutality at the hands of her parents
based on admittedly incomplete information." '65 The court did "not think
the quoted statement [could] be reasonably understood as doing other than
suggesting the possibility that Robin may have been lying." '266 The court's
conclusion rests on Milkovich and Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examin-
er,267 a California Supreme Court decision applying a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" multifactor analysis.268
The court's holding on Robin George's claim is unsound. Whether Rob-
in lied is provable as true or false. That the press release merely suggested
the possibility that she had lied, or expressed an opinion that she may have
lied, should not shield the defendants from liability.269 If X repeats a de-
famatory charge originally made by another, X is subject to liability for
republication of the charge, even if X states that the charge is only a rumor,
or that he does not believe it is true.' If a defendant is subject to liability
for repetition of a defamatory charge in an action by the object of the re-
peated charge, even though the defendant expressed disbelief in the accusa-
tion, it makes no sense to deny liability to the alleged source of the charge
when the defendant has fabricated the original charge and also said the
source may have lied. The same reasons supporting the defendants' liability
to Robin's mother support liability to Robin. The defendants were liable to
Robin's mother for the beating accusation, even though the press release
said that Robin may have fabricated it. The defendants likewise should be
subject to liability to Robin for the fabrication charge, even though the press
release merely said she may have lied. The reason for the rule that allowed
Robin's mother to recover is that "[n]o character or reputation would be




267 721 P.2d 87 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
26 George, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-03; see Baker, 721 P.2d at 90-91.
269 See, e.g., Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos., 283 Cal. Rptr. 644, 652 (Ct.
App. 1991) ("[W]e reject the notion that merely couching an assertion of a defamatory
fact in cautionary language such as 'apparently' or 'some sources say' or even putting it
in the form of a question, necessarily defuses the impression that the speaker is commu-
nicating an actual fact."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 cmt. c (1977) ("A
conditional or alternative statement may be defamatory if, notwithstanding its condition-
al or alternative form it is reasonably understood in a defamatory sense.").
210 2 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 143 (2d ed. 1986); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmts. c, e (1977).
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was engaged in circulating could be made to defeat the right of recovery for
the slander."27' Similarly, it would make reputation too vulnerable if speak-
ers were allowed to insulate themselves from liability merely by couching
defamatory charges in conditional terms.272
Several other cases purporting to apply Milkovich fall into this catego-
ry.273 Some decisions using the "point of view" approach rely upon state
271 Nicholson v. Merritt, 59 S.W. 25, 26 (Ky. 1900) (holding that defendant's expres-
sion of personal disbelief while republishing slander should be considered only in dam-
ages phase).
272 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 446 A.2d 469 (N.J.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982).
To establish the defamatory nature of the articles it was not necessary for plain-
tiffs to prove that defendants had accused them of the commission of a crime.
Words that clearly "sound to the disreputation" of an individual are defamatory on
their face. The unambiguous import of the two articles is to cast doubt on the
reputations of plaintiffs, Lawrence and Simpson. The statement that plaintiffs
"may be" charged with criminal conduct diminishes their standing in the commu-
nity and is little different from an assertion that plaintiffs have actually been
charged with certain crimes. Hence the court correctly ruled that the articles were
libelous per se, i.e., not susceptible of a nondefamatory interpretation.
Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
273 Dodson v. Dicker, 812 S.W.2d 97 (Ark. 1991), was a defamation and invasion of
privacy action that involved a letter written by the defendant, a massage therapist, to the
State Board of Therapy Technology. Id. at 110. Copies of the letter were sent to various
other persons, including a reporter. Id. The plaintiff, the husband of the president of the
Board, recovered a judgment against the defendant after a jury trial. Id. The court sum-
marized the statements made in the letter:
Ms. Dodson's letter focused on the actions of the president of the State Board of
Therapy Technology, Marinetta Dicker, and also included references to her hus-
band, appellee David Dicker. The letter asserted, among other things, that David
Dicker assisted Marinetta Dicker in rewriting the test of licensing of therapy tech-
nicians, which may have been done for profit; the Dickers drafted the budget for
the board without the approval of other board members; the Dickers drew up a
proposed license law for presentation to the Arkansas legislature without the ap-
proval of the board; and, David Dicker has imposed himself as the sixth member
of the board. Dodson also stated that, in her opinion, the board has slandered a
fellow therapist, Steve Schechter, and, David Dicker's letter to the Rolf Institute
was a good example of it; and she wrote "he [Dicker] has such a 'hate' for Steve,
and to be fair, Steve does not have any great love for him either, and in fact nei-
ther do I. I hate a bully ... especially a sneaky bully, which is what he appears
to be in my opinion."
Id. at 97-98 (footnote omitted). The court held that the defendant's motion for a direct-
ed verdict should have been granted on both the libel and privacy claims. Id. at 112.
Regarding the libel claim, the court stated that Milkovich requires a determination
whether a statement implies an assertion of objectively verifiable fact. Id. at 11. The
court then adopted a multifactor analysis to determine whether the defendant's state-
ments implied an assertion of fact. Id. at 98. The court found, however, that it was
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unnecessary to examine all of the facts because "evidence supporting the second catego-
ry-the tenor, or general drift of thought of Dodson's letter-completely negates any
impression that Dodson's statements were presented as an assertion of objective facts
about David Dicker." Id. at 99. The fact that Dodson referred to David Dicker with
intemperate language did not convince the court "that the statements, in their totality,
were the type of assertions of objective facts about Mr. Dicker that give rise to liability
in a defamation action." Id.
As is typical of decisions using a multifactor analysis, the rationale of this deci-
sion is unclear because the court did not state what ultimate test of opinion the various
factors are supposed to elucidate. See supra text accompanying note 11. It is reasonable
to imply from the court's analysis, however, that it immunized the assertions on the
ground that they were statements of the defendant's belief or conjecture that the stated
facts were true. The court did not reveal precisely what statements in the letter were al-
leged to be defamatory; nor did the court give any information that would show why
the statements in the letter would defame the plaintiff. Most of the statements, however,
are clearly factual. For example, Dicker either did or did not assist his wife in rewriting
the licensing test for profit; the Dickers either did or did not draft the board's budget
without board approval; and Dicker either did or did not slander a fellow therapist. The
defendant's use of the term "sneaky bully" might be a mere epithet, or it might be pure
opinion if based on the facts stated in the letter. If, however, the facts stated were de-
famatory, the defense of pure opinion would not apply. The court, however, did not
refer to the pure opinion rule. Moreover, the court's discussion of the privacy claim
makes it clear that, at trial, a number of the facts stated in the letter were disputed and
some were apparently false. See Dodson, 812 S.W.2d at 99-100. It may well be that the
court in Dodson reached the correct result. Yet it is difficult to understand how most of
the statements in the letter could be regarded as opinion.
In Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 508 N.W.2d 917 (Neb. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1835 (1994), the court used a "totality of the circumstances" analysis
to hold that the publication of the results of a poll of attorneys' ratings of judges' per-
formances "was a compilation of attorneys' subjective ratings" and, as such, "cannot
imply a provably false factual assertion." Id. at 923-24. It is clear that accurate reports
of such polls have such value to the public in the election of judges that they should not
be actionable. It is questionable, however, to treat such publications as protected opin-
ion. Conclusory ratings imply the existence of factual support. Moreover, the truth or
falsity of some ratings, such as on "punctuality in attending court proceedings" could be
established with ease, at least in some cases. See id. at 923. Instead of using an opinion
rationale, it would seem better to give direct recognition to the value of the publication
of such polls by using a report privilege. Cf Edwards v. National Audubon Society,
Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. New York Times Co.,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
In Moyer v. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 275 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct.
App. 1990), a student high school publication reported that a smoke bomb had gone off
in the plaintiffs classroom. Id. at 495. The headline stated "Students terrorize Moyer."
Id. at 497. The article quoted "the Shadow," who provided the smoke bomb to the
bomb thrower, as saying he did so because "Mr. Moyer is a babbler, and babblers are
annoying to me." Id. The Shadow was also quoted as saying: "[H]e pissed me off, he is
the worst teacher at FHS." Id. at 495. The California Court of Appeal analyzed the facts
under the Oilman multifactor test, stating that under Milkovich the question was "wheth-
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er a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the published statements imply a provably
false factual assertion." Id. at 497. The court answered that question "by applying the
'totality of circumstances' test-a review of the meaning of the language in context and
its susceptibility of being proved true or false." Id. The court held that the "worst teach-
er" charge was not actionable because it contained "no verifiable facts" and was "sim-
ply an expression of anger or disgust." Id. As to the charge that the plaintiff was a
"babbler," the court found that "the readers of the article would have understood that
the word was not used literally but as a form of exaggerated expression conveying the
student-speaker's disapproval of plaintiff's teaching or speaking style. Id. at. The state-
ment could not reasonably have been understood to be stating actual facts about plain-
tiff." Id. at 498.
The court's views on the statements that "Mr. Moyer is a babbler" and "He pissed
me off' are not problematic. The holding on the "worst teacher" charge, however, ap-
pears to protect an "impure" statement of opinion. No factual basis for the charges was
stated in the article, and, unlike a review of a restaurant or a book, the underlying facts
were not available or known to readers who had not taken the plaintiff's classes. The
charge does not appear to be a mere epithet or "preference expression," neither of
which is actionable. On epithets, see supra note 16. On preference expressions, see
infra text accompanying notes 664-66. The statement was a comment on the quality of
the plaintiff as a teacher. It implied the existence of defamatory facts to support the
opinion. Thus, the holding seems inconsistent with Milkovich's immunization of only
pure opinion. It should be noted, however, that, even under Milkovich, the plaintiff
probably would have great difficulty recovering in this type of case, given his burden of
proving both falsity and fault. Charges of this nature would seem impervious to proof
of actual malice, and proof of negligence might be very difficult.
Courts are divided on the issue of whether a public school teacher is a public
official or public figure. See Peter S. Cane, Note, Defamation of Teachers: Behind the
Times?, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 1191 (1988). Cane supports the view expressed in Justice
Brennan's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474
U.S. 953, 959-60 (1985), that public school teachers are public officials. Cane, supra, at
1200-01.
Another California case is Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Ct. App. 1991),
which held that the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the defendants
because the plaintiff, a social worker, was a public official and had failed to allege
actual malice. Id. at 246, 251, 254. The court, however, also addressed the trial court's
holding that the statements in question were nonactionable opinion. Id. at 247. Applying
Milkovich and a "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis, the court held that the
defendants' charge that the plaintiff was incompetent was "reasonably susceptible of a
provably false meaning." Id. at 248-50. Yet the court also held that a statement assert-
ing that the conduct of the plaintiff "goes so far beyond incompetence that I almost
wonder about some kind of hostility towards the child or toward handicapped children
in general" was nonactionable opinion. Id. The court did not believe the statement could
be "reasonably understood to assert as an actual fact that plaintiff is hostile to children,"
adding that it was "nothing more than speculation or rumination-something less even
than surmise or conjecture." Id. As noted in the discussion of the George case, supra
notes 257-72 and accompanying text, the assertion of a defamatory charge in the form
of surmise or conjecture should not immunize the speaker. Moreover, if such issues as
actual and common-law malice are factual, so too should be the issue of hostility to
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law, rather than on Milkovich 4 The most notable in this category is
children. For definitions of actual and express malice, see, e.g., Jacobs v. Frank, 573
N.E.2d 609, 613 (Ohio 1991); 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 270, at 232-42.
In Huyen v. Driscoll, 479 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), the plaintiff, a for-
mer director of the St. Paul Human Rights Department, brought a libel action based on
statements made in a report of a study of the department conduct by a committee of the
St. Paul Human Rights Commission. Id. at 77. The court upheld a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict for the defendants, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding of actual malice. Id. at 78. In addition, the court held that the state-
ments at issue were protected statements of opinion. Id. The court used a multifactor
analysis, which it found consistent with Milkovich. Id. at 79-80. Under that analysis, the
court held that the statements were not objectively verifiable. Id. at 80. The court's
decision may have been correct, as evaluative statements in the report may not have
implied facts beyond those stated in the report. The decision, however, did not rest on
an analysis of the statements as pure opinion. The court noted that "[e]ven if the state-
ments are hybrid statements containing both opinion and underlying facts, the state-
ments still cannot be proven false because 'when all the underlying predicate facts are
considered, with all their conflicting inferences, the statement is not provable one way
or the other."' Id. at 81 (citing Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Minn. 1990)
(Simonett, J., concurring specially), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991)). This statement
demonstrates some ambiguity in the court's analysis of whether the statement was pure
opinion. The "point-of-view" approach seems evident in the following conclusion of the
court:
All of these statements were contained in a report, the sole purpose of which was
to measure subjectively the government's performance in the human rights arena.
The report states clearly that it is a "collection of ideas and conclusions, not
facts." As the trial court correctly noted, a reader of the report would expect the
statements to convey impressions and evaluations, .not facts. The statements in the
report were non-actionable opinions.
Id.
In Henry v. National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists, 836 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Md.
1993), aff'd, No. 93-2526, 1994 WL 406550 (4th Cir. Oct. 27, 1993), the court used an
Oilman-type of analysis in reliance on a pre-Milkovich Fourth Circuit decision, Potomac
Valve & Fitting Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987). The court
held that the statements in question were verifiable and precise in meaning; they were
protected, nonetheless, because they occurred in a heated labor dispute and therefore the
reasonable reader would understand them as subjective assertions. Henry, 836 F. Supp.
at 1217-19. In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the required
showing of actual malice for purposes of summary judgment, and also had failed to
show that most of the statements were false. Id. at 1213, 1214.
274 See Lapkoff v. Wilks, 969 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1992). In Lapkoff, the Fourth Circuit
applied Virginia's multifactor test and held that the defendant's statements concerning
the plaintiffs performance in a previous job, which caused the plaintiff's current em-
ployer to fire him, were opinion. Id. at 83. The court found the statement "I wouldn't
trust him as far as I can throw him" to be "clearly Wilks' opinion because it is a rela-
tive statement completely dependent on Wilks' obvious bias toward Lapkoff." Id. at 82.
Similarly, a statement imputing either condonation of fraud in loan applications, or
negligence in not knowing about the fraud, was opinion because "by couching the state-
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Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski,27" a decision of the New York Court of
Appeals rendered after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari, vacated the
prior judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of Milkovich.276 On remand, the court ad-
hered to its previous determination that the publications in question were not
actionable." The court held that Milkovich did not require a different re-
sult,278 and that the state constitution provided an independant basis for the
decision. 79 Under Milkovich, the court held that the "core premise" of the
alleged defamation was factual, and that the plaintiff had not shown the
premise to be false."'
ment in the disjunctive, that is either/or, no reasonable jury could interpret the statement
as expressing an established fact about Lapkoff." Id. In addition, the court found that
"[a]s to Wilks' belief that Lapkoff's inaction in the face of fraudulent activity created
some type of 'problem,' presumably that Lapkoff was a poor sales manager, that posi-
tion can only be construed as a relative statement, again dependent on Wilks' viewpoint
that it was a problem." Id; see also Behr v. Weber, 568 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (App. Div.),
appeal denied, 582 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. 1991). The Appellate Division in Behr held that
defendant's display of a picket sign in front of plaintiffs' store and on the Donahue
program that read "Behr's Does Not Deliver," parodying plaintiffs slogan, "We Deliver
When You Deliver," id. at 949, and defendant's complaints "about the plaintiffs' poor
service and incomplete delivery of a furniture order," made on the Donahue program
and in letters to several organizations, were "clearly a personal expression of defendant
Weber's disapproval of plaintiffs' furniture delivery services, based upon defendant
Weber's, own documented efforts to obtain a promised delivery, and were, therefore, not
actionable." Id. It should be noted that the defendant's statements on the Donahue pro-
gram and in letters to organizations may have been pure opinion. Display of the picket
sign in front of the defendant's store, however, would imply the existence of supporting
facts. The defendant's "documented efforts to obtain a promised delivery," id., may
have "justified" the statement on the picket sign. See 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 270,
at 67 (stating that "at common law, if the facts on which the opinion was based were
not stated or otherwise known, the appropriate defense was in 'rolled up' form" and
that "it had to be shown (1) that facts actually exist or the statement thereof is privi-
leged, which (2) would justify the opinion, i.e., make it a reasonable one."). In Behr,
however, the court appears to use a point-of-view approach rather than justification. See
also Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1990); infra notes 299-313 and
accompanying text.
27S 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991).
276 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
277 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1272.
278 Id. at 1276.
279 Id. at 1280.
28 Id. at 1276. In Immuno, the plaintiff was a multinational corporation that planned
to open a facility in West Africa in which chimpanzees would be used for hepatitis
research. Id. at 1272. The defendant was the editor of a scientific journal and a profes-
sor who used primates in medical research. Id. In the journal the defendant published a
letter to the editor written by the chairwoman of an organization that opposed the use of
primates for biomedical research. Id. The New York Court of Appeals stated that the
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The letter involved in Immuno criticized the manufacturer's plan to
establish African facilities and to use African chimpanzees to study hepa-
titis. The court, however, expressed uncertainty as to whether some of the
many statements in the letter that the court previously had held to be pro-
tected opinion might not be regarded as factual under a Milkovich analy-
sis.28" ' As an example, the court stated that the letter writer's assertions
about the plaintiffs motivation might imply facts under a Milkovich anal-
ysis."2 Consequently, the court turned to state law and held that the letter
expressed protected opinion under the New York Constitution."3 Using a
multifactor analysis,284 the court employed a "point of view" approach:
We conclude that the body of the letter in issue com-
municated the accusations of a group committed to the pro-
tection of primates, and that the writer's presumptions and
predictions as to what "appeared to be" or "might well be"
or "could well happen" or "should be" would not have been
viewed by the average reader of the Journal as conveying
actual facts about plaintiff. It may well be, for example, that
McGreal's statements regarding plaintiffs motivations-if
studied long enough in isolation---could be found to contain
implied factual assertions, but viewed as IPPL's letter to the
editor, it would be plain to the reasonable reader of this
scientific publication that McGreal was voicing no more than
a highly partisan point of view.285
Since the Immuno decision, at least two New York decisions have applied
its point-of-view approach.286
"core premise" of the letter was that the plaintiff planned to release into the wild chim-
panzees who might be disease carriers, as there was no way to determine that an animal
was not a carrier. Id. at 1275.
281 Id. at 1277 n.3.
282 Id. at 1281.
283 Id.
28 The court did not describe the multifactor approach, but stated, "as we previously
held in Immuno-the standard articulated and applied in Steinhilber furnishes the opera-
tive standard in this state for separating actionable fact from protected opinion." Id. at
1280. In its earlier Immuno opinion, the court had followed Steinhilber v. Alphonse,
501 N.E.2d 550, 554 (N.Y. 1986), in employing the Olman multifactor analysis. See
Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 549 N.E.2d 129, 133 (N.Y. 1989).
285 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1281.
286 See 600 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938 (N.Y. 1992)
(holding that defendant's statement that "this entire lease and proposition ... is as
fraudulent as you can get and it smells of bribery and corruption" was protected opinion
under Milkovich and Immuno and stating that "given the loose nature of the language,
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4. Use of a Multifactor Analysis that Immunizes Statements Because Reliable
Evidence is Unavailable on the Issue of Falsity
The Supreme Courts of South Dakota and Utah have held, under a
multifactor analysis, that a statement qualifies as nonactionable opinion if no
reliable evidence is available on the issue of falsity." 7 In West v. Thomson
Newspapers,288 the Utah Supreme Court held that a charge in a newspaper
editorial that the mayor had changed his stance on a hotly contested political
issue after he was elected was not actionable. 9 The mayor alleged that
the charge was defamatory because it implied that he had deceived the vot-
ers to get elected.9 Assuming that the charge was false, and that the
charge implied a deliberate deception of the voters, the court stated that the
common law privilege of fair comment was inapplicable because the defam-
atory implication was not based on a true or privileged assertion of fact. 9'
Nevertheless, the court held that the charge was nonactionable under the
state constitution's protections for freedom of speech.292 The court em-
ployed an Ollman analysis, but unlike the point-of-view opinions discussed
in the previous section, the court stressed evidentiary issues.293
The court first examined the verifiability question. The court acknowl-
edged that a jury could find that the change-of-position charge implied that
the mayor had misrepresented his views to the voters.294 It held, however,
that "the implication [was not] sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being
the 'general tenor' of the remarks made at a public hearing, and the skepticism a rea-
sonable listener brings to such proceeding, we believe the ... statement is not such that
a reasonable listener would conclude factual assertions were being made about plain-
tiff'), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2341 (1993); McGill v. Parker, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App.
Div. 1992).
No reasonable person reading the letters and leaflets in their entirety would find
these conclusions to be anything other than highly partisan expressions of opinion
by animal rights activists that the carriage horse trade was not providing adequate
and humane treatment of its animal . . . . [and that] such communications, as
Immuno held, should not be hypercritically scrutinized for the extraction of possi-
ble assertions of fact from what in context is a clear expression of opinion.
Id. at 99.
287 See Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1990); West v. Thomson
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).
28 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994).
29 Id. at 1020.
290 Id. at 1011.
291 Id. at 1012.
292 Id. at 1020-21.
293 Id. at 1018.
294 Id.
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proven true or false.""29 In an unconvincing line of reasoning, the court
stated:
Whether West actually intended to dupe voters into electing
him mayor by misrepresenting his position on municipal
power is something only West himself knows, not something
that is subject to objective verification. Even if we assume
for the sake of argument that West did change his position
after being elected mayor, there are a number of entirely
legitimate reasons for doing so. For example, he could have
simply decided that municipal power was a fiscal imperative.
Thus, asking a fact finder to determine the subjective intent
behind West's alleged change of position will inevitably
produce a verdict based on speculation. "An obvious poten-
tial for quashing or muting [free speech] looms large when
[fact finders] attempt to assess the truth of a statement that
admits of no method of verification." '96
This analysis involved a sleight of hand because the court addressed the
wrong issue. The plaintiff alleged that the defamatory implica-
tion--deliberate deception-was false, not because his change of position
involved no voter deception, but because he had not changed his posi-
tion. 97 Proof that the mayor had made his position clear on the municipal
power issue prior to the election would show that there had been no voter
deception. The jury question would not involve the subjective issue of the
mayor's motivation, but rather the objective issue of pre-election statements.
Turning to the immediate and broader contextual questions, the court found
that the charge was political commentary and, as such, was "entitled to the
fullest protection afforded by our state's constitution. "298
Like West, Janklow v. Viking Press,299 also seems to have held that if
reliable evidence is unavailable on the issue of falsity, the statement is opin-
ion. Janklow was a libel action by a former state governor against the author
and publisher of a book entitled In the Spirit of Crazy Horse.3 ° Regarding
the claimed libels, the South Dakota Supreme Court stated:
The statements concern allegations of a rape, driving drunk
295 Id.
296 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 981-82 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)).
297 Id. at 1001.
29' Id. at 1020.
299 459 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1990).
300 Id. at 417.
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while nude from the waist down, and shooting dogs while
riding a motorcycle in the residential area of a reservation.
Matthiessen admits that the book is not entirely objective;
however, the purpose of the book is to promote the historical
viewpoint of traditional Indians.3 '
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.3"2 The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed, principally on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence of actual
malice to submit the case to the jury.303 However, the court also held that
some of the statements at issue were protected as opinion.3°4 On that issue,
the court observed that "[tihe most significant statement is Russell Means'
quote which infers that Janklow actually raped Jancita Eagle Deer.""3 5 The
quotation of Russell Means included the following statement: "I guess it was
alcohol behind the rape of Jancita Eagle Deer. He did it, all right. I knew
Jancita-that really ruined her life.... Janklow went from raping young
girls to raping Mother Earth [referring to Janidow's support of the mining
industry] .306
In deciding that this statement was opinion, the court made no reference
to Milkovich, although it was cited by the dissent.3 7 Instead, the court used
the four-factor test adopted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.308 Under this test, which is the same as the
Olman test,309 the court held that the Means quote was opinion.3 0 On
the verifiability factor, the court determined that "Russell Means cannot
verify that Janklow actually raped Jancita Eagle Deer. Further, Means does
not make any specific detailed account of facts which would lead a person
to believe his statement is factual. If a statement cannot plausibly be veri-
fied, it cannot be seen as 'fact.""'3 "
The court's statement that "Means [did] not make any specific detailed
account of facts which would lead a person to believe his statement [was]
factual"3 2 appears to mean that a statement is opinion if reasonably under-
30 Id. (footnote omitted).
302 id.
303 Id. at 418-22.
3o4 Id. at 424.
3o1 Id. at 423.
" Id. at 418 (alteration in original).
307 See id. at 428 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
308 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); see also, Janklow v.
Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415, 423 (S.D. 1990).
31 See Newsweek, 788 F.2d at 1302-03.
30 Janklow, 459 N.W.2d at 424.
31 Id. at 423 (citing Newsweek, 788 F.2d at 1302).
312 id.
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stood to be a statement of the speaker's belief. The rest of this statement,
however, apparently means that a statement is opinion if reliable evidence is
unavailable on the truth/falsity issue. If reliable evidence is unavailable, the
plaintiff should lose because he cannot prove falsity. The lack of evidence
of falsity, however, does not make a factual statement opinion.313
5. Use of Milkovich or a Multifactor Analysis to Immunize Ambiguous
Statements
Following in the path of Ollman v. Evans,3"4 two United States Courts
of Appeals, and intermediate appellate courts in California and Minnesota
have employed the verifiability test to immunize statements that are impre-
cise or ambiguous."a5 Notable in part because a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed itself less than three
months after its original decision in the case, Moldea v. New York Times
Company ("Moldea I/")316 held that statements about a book in a book re-
view are not actionable if they are "rationally supportable by reference to
the actual text," ' 7 even if a reasonable jury could find that the statements
mischaracterized portrayals in the book.3"8 Thus, if a defamatory statement
in a book review is subject to two rational interpretations, one of which is
false, the statement is not actionable because it is not verifiable. The court
held that when "[a]pplying the 'supportable interpretation' standard, the
correct measure of the challenged statements' verifiability as a matter of law
is whether no reasonable person could find that the review's characteriza-
tions were supportable interpretations of [the book]."3 ' Under its newly
adopted test, the court held that the book review in question was not action-
able. 320
The book, entitled Interference: How Organized Crime Influences Pro-
fessional Football, was written by Dan E. Moldea, an investigative journalist
313 See discussion infra part V.D.
314 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); see discussion
infra part V.D.
3' Moldea v. New York Times Co. [hereinafter "Moldea ir"], 22 F.3d 310 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, No. 94-192, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 6371 (Oct. 3, 1994); Phantom Tour-
ing, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2942 (1992); James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890 (Ct. App.
1993); Lund v. Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); Hunt v. University of Minn., 465 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); see also
discussion infra part V.D. (discussing problem of immunizing ambiguity).
316 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
317 Id. at 315.
318 Id. at 316.
319 Id. at 317.
320 Id.
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who specialized in reports about organized crime.32' Moldea had published
many newspaper and magazine articles, as well as three other books on this
subject.322 The book review was written by Gerald Eskenazi, a sports writ-
er for the New York Times. In his libel action, Moldea claimed that six
statements in the review defamed him "by accusing him of being an incom-
petent practitioner of his chosen profession, investigative journalism, and by
supporting that accusation with false characterizations of his book." '323 He
further alleged that the review "both destroyed public interest in his book
and effectively ended his career as an investigative journalist." '324 In addi-
tion, he claimed that the review had prevented him from obtaining lecture
bookings, from which he previously had earned a significant income.325
In its first Moldea opinion ("Moldea/,,)326 the D.C. Circuit Court held
that the review contained three defamatory charges that a jury could find
were false.327 The first was the statement that "[t]here is too much sloppy
journalism to trust the bulk of this book's 512 pages-including its whop-
ping 64 pages of notes.""32 As to this charge, the court determined:
To assert that Interference is "sloppy" necessarily implies
that Eskenazi concluded that it is sloppy because of specific
shortcomings he found in the book. In order for the review
to be nonactionable as a matter of law, the Times must show
that it offered true facts in support of its judgment that
served to support its statement of opinion.329
The court held that a jury could find that two statements in the book review,
presented in support of this opinion, were false.33 The first was the fol-
lowing passage in the review:
Mr. Moldea tells as well of Mr. Namath's "guaranteeing" a
victory in Super Bowl III shortly after a sinister meeting in a
bar with a member of the opposition, Lou Michaels, the
Baltimore Colts' place-kicker. The truth is that the pair al-
32 Id. at 312.
322 Moldea v. New York Times Co. [hereinafter "Moldea I"], 15 F.3d 1137, 1140
(D.C. Cir.), modified, 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
323 Id. at 1141.
324 Id. at 1140.
325 Id.
326 Moldea 1, 15 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
327 Id. at 1146-49.
321 Id. at 1141.
329 Id. at 1146.
330 Id. at 1149.
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most came to blows after they both had been drinking; and
Mr. Namath's well-publicized "guarantee" came about quite
innocently at a Miami Touchdown Club dinner when a fan
asked him if he thought the Jets had a chance. "We'll win. I
guarantee it," Mr. Namath replied."'
The court held that a jury could find that the review falsely characterized
Moldea's portrayal of the meeting between Namath and Michaels as "sinis-
ter," because the book quotes Michaels and another player who was present
as stating that the meeting was "confrontational" and that "nothing techni-
cal" about the game was discussed.332 The second statement that the jury
could have found to be false was the assertion that "[Moldea] revives the
discredited notion that Carroll Rosenbloom, the ornery owner of the Rams,
who had a penchant for gambling, met foul play when he drowned in Flori-
da 10 years ago. 333 The court observed that Moldea's discussion of the
drowning on pages 319 through 326 of the book ends with "quoted observa-
tions from several of Rosenbloom's friends who speculate that he was mur-
dered. 334 The court added:
However, later in his book, on page 360, Moldea states that
he has located previously unknown photographs taken at
Rosenbloom's autopsy which he presented for inspection to
"several friends within the law-enforcement community."
Moldea then concludes that "In short, the evidence appears
to be clear that Rosenbloom died in a tragic accident and
was not murdered."
335
The court determined that the "revival" charge was supportable in the sense
that Moldea referred to suspicions of Rosenbloom's friends.336 The charge,
however, could be found false:
A jury could, taking into consideration the generally negative
tone of the review as a whole, find that the implication in-
tended by the "revives the discredited notion" passage was
not simply that Moldea discusses a "discredited notion," but
that Moldea does not reveal what Eskenazi implies is the
well known truth about Rosenbloom's death. Read in this




331 Id. at 1147-48.
336 Id. at 1148.
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fashion, the Times review implied that Moldea is a poor
journalist indeed-one who accepts versions of events that
he should know already have been disproved; or worse still,
intentionally purveys "discredited notions" in an effort to
suggest scandal where there is none.337
In Moldea II, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the interest
in freedom of expression in book reviews requires a different verifiability
test than the customary test whether a jury could find that a charge was
false.33 The court held that the review was not actionable under its new
test-whether the charge was a reasonable interpretation of the book's char-
acterizations. 39 The court held that the "sloppy journalism" charge "is
supported by revealed premises that we cannot hold to be false in the con-
text of a book review."34 The "revival" charge was a reasonable inter-
pretation of the book's accounts of Rosenbloom's drowning:
Given that Interference does not reveal that Rosenbloom's
death was accidental until 35 pages after giving undeniably
titillating hints of homicide, we cannot hold that a reviewer
could not reasonably suggest that Moldea sought to "revive"
the notion that Rosenbloom was murdered in order to build
suspense before disproving that theory.'
This holding is questionable, even under the court's "reasonable construc-
tion" theory. It is one thing to charge that Moldea revived the drowning
suspicions to build suspense before disproving the theory, and quite another
thing to charge that Moldea revived the suspicions without explaining that
he disagreed with the theory, and came up with newly discovered evidence
that disproved it. The "reasonable construction" test of verifiability, howev-
er, itself is questionable.342
The court's treatment of the "sinister meeting" statement is even more
curious than its treatment of the "revival" charge. The court could not bring
itself to hold that the review's characterization of Moldea's account of
Namath's encounter with Michaels was a "supportable interpretation. '343
Although it was "troubled by the 'sinister meeting' passage," the court was
337 Id.
338 Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 315.
339 Id. at 319.
340 Id. at 317.
341 Id. at 318.
342 See discussion infra part V.D.
343 "Even applying the 'supportable interpretation' standard, this review passage is
close to the line." Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 318.
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"constrained to conclude that it [did] not give rise to an actionable
claim."3" The statement was not actionable because the "sloppy journal-
ism" charge was supported by five examples that could not be proven
false.345 Thus, "even without the support of the 'sinister meeting' passage,
the review's assertion that Interference is marred by 'too much sloppy
journalism' is (as a legal matter) 'substantially true."'346 The "sinister
meeting" charge, standing alone, was not "defamatory on its face" or "inher-
ently defamatory." '347 The court explained that "the discussion of the 'sin-
ister meeting' [was] but one of several interpretations of the book offered to
support the claim of 'sloppy journalism.""'34
The court used this rationale to get around its rejection in Moldea I of
the "incremental harm" rule.349 In Moldea I, the court would not allow the
Times to "establish on remand that the review is nonactionable merely by
proving that some of the factual claims it makes to support its assertion that
Interference is 'sloppy' are true."35 The complaint in Moldea I was ac-
tionable because two of the review's examples of "sloppy journalism" could
be found false.3"' In Moldea II, the court found that the complaint was not
actionable if only one of the examples could be found false.'
Whether the court's approach to the issue of substantial truth is defen-
sible, its newly adopted test of verifiability is not. The court justified
adoption of the test by a misapplication of Supreme Court decisions, and its
new test does not advance First Amendment values. The court asserted that
its "decision to apply the 'supportable interpretation' standard to book re-
views [found] strong support in analogous decisions of the Supreme Court,
all decided or reaffirmed after Milkovich."'353 The court interpreted those
"cases [to] establish that when a writer is evaluating or giving an account of
inherently ambiguous materials or subject matter, the First Amendment re-
quires that the courts allow latitude for interpretation."354 The decisions on
which the court relied, however, concern the applicability of the rational




341 Id. at 319.
348 Id.
341 In Moldea I, the court noted that it had "squarely rejected the argument that a
false defamatory statement made among other true ones cannot be actionable because it
does only 'incremental harm' to a plaintiff s reputation." Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1149.
310 Id. at 1150.
351 Id. at 1146.
352 Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 318-19.
313 Id. at 315.
354 Id.
35 See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Bose Corp. v.
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this fact, but stated:
Although Masson, Bose and Pape all concerned the evidence
necessary to establish "actual malice," those decisions are
rooted in the question of a plaintiffs ability to prove falsity
so as to show that a defendant presented information he or
she knew to be false. Because of their focus on falsity, the
reasoning of these decisions is fully applicable to the instant
case.
356
The court's conclusion elides important differences between the appli-
cation of a rational interpretation standard to the issue of actual malice, and
its application to the issue of falsity. The focus of the Supreme Court deci-
sions in Bose, Pape, and Masson was not on falsity, but on actual malice.
These decisions did not hold that a plaintiff may never recover for a defam-
atory statement that is a rational interpretation of an event or source. In
Bose and Pape, the only evidence of actual malice was the publisher's de-
liberate choice of the language in question.357 The Court in Pape held that
even if the language used carried a false meaning, the deliberate choice of
the language alone could not support a finding of actual malice when the
language chosen was "one of a number of possible rational interpretations of
a document [or event] that bristled with ambiguities." '358 In Masson, the
Court refused to apply the rational interpretation test to the use of deliber-
ately altered quotations of the plaintiffs words, recognizing that such an
"orthodox use of a quotation is the quintessential 'direct account of events
that speak for themselves.' 359 The defendant would be subject to liability
if the alterations in the plaintiffs language made the quotation substantially
false. 360 Actual malice could be inferred from the deliberate choice of
words because the author was not purporting to interpret the statements of
the plaintiff, but was purporting to state them precisely.36'
In Masson, the Court elaborated on the issue of falsity in language that
seems particularly relevant to Moldea II:
The common law of libel takes but one approach to the
question of falsity, regardless of the form of the communica-
Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S.
279 (1971).
356 Moldea II, 22 F.3d at 316 (footnotes omitted).
317 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511-12; Pape, 401 U.S. at 285.
358 Pape, 401 U.S. at 290, quoted in Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 512.
... Masson, 501 U.S. at 519 (quoting Pape, 401 U.S. at 285).
'60 Id. at 516.
361 Id. at 518-20.
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tion. It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon
substantial truth .... [T]he statement is not considered false
unless it "would have a different effect on the mind of the
reader from that which the pleaded truth would have pro-
duced." Our definition of actual malice relies upon this his-
torical understanding.362
This language suggests that the common law test of falsity applies to all
communications, regardless of their form. Therefore, Masson stands for the
proposition that malice may be inferred from the deliberate alteration of the
plaintiffs language in a manner that makes the altered quotation substantial-
ly false.
In none of the cases relied upon in Moldea II does the Court hold that
the rational interpretation test would preclude the plaintiff from recovery if
the plaintiff could prove substantial falsity under the traditional common law
test and could establish actual malice by evidence other than mere inference
from the choice of language. At least one lower court has allowed recovery
under these circumstances,363 and the Supreme Court decisions do not sug-
gest this result is invalid.
The reasonable construction test as applied to the falsity issue does not
advance First Amendment interests; it virtually immunizes reviewers at the
expense of authors. The extensive protections already given to reviewers by
the rules on actual malice and the burden of persuasion on falsity are suffi-
cient. The plaintiff should be required to prove not only fault with regard to
falsity, but also fault with regard to readers' interpretations of ambiguous
charges, in order to show actual malice.3" With this proviso, current
protections are more than adequate to protect the interest of reviewers. The
new protection extended in Moldea II is counterproductive. Under the new
test, Moldea could not recover even if he could prove that the review pre-
sented an inaccurate account of what the book reported, and that the review-
er knew that the reasonable reader would receive a false impression of what
the book said. Such a rule protects the crafty at the expense of the innocent;
it even protects the deliberate liar. If Moldea's allegations are true, the effect
of this book review was to silence Moldea as a writer and a lecturer.365
362 Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted).
363 See infra notes 706-13 and accompanying text (discussing Good Gov't Group of
Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979)).
364 See discussion infra part V.D.
365 Moldea's publications did in fact diminish for a period of time. It was recently
reported that "after several discouraging years of having his proposals rejected,
[Moldea] recently signed a $75,000 advance for a book on the Robert Kennedy assas-
sination." Carlin Romano, Paper Chase-, 258 THE NATION 778, 780 (June 6, 1994)
[hereinafter Paper Chase-I].
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The broad freedom of speech granted to reviewers threatens to diminish the
speech of bookwriters and lessen the aggregate number of voices in the
marketplace of ideas.366
In Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications,367 the court held
that certain statements in a series of articles published by the Boston Globe
about the Phantom Touring Company were protected opinions under
Milkovich because they were ambiguous:
" Carlin Romano, who is the literary critic of The Philadelphia Inquirer and pres-
ident of the National Book Critics Circle, also has expressed concern about the free
speech implications of Moldea II, given the New York Times's media power and its
refusal to publish a response by Moldea to its review of Interference. See id. at 778;
Carlin Romano, Paper Chase-II, 258 THE NATION 874 (June 20, 1994) [hereinafter
Paper Chase-lI]. Regarding First Amendment theory, he noted that there is a recog-
nized "need for the press to curb the bad institutional impulses of government." Id. He
added:
The Moldea case, by contrast, forces us to weigh whether free-expression theory,
and First Amendment jurisprudence, must also take better account of the institu-
tional impulses of the elite daily newspaper: its tendency to keep secrets about its
internal operations, to reject outside criticism, to muffle internal dissent, to pro-
mote the public impression that it has always acted properly. When those impuls-
es combine, as they do at the Times, with a marketing approach that touts the
paper as the one necessary and sufficient news product for all readers, a threat to
free expression looms. When that alliance further combines with raw private pow-
er as chief evaluator of the country's books (a power The Boston Globe's editorial
on the Moldea case rightly attributed to "how spineless the rest of the media are
in the shadow of the Times"), lovers of robust debate must re-examine their pre-
mises.
Id. Romano stingingly asserted:
[D]espite the reflex posturing of big media organizations praising Moldea II as a
victory for freedom of speech, it's actually the opposite. It's a victory not for
working journalists, authors and critics who thrive on debating issues and inter-
pretations but for corporate media managers who want to squelch criticism of
what they publish, escape tightening their standards to eliminate shoddy review-
ing, evade questioning of the judgment of their critics, avoid paying for their
mistakes as other corporate managers must and, above all, prevent ordinary Amer-
icans-the members of a jury-from getting a look at their practices.
Paper Chase-I, supra note 365 at 780. Romano argued that "[a court] should err on
the side of little-guy plaintiffs versus powerful media defendants when the defendant's
allegedly libelous statements are arguably factual and false, the plaintiff is a subject of
the media defendant's criticism and the plaintiff has been offered no opportunity to
reply." Paper Chase-I, supra at 877-78. He concluded: "[T]he right to sue for libel
remains one of the few weapons a stigmatized author retains in a corporate media envi-
ronment. It should not be necessary for an author who has a grievance against the
Times Book Review to sue." Id. at 878.
367 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992); see also supra notes
211-18 and accompanying text.
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Many of the statements cited in the complaint and appellate
brief either constitute obviously protected hyperbole or are
not susceptible of being proved true or false. Such, for ex-
ample, is the language in "The phantom of the 'Phantom"'
quoting a critic who described the Hill production as "a rip-
off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job." Not only is this
commentary figurativ6 and hyperbolic, but we also can imag-
ine no objective evidence to disprove it. Whether appellant's
"Phantom" is "fake" or "phony" is similarly unprovable,
since those adjectives admit of numerous interpretations.368
The court also stated that the assertion that the defendants were "blatantly
misleading the public" was nonactionable because it "is subjective and im-
precise, and therefore not capable of verification or refutation by means of
objective proof. '369 The court's analysis is highly questionable as a proper
interpretation of Milkovich because the charge that the defendants were mis-
leading the public is at least an impure opinion that states or implies defam-
atory fact.
In James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,370 the court held that vague,
subjective terms used in a critical column about a public defender's acqui-
sition of the school records of victims of alleged sexual assaults were opin-
ion:
The statements that "when the legal community turns on
kids, it doubles their trauma," and that [an attorney who ad-
vised school districts] "get[s] hassled all the time by attor-
neys wanting school records without going through the prop-
er motions," contain too many generalizations, elastic terms,
and elements of subjectivity to be susceptible of proof or
disproof. When does the "legal community" "turn on"
"kids"? What is "trauma" in this context, and how can its
increments by measured? What does "hassled" mean? What
are "the proper motions," and what is the implication of the
fact attorneys do not want to go through them: Beyond "has-
sling," are we to understand that these attorneys would sim-
ply take the records without going through the proper mo-
tions?
The columnist's perception that "the judge has taken a
368 Phantom, 953 F.2d at 728.
369 Id. at 728 n.7.
370 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890 (Ct. App. 1993).
532 [Vol. 3:2
A MATTER OF OPINION
dim view of the defense tactics" is plainly labeled as opinion
but arguably implies that the judge has indeed taken "a dim
view." But what is a "dim view"? In common parlance it
means disapproval or dissatisfaction. But how much or how
little of either would suffice to connote a "dim view"? These
matters, again, are not susceptible of proof or disproof."a '
The result in James may be appropriate on the grounds that the defendants'
statements either were not of and concerning the plaintiff, or that they were
true.372 Immunizing statements because they are vague or ambiguous, how-
ever, is a problematic practice.373 '
In Lund v. Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Co.,a74 a manager
of the defendant company held a "brainstorming session" with employees to
discuss their problems and concerns.375 After the meeting, which the plain-
tiff, Lund, did not attend, the manager posted on a bulletin board a memo-
randum about the complaints aired at the meeting.376 Number sixty-six of
the eighty-five numbered entries read: "FAVORITISM, DICK LUND,
SICK, MOVE-UPS, BROWN NOSE, SHIT HEADS. 377 The plaintiff al-
leged that other employees harassed him after this memorandum was posted,
causing him to suffer emotional and physical problems. 378 The Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that the statements in entry sixty-six were constitu-
tionally protected as opinion. 379 The court employed a multifactor analysis,
which the court noted was no longer binding after Milkovich, but was "still
helpful for determining whether a statement implies actual facts that can be
proven false."38 The court held that the factor of precision and specificity
ruled out liability for the words "move-ups" and "shit heads. 38' The court
71 Id. at 898.
372 It seems doubtful that the defendants' references to the legal community in gener-
al and to attorneys hassling school-district attorneys would be understood as referring to
the plaintiff public defender. It further appears that the statement that the judge had
taken a "dim view" of the plaintiff's defense tactics was true. On being informed that
the public defender's office had obtained possession of the children's school records,
the judge stated: "[I]f that has occurred-Apparently it has-that is in violation of, at a
minimum, the rules of Court." Id. at 892. The judge set a date for a further hearing on
the matter. Id.
373 See discussion infra part V.D.
'- 467 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).




379 Id. at 370.
311 Id. at 369.
381 id.
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added that "the underlying facts to be inferred from these terms are unclear.
Although uncomplimentary, 'shit heads' does not suggest verifiably false
facts about Lund.""3 2 As for the remaining words, the court stated:
The terms "favoritism" and "brown nose" require a simi-
lar conclusion. They are not themselves factual assertions,
and it is unclear what, if any, underlying facts they imply.
Even if the terms are viewed as hybrid statements of opinion
and fact, we conclude that the ambiguous implications of the
words prevent them from being proven true or false. 3
Arguably the terms used in Lund were, as a matter of law, mere invec-
tives or insults, and therefore not actionable. However, the court's holding
that they were protected as opinion because they were ambiguous, even if
they were "hybrid statements of opinion and fact," is highly question-
able.384
In Hunt v. University of Minnesota,31 5 the Minnesota Court of Appeals
considered statements made by a former co-employee of the plaintiff to a
member of a county board that was considering hiring plaintiff as a lobby-
ist.386 The court affirmed the trial court's award of summary judgment to
the defendant on the uncontroversial ground that the statements were condi-
tionally privileged and there was "no jury issue on malice." '387 In addition,
the court held that the statements in question were constitutionally protected
opinion.311 The statements were "that Hunt had trouble dealing with legis-
lators because she lacked warmth, was insincere, and had no sense of integ-
rity." ' 9 Hunt did not contend that the statements about her warmth and
sincerity could be proved false, but asserted that the charge about her integ-
rity "can be interpreted as stating facts. '39" Based on a multifactor analysis,
which the court determined was "still helpful under Milkovich,""' the court
held that the statement was opinion.392
The court in Hunt appears to have based this conclusion on two tests.
The first was the ambiguity test. The court found that the charge was not
382 Id.
383 Id.
See discussion infra part V.D.
385 465 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
36 Id. at 91.
387 Id. at 90.
388 Id.
389 Id. at 91.
391 Id. at 94.
391 Id.
392 Id. at 92.
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provable as false because "when all the underlying predicate facts are con-
sidered, with all their conflicting inferences, the statement is not provable
one way or the other." '393 Thus, the conflicting inferences of the underlying,
unstated facts gave the statement variable meanings, making it unverifiable.
The second test immunizes the statement of a speaker's point of view or
conjecture, even without supporting facts. Thus, the court reasoned that
"[a]ny evaluation of Hunt's work in this context [could not] be seen as fact,
but instead must be viewed as a personal impression built over the course of
time, based on general past experience and limited solely to the individual
speaker." '394 This holding is questionable because impugning one's "integri-
ty" is highly defamatory.395
The conditional privilege for statements in the context of employment
references was designed to facilitate socially important speech, as long as
the privilege is not abused.396 Treating an unsubstantiated charge of a lack
of a "sense of integrity" as immune opinion, however, goes far beyond the
fact/opinion distinction made in Milkovich, and is not required by First
Amendment policy.397
6. Use of a Multifactor Analysis to Hold that Statements are Factual
Not all decisions that use a multifactor analysis hold that statements are
opinion. Some courts have held that charges were factual under a
multifactor analysis.398 Although most of these decisions seem correct, two
... Id. at 94-95 (quoting Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Minn. 1990)
(Simonett, J., concurring)).
'94 Id. at 95.
395 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
It is actionable per se to impute to another in libelous form conduct that tends to
lower the other's reputation for veracity or honesty, irrespective of whether the
conduct constitutes a criminal offense and irrespective of whether it tends to af-
fect the trade, business or profession of the other. Thus it is actionable so to ac-
cuse another of the crime of perjury, larceny or embezzlement, or to make any
derogatory imputation of fact concerning another's veracity or integrity.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. g (1977). Although Hunt was an action
based on slander, there was no issue on appeal as to whether the statement was slander
per se. It may be that the defendant did not contest that the statement was slander per
se, or that the action was for slander per quod, with the plaintiff alleging special dam-
ages resulting from her failure to get the job with the county board. Regarding slander
per se and per quod, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 570-75 (1977).
396 LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 465-66 (1978).
391 See discussion infra part V.C.
398 See, e.g., Cliniatis v. Dimas, 848 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Keohane v.
Stewart, No. 93SC382, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 532 (July 11, 1994); Sigal Constr. Corp. v.
Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1991); Kumaran v. Brotman, 617 N.E.2d 191 (I11. App.
Ct. 1993); Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster Inc., 610 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1994); Gross v.
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of the cases decided under New York law demonstrate the vagaries of
multifactor analysis.
In Gross v. New York Times Co., the New York Court of Appeals
used the multifactor point-of-view analysis that it had adopted in Immuno
AG. v. Moor-Jankowski"0 to hold that the complaint alleged charges of
defamatory fact and therefore was sufficient to withstand a motion to dis-
miss." ' The action was based on a series of investigative reports in the
New York Times on charges that the plaintiff, then the Chief Medical Ex-
aminer of New York City, had produced misleading or inaccurate autopsy
reports on people who had died in police custody.4 2 The court stated:
[A]lthough the articles contain many assertions that would be
understood by the reasonable reader as mere hypotheses
premised on stated facts, there are also actionable charges
made in the articles-such as the charges that plaintiff en-
gaged in cover-ups, directed the creation of "misleading"
autopsy reports and was guilty of "possibly illegal" con-
duct-that, although couched in the language of hypothesis
or conclusion, actually would be understood by the reason-
able reader as assertions of fact.40 3
The court observed that these charges were made in a special feature series
in the paper's news section, that they contained copious documentation, and
that they purported to be based on a thorough investigation 4 The court
asserted that "the circumstances under which these accusations were pub-
lished 'encourag[ed] the reasonable reader to be less skeptical and more
willing to conclude that [they] stat[ed] or impl[ied] facts.' 40 5
This opinion illustrates the difficulty of applying the multifactor, point-
of-view analysis to the fact/opinion distinction. It gave no guidance to the
trial court as to which statements in the articles in question should be re-
garded as factual, beyond the examples given in the quotation set forth
above. The court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs contention that charges of
criminal conduct are actionable, whether or not expressed as the opinion of
the author. 6 Noting that such charges may be merely rhetorical hyper-
New York Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 1993).
399 623 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 1993).
- 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). For a discussion of
Immuno, see supra notes 275-86 and accompanying text.
40" Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1165.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 1168 (citation omitted).
404 Id. at 1169.
405 Id. (citation omitted).
41 "Although plaintiff repeatedly suggests otherwise, there is simply no special rule
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bole, the court further stated:
Similarly, even when uttered or published in a more
serious tone, accusations of criminality could be regarded as
mere hypothesis and therefore not actionable if the facts on
which they are based are fully and accurately set forth and it
is clear to the reasonable reader or listener that the accusa-
tion is merely a personal surmise built upon those facts. 7
It is unclear how this statement can be reconciled with the court's previous
assertion that the articles' charges as to cover-ups and misleading autopsy
reports, "although couched in the language of hypothesis or conclusion,
actually would be understood by the reasonable reader as assertions of
fact." 8 The context of the charge was crucial to the court in determining
whether the reasonable reader would understand the charge as a personal
surmise or an assertion of fact.409 Still, it concluded that some unspecified
assertions in the articles would be understood as "mere hypotheses premised
on stated fact," while other charges "couched in the language of hypothesis
or conclusion" would be understood as assertions of fact.410
The court may have been implying that the statement of a hypothesis or
conclusion in a news report is not opinion if the facts on which it is based
are not fully and accurately stated; yet Immuno did not limit protected opin-
ion to hypotheses based on disclosed facts.4" Immuno involved a letter to
the editor, written from a clearly partisan stance, rather than an investigative
report printed in the news section of a newspaper.4 ' The significance of
Gross and Immuno may be that the statement of a point of view without a
factual predicate is opinion in a partisan letter to the editor, but not in an
investigative news story. Still, Gross is unclear on the question whether
hypotheses stated in a news article are factual only when unaccompanied by
of law making criminal slurs actionable regardless of whether they are asserted as opin-
ion or fact." Id.
407 Id.
40' Id. at 1168.
i The court in Gross stated:
In all cases, whether the challenged remark concerns criminality or some other
defamatory category, the courts are obliged to consider the communication as a
whole, as well as its immediate and broader social contexts, to determine whether
the reasonable listener or reader is likely to understand the remark as an assertion
of provable fact ....
Id. at 1169 (citation omitted).
410 Id. at 1168.
4 See Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1280-82 (employing a contextual analysis and not
inquiring about a factual predicate).
412 Id. at 1280.
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a factual predicate.
In Gross, the appellate division had affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the complaint.41 3 The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals re-
flects the ad hoc character of multifactor analysis, giving little guidance to
the lower courts for the resolution of the issues in Gross on remand or in
future cases. Because the approach lacks a core definition of opinion, courts
using the analysis select the factor or factors they believe are decisive in
particular cases, but they have no basis for explaining the reasons for their
choices.4"4
Applying New York law and following Gross, a United States district
court also has held that allegations of criminal conduct were factual. In
Coliniatis v. Dimas,4 '5 a letter sent by a law firm to its client reported a
charge by a real estate agent that the plaintiff, an employee of the client,
was attempting to exact kick-backs from the agent.4"6 The letter stated that
the charges were "of substantial but not absolute reliability," and that "[if
the charges] be true," then the plaintiff was planning to obtain kick-backs in
excess of $500,000. 4' The court held that under both Milkovich and the
New York multifactor analysis, the kick-back charges were factual.4 8
Applying the multifactor analysis of Gross, the court found that "[t]he
statements contained in the Letter, 'although couched in the language of
hypothesis or conclusion, actually would be understood by the reasonable
reader as assertions of fact.""'4 9 The court held that the first two parts of
the multifactor analysis were satisfied because "[t]he Letter charges
Coliniatis with criminal behavior in precise language that is both readily
understandable and verifiable."'4 The third factor was met because "the
Letter gives the impression that it was written after lengthy delibera-
tion."42' The court determined that "the Letter's verbal context suggests to
41' Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1166.
... See supra text accompanying note 11.
4" 848 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
416 Id. at 466.
417 Id.
48 Applying the Milkovich analysis, the court stated:
First, the Letter addresses an area of public concern, the possibility that Coliniatis
was engaging in an illegal scheme to defraud Olympic, an arm of the government
of Greece. Second, the truth or falsity of the statement that Coliniatis expected to
receive a kick-back from all of the professional arrangements entered into be-
tween Sfouggatakis and Olympic can be factually verified. Third, the statements
contained in the Letter are not "the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic lan-
guage which would negate the impression that the writer [is] seriously maintain-
ing" that plaintiff engaged in an illegal kickback scheme.
Id. at 467 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)).
419 Id. at 468 (quoting Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1168).
410 Id. at 468-69.
411 Id. at 469.
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the reader that the statements were intended to be understood as assertions
of fact." '422 The fourth factor was also met:
The statements contained in the Letter were made in the
context of an attorney-client relationship in which the attor-
ney sought to relay sensitive information of importance to
his client, presumably because of his professional obligation
to do so. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that a
reasonable reader would believe that the Letter was convey-
ing facts about the plaintiff.
423
Relying on Gross, the court asserted that "there is no special rule of law
making allegations of criminal conduct actionable regardless of whether they
are asserted as opinion or fact. '4 24 Like Gross, however, the decision in
Coliniatis provides no basis for determining when a statement couched in
terms of hypothesis or opinion will be treated as factual. The holdings in
both Gross and Coliniatis appear to be ad hoc determinations not linked to
any general definition of protected opinion.
Less problematic than these New York decisions are four cases in which
the courts used a multifactor analysis to determine that the assertions in
question were factual. In Sigal Construction Corp. v. Stanbury,425 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals held that it did not need to decide
whether Milkovich applied to statements made prior to that decision because
the statements were factual under the court's pre-Milkovich multifactor
test.426 The statements were made by the plaintiffs former employer to a
prospective employer about the plaintiff's job performance as a construction
project manager.427 The court held that the defendant's assertion that the
plaintiff was "detail oriented ... to the point of losing sight of the big pic-
ture" was factual because of the context.428 The court reasoned that "[i]n
commenting on Stanbury's work habits, Littman must have known, or at
least should have known, that Janes would interpret his statements as factual
evaluations of Stanbury's approach to managing a construction project. 429
The court held that defendant's statement that the plaintiff did not "see the
big picture" was factual because it "implied undisclosed defamatory
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 469 n.5 (citing Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1169).
425 586 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1991).
426 Id. at 1210.
427 Id. at 1206.
428 Id. at 1211.
429 Id.
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facts."43 Furthermore "Stanbury testified, without contradiction, that 'not
seeing the big picture' meant in the construction trade that he did not per-
form his job properly, could not recognize unusual problems, and, thus could
not determine what is necessary to correct such problems so that the project
would be properly completed on time."43 ' The court determined that the
defendant's statements were verifiable, as demonstrated by the evidence pre-
sented at trial: "This evidence made clear that whether Stanbury was too
detail oriented to complete the project properly and on time could be objec-
tively evaluated and thus verified.
432
In Keohane v. Stewart,433 the court used a multifactor analysis to hold
that a councilman's questions addressed to a reporter following a judge's
ruling in a criminal trial-"What do you think, was [he] paid off with drugs
or money?" and "Do you think he was paid off in cash or cocaine?"-were,
under the circumstances, implicit assertions that the plaintiff judge had taken
a bribe.434 In Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,' the New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, held that a book's statements implying that
the plaintiff attorney had a conflict of interest in representing a client, and
that he had suborned perjury, were not protected opinion, considering the
immediate context of the statements and the context of the entire book.436
In Kumaran v. Brotman,4" an Illinois intermediate appellate court held,
under a totality-of-circumstances test, that the use of the word "scam," im-
plying that the plaintiff frequently brought unwarranted lawsuits to procure
settlements, was a factual charge.43
7. The Immunization of Hyperbole and Invective
Since Milkovich, seven decisions have immunized language involving
hyperbole and invective.439 To some extent the cases in this category may
430 Id.
431 Id.
432 Id. at 1212.
433 No. 93SC382, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 532 (July 11, 1994).
434 Id. at *3.
435 610 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1994).
436 Id. at 506.
437 617 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
431 Id. at 200-01.
439 Turner v. Devlin, 848 P.2d 286, 292 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc); Morningstar, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App. 1994); Kimura v. Superior Court, 281
Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (Ct. App. 1991); Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158,
1164 (Mass. 1993); Polish American Immigration Relief Comm., Inc. v. RELAX, 596
N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (App. Div. 1993); Milford Plaza Assoc. v. The Hearst Corp., 20
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1967, 1968 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Bross v. Smith, 608 N.E.2d
1175, 1180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2340 (1993).
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overlap with those in the third category, immunizing a speaker's "point of
view"; that is, the courts may be resting on the proposition that when highly
insulting language is used in the course of a heated controversy, those to
whom the language is published will understand it to represent the speaker's
point of view. Four of these decisions are not problematic." The other
In Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158 (Mass. 1993), the court
immunized as hyperbole or invective a charge concerning picketing of a state party con-
vention by a police union. Id. at 1163. The article stated: "Luis Prado, executive direc-
tor of La Alianza Hispana in Roxbury, said the situation was far worse than the Febru-
ary elections in Nicaragua, where he served as a United Nations monitor. 'The
Sandinistas never dared to do anything like this,' he said. 'This is like using brute force
in politics."' Id. at 1167. The court concluded that statements in the article concerning
the motives of the picketers were pure opinion. Id. at 1163. The court then stated:
Our conclusion that the challenged statements constituted expressions of opinion
remains unchanged when we read the theory that Silber supporters promoted the
picketing together with Prado's reference to the Sandinistas and with the use of
such words as "hostage" or "brute force." These utterances readily fall into the
category of mere vituperation and verbal abuse and reasonably could not be con-
strued to state facts.
Lyons, 612 N.E.2d at 1162 n.6 (citations omitted). Given that the article contained a full
description of the picketing of the convention, it appears that the charge that "the situa-
tion was far worse than the February election in Nicaragua" was a hyperbolic character-
ization of picketing that disrupted a party's political process. Id. at 1167. It does not ap-
pear to imply defamatory unstated facts.
In Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1994), the
defendant published a financial newsletter in which it strongly criticized the plaintiff for
its advertisements of its mutual fund rankings by Lipper Analytical Services. Id. at 548.
The criticisms appeared in a column labeled "Commentary." Heading the column was
an italicized statement "Pilgrim dominates the charts?" and then the title in bold type,
reading "Lies, Damn Lies, and Fund Advertisements." Id. at 549. The article portrayed
the advertisements as misleading because of their use of fine print and their manipula-
tion of the Lipper mutual fund categories to suggest that Pilgrim funds had placed in
the top five rankings of some unidentified, single category. Id. at 549-51. The plaintiff
did not allege that any statement in the article itself was false. The plaintiff alleged it
had been libelled because (1) the defendant did not disclose that Lipper was the source
of the rankings featured in the ads, (2) the title of the article falsely charged that
Pilgrim's ads contained lies, and (3) the article questioned the validity of the plaintiffs
rankings. Id. The court easily dismissed the first and third bases for a libel action, hold-
ing that disclosure of the source of the rankings would not have changed the effect of
the article on the mind of the reader, id. at 552, and that the plaintiff had failed to al-
lege that any statements in the article were false, id. at 558. With respect to the asser-
tion that the title of the article accused the plaintiff of lying, the court held that the
sophisticated readers of this newsletter would construe the title as mere rhetorical hy-
perbole. Id. at 554-55. The court noted that the heading was a play on Mark Twain's
attribution to Benjamin Disraeli of the quip that there are three kinds of lies: "lies,
damned lies, and statistics." Id. at 553. The court observed that "the title conveyed the
sense this was an article expressing an opinion about how statistics were manipulated,
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three, however, are questionable.
In Kimura v. Superior Court," a California intermediate appellate
court immunized language it found to be political rhetoric and invective in
the context of a heated campus controversy." 2 This category of political
speech is not precisely "opinion" as such, but, as the court stated, is "more
opinion than fact" and not provable false."43 Lower court decisions before
Milkovich have held that political invective is not actionable,' and
Milkovich approved the Court's previous decisions holding that such rhetoric
is absolutely privileged under the Constitution when it does not carry a
provable false factual connotation." 5 The difficulty lies in distinguishing
between charges that do and do not carry factual implications.
Kimura held that the defendant's charges of racism and bigotry were
not that the statistics themselves were false." Id. The court concluded that the hyperbol-
ic language in the title "was protected before Milkovich and remains protected in its
wake." Id. at 555.
In Polish American Immigration Relief Comm., Inc. v. RELAX, 596 N.Y.S.2d 756
(App. Div. 1993), the court held that the use of the words "thieves," "madhouse," and
"false do-gooders," in reference to the plaintiff Polish-American immigrant organiza-
tion, were clearly rhetorical hyperbole and invective in the context of the publication.
Id. at 757. Because the factual bases for the charges were disclosed, the pure opinion
rule applied. Id. at 758-59.
In Milford Plaza Associates v. The Hearst Corp., 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1967
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), the court held that a humorous newspaper column complaining
about a hotel commercial broadcast during a PGA golf tournament contained no factual
charges. Id. at 1968. The column stated: "For 50 bucks, you can stay in the Milford
Plaza. But be sure to take some Gold Bond itch powder with you. Any hotel in Man-
hattan that would offer you a room at that meager cost might also offer you the risk of
catching Lyme Disease." Id. at 1968. The court ruled that the column "did not purport
to assert facts or observations based on knowledge of facts and the remarks at issue
were prompted by curmudgeonly reaction to TV ads, not a survey of the quality of
hotel accommodations in New York." Id. Although the court did not expressly rely on
the rhetorical hyperbole rule, the brief opinion is consistent with the principle that mere
invective is nonactionable. It was clear to the reader that the comment about Lyme
Disease was merely a humorous, negative reaction to the commercial.
41 281 Cal. Rptr. 691 (Ct. App. 1991).
442 Id. at 692-93.
443 Id. at 701.
' The leading case is Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir. 1976) (involv-
ing the terms "fascist," "fellow traveler," and "radical right"), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977).
"[W]hen it appears that political labels are used loosely as epithets or. as charac-
terizations in the realm of opinion, rather than as factual implications, the courts tend to
treat such use as nondefamatory." 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 270, at 32 n.34.
44' Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (discussing "the Bresler-
Letter Carriers-Falwell line of cases"); see supra note 83 (discussing those cases).
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constitutionally protected expressions."6 The case grew out of a controver-
sy at Crown College of the University of California at Santa Cruz. Crown
and Merrill Colleges jointly held monthly theme dinners, each honoring a
particular culture."7 The activities coordinators of the two colleges pro-
posed holding a Filipino College Night on December 7, 1988."' The
plaintiff, Don Vandenberg, the Bursar of Crown College and its head of
staff, cancelled the participation of Crown College in the dinner because it
was scheduled on the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor.449 Various members of the campus community criticized Vandenberg
for that action.45°
Among his strongest critics was the defendant Victor Kimura, a univer-
sity official of Japanese descent. Kimura wrote an emotional two-page letter
to Vandenberg saying that he was "absolutely appalled and disgusted" with
the cancellation of Filipino College Night, and that Vandenberg's "attempt
'to punish"' the Filipino students demonstrated "not only an incredible level
of bigotry, but also a total ignorance of two of the most fundamental re-
quirements of affirmative action: the need to recognize ethnic differences
and the ability to not discriminate because of those differences. '45' The let-
ter also stated:
You and [the Provost] are perfect examples of what enlight-
ened people of all ethnic and cultural backgrounds define as
"racist" and "bigoted," and are at least responsible for se-
verely impeding in a major way the campus' ability to mount
a truly effective affirmative action program. The commitment
to affirmative action.., stops at the level of provost and
bursar.452
Kimura distributed copies of the letter to university officials, students, and
media representatives.453 The campus newspaper published the letter, and
"[t]he discussion became so emotional in tone that Vandenberg even re-
ceived death threats from some individuals. 454 The Provost resigned, "cit-
ing a lack of support from [the university chancellor] with regard to
Kimura, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.




451 Id. at 701.
412 Id. at 701-02.
411 Id. at 693.
44 Id. at 694.
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Kimura's attack upon her and Vandenberg," '455 and Vandenberg claimed
that he had suffered "total psychiatric disability such that he will never be
able to return to his former job."456
Relying on Milkovich and a "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis,457
the court held that "the allegedly defamatory communication is not action-
able because it constitutes constitutionally protected rhetoric generated in
discussion of a matter of public concern, and does not imply the existence
of defamatory facts." '458 The court did not base its holding on the pure
opinion rule, although it noted that the letter "plainly refers to and is pri-
marily based on the known fact that Vandenberg cancelled the Filipino
dinner." '459 Rather, the court relied on the imprecision of the charges and
the use of the terms "racist" and "bigot" as epithets:
[T]he language of the letter, and particularly its use of the
epithet "racist," does not have the tone of a reasoned accu-
sation, but rather is more like the emotional rhetoric char-
acteristic of debate in this area. One decision has noted that
the term "racist" has no precise meaning, can imply many
different kinds of facts, and is no more than meaningless
name-calling, not actionable under Illinois state defamation
law.
460
The court observed that "[a]ccusations of racism in a college community are
more apt to be expressions of anger, resentment, and possibly political dif-
ferences of opinion, than to be factual accusations intended to be taken
literally. 46'
The Kimura decision seems correct with regard to the defendant's charg-
es of racism and bigotry in connection with the plaintiffs cancellation of
Filipino College Night. The letter in effect characterized the cancellation as
an act of bigotry, and the characterization was either an evaluative comment
or a mere insulting invective critical of the plaintiffs action.
The court's treatment of the charges on affirmative action, however, is
questionable. The letter's statements-that the plaintiff was "at least respon-
sible for impeding in a major way the campus' ability to mount a truly
effective affirmative action program" and that "[tihe commitment to affir-
455 Id.
456 Id.
411 Id. at 695-96.
458 Id. at 693.
451 Id. at 698 (emphasis added).
460 Id. (citing Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1988)).
461 Id.
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mative action.., stops at the level of provost and bursar"2-received
only glancing attention by the court. It said: "Vandenburg argues that the
reference to affirmative action means that he impeded the University's affir-
mative action program, but 'affirmative action' is itself an exceptionally
imprecise term which lacks uniform understanding." 3 This rationale is
unconvincing. The letter may have been interpreted to mean that
Vandenberg had impeded the college's adoption of an affirmative action
program or that he had hampered efforts to carry out one that had been
adopted. If the letter were so understood, it would have had a specific factu-
al connotation, unaffected by the imprecision of the term "affirmative ac-
tion" as a generic concept. The trial court had denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, perhaps on that ground.4"
The court may have believed that the angry, indignant tone of the entire
letter made the affirmative action charge mere invective. The court stated,
before addressing the affirmative action charge, that "the letter here is...
readily characterized as an expression of anger and resentment which will
not be regarded in [a college] community as a literal, factual accusa-
tion. '465 Still, the charge appears to imply that Kimura's accusation of rac-
ism and bigotry are based on more than Vandenberg's cancellation of Filipi-
no College Night, and involved obstruction of affirmative action. The
court's view that the entire letter would be viewed as political invective is
questionable; it appears that the trial court was correct in holding that there
were factual issues to be resolved.466
The second decision in this category, Bross v. Smith,467 grew out of a
controversy within a police department over the suspension of the police
chief.4 68 Following the suspension, a series of unsigned letters appeared on
the department bulletin board and in the police officers' mailboxes. 9
Those letters (the "rat letters"), in vulgar and profane language, accused the
plaintiff police officers of plotting to have the chief suspended.47° They
also "made various allegations of wrongdoing, and threatened firing and
criminal prosecution of individuals associated with the 'B team' [those op-
posed to the suspended chiefl. 471
462 Id. at 701-02.
463 Id. at 701.
Id. at 692.
46 Id. at 699.
' The trial court had denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment or
summary adjudication. Id. at 692. The case went to the appellate court on a petition for
a writ of mandate. Id.
-7 608 N.E.2d 1175 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2340 (1993).
468 Id. at 1176-77.
469 Id. at 1177.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 1176-77.
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The letters were not reproduced in the court's opinion, but with refer-
ence to their content, the court stated:
We find that application of the principles set forth in
[Falwell v.] Hustler and Milkovich to the present case to be
problematic. The writings in this case seem to fall in a gray
area between the writings in Hustler and in Milkovich. The
rat letters contain assertions that are arguably provable as
true or false. For example, was Bross a "doper" or "pill
head," i.e., did he use illegal drugs; did Marsh and Schmidt
"fuck" the chief, i.e., did they falsely accuse the chief to
obtain power for themselves; did Dwyer "cover" for them;
did Marsh and Schmidt steal ammunition; were the rats
"fucking each other's wives and girlfriends," i.e., engaging
in the same types of sexual misconduct of which they ac-
cused Dwyer? Nevertheless, it is certainly arguable that the
letters use the "sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic lan-
guage which would negate the impression" that these indi-
viduals committed these acts. Further, the "general tenor" of
the letters could negate any impression that the "rats" com-
mitted any improprieties.4"
The court concluded, largely on the basis of the decision in Phantom
Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications,473 that the letters were
nonactionable :
474
[The letters'] general tenor negates any impression that
the statements contained in them are factual assertions. The
letters are so couched in exaggeration and hyperbole and are
so subjective in tone that a reasonable person could only
conclude that the author was voicing an opinion rather than
stating actual facts.47
The basis for this holding is unclear. The court may have meant that the
language in the letters was so extreme that the reader would interpret them
as stating the author's point of view. Or the court may have meant that the
reader would not give any credence to the letters. Either way, the decision
472 Id. at 1181.
411 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992); see supra text ac-
companying notes 211-18, 367-69.
4' Bross, 608 N.E.2d at 1182.
475 Id.
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seems unsound. If the letters contained charges of drug use, theft, sexual
misconduct, and making false accusations against the police chief, should
the question of the meaning of the language have been decided as a matter
of law, just because the language was extreme? Such charges are provable
as false, and the court should not determine the matter of credence.476 The
use of rhetorical hyperbole is not always protected opinion; the question is
what the language reasonably would be construed to mean.477 Those who
read the letters may have understood them as making factual charges.
Turner v. Devlin478 raises similar issues. In Turner, the Arizona Su-
preme Court held that a letter complaining about the conduct of a police
officer, sent by a school nurse to the police chief and other officials, could
not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about the officer.479
The letter criticized the manner in which the officer had handled an inves-
tigation of child abuse at the high school where the nurse worked:
When the Phoenix police officer arrived, rather than
visiting the student at his bedside where he was being
monitored for symptoms of concussion, possible damage to
the internal left ear and left eye; the officer demanded that
the student stand against the wall. The student was interro-
gated as if he, the victim, had committed an illegal act. The
officer was rude and disrespectful, and his manner bordered
on police brutality. °
Combining the point-of-view and rhetorical-hyperbole rationales, the court
476 Professor Phillips has made the point well:
[I]t appears disingenuous to argue that statements are not actionable because,
owing to the context in which they are made, nobody believes them. If nobody
believes them, then why does the speaker bother to make them? Is he a bigger
fool than all the rest of the gullible world? The disclaimer-of-belief argument
closely resembles the often unsuccessful argument against liability for alleged
puffing in the sales context .... [M]any people do in fact rely on the presumed
superior knowledge of persons allegedly possessing such knowledge or who have
access thereto. The apparent decisive effect of the political hyperbole, rhetoric, in-
vective, and innuendo during the 1988 United States presidential election bears
telling witness to the force of opinion on the public mind.
Phillips, supra note 11, at 663 (footnotes omitted).
... See, e.g., Morgan v. Bulletin Co., 85 A.2d 869, 871-72 (Pa. 1952) (holding that a
reference in newspaper story to the "Mata Hari of the parking meters" could be reason-
ably construed to imply that plaintiff was involved in attempted bribery to obtain con-
tracts with the city to install parking meters).
478 848 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc).
471 Id. at 292.
480 Id. at 294.
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held that the statements characterizing the officer's behavior were "subjec-
tive impressions, unprovable as false," and were mere rhetorical hyperbo-
le.48" ' The disputed charge that the officer "demanded that the student stand
during questioning" was not defamatory.482 The characterizations of the
officer's behavior did not imply a false assertion of fact because they did
not imply physical abuse.483
The court's rationale is questionable. At a minimum, a reasonable reader
of the letter could understand it to charge that the officer required a student
with symptoms of severe injuries to leave a bed where he was being moni-
tored and to stand for interrogation. The charge that the officer's "manner
bordered on police brutality" '484 reinforces the implication that the officer's
handling of the investigation caused at least a threat of physical and emo-
tional harm to the high school student. The plaintiff officer claimed that the
student's injuries were not as severe as the nurse portrayed them, and that
he had not demanded that the student stand.485 Whether the officer reason-
ably should have realized under the circumstances that he was causing a risk
of physical and emotional harm to the student is the kind of issue that juries
frequently resolve as one of fact. The outraged tone of the letter suggests
the officer engaged in unprofessional behavior.
8. Conclusory Holdings that Statements are Opinion, Without Accompanying
Analysis
A United States District Court and two New York intermediate appellate
courts have held that assertions were protected opinion, without describing
the analytical approach they used to distinguish between fact and opin-
ion.486
In In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings & Loan Securities
Litigation,487 the court held that some assertions by the defendants of
wrongdoing by the plaintiffs were factual, and that other assertions were
not.488 The latter included "statements made by [an individual defendant
411 Id. at 293-94.
482 Id. at 291.
483 Id. at 293.
484 Id. at 287.
411 Id. at 291.
486 In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings & Loan Securities Litigation,
845 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Ariz. 1993); DRT Constr. Co. v. Lenkei, 576 N.Y.S.2d 724
(App. Div. 1991), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 753 (1992); Williams v. Varig Brazilian
Airlines, 564 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 854 (1991).
487 845 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Ariz: 1993).
488 The court did not describe any of these assertions in detail. The assertions includ-
ed statements in a "Sixth Amended Complaint" that the defendants had widely circulat-
ed to potential clients of the plaintiffs, but had never filed in a class action suit involv-
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attorney] to the press that plaintiff Fischel [an economic consultant] ha[d]
made the 'biggest mistake any guy made in the country' in supposedly
reaching the conclusion that Lincoln Savings* was safe, ' 489 "statements by
[another individual defendant attorney] at a seminar maintaining that Fischel
had given Charles Keating a 'clean bill of health,"' 90 and "continuing
statements made to Lexecon's prospective clients that Lexecon 'carried too
much baggage to be effective expert witnesses."' 4 9' The court did not ex-
plain why these statements did not imply defamatory facts, except for noting
that it agreed with defendant's assertion that their statements were "no more
than a lawyer's 'expression of [his] opinion regarding his client's allegations
against' Lexecon, as anyone reading or hearing the statements would have
understood."'4 92 The first two statements appear to be evaluative comments
based on the true fact that the plaintiffs had prepared reports describing
Lincoln Savings as "sound. ' 493 The "too much baggage" comments, how-
ever, might have implied defamatory facts. Without a more complete de-
scription by the court of these charges, it is unclear whether they were pure
evaluative opinions.
In Williams v. Varig Brazilian Airlines,494 the court held that statements
in a memorandum from the plaintiffs supervisor to a company manager and
statements in the manager's discharge letter to the plaintiff were protected
opinion. 95 The memo regarded "plaintiffs purportedly unsatisfactory per-
formance and poor attitude [and] recounted various conflicts between her
and her coworkers, observing that 'because of her disposition and her atti-
tude Mrs. Williams is very difficult to work with."'4 96 The discharge letter
stated, in part, that "[h]aving reviewed your employment record and, in
particular your work performance and attitude since your disciplinary sus-
pension, the Company has concluded that you are failing to meet the stan-
dards we expect from an employee occupying your position. '497 The deci-
ing these parties. Id. at 1382. The court did not describe the contents of that purported
complaint. See id. Other assertions held actionable were in a letter to the National Law
Journal stating that the corporate plaintiff, Lexecon, had "settled" in the class action
suit. Id. at 1387. The letter "further stated that Lexecon was guilty of 'wrongful activ-
ities on behalf of a convicted felon and 'fraudulent dealings with regulators' and sug-
gested that [the class action judge] found Lexecon guilty of the allegations." Id.
489 Id. In a footnote, the court added that Lexecon opined "in the reports prepared at
the behest of ACC/Lincoln Savings, that 'Lincoln is sound' and is 'safer' than other
comparable thrift institutions." Id. at 1387 n.14 (citation omitted).
490 Id. at 1387.
491 Id.
492 Id. at 1388.
491 See id. at 1387 n.14.
494 564 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 854 (1991).
491 Id. at 331.
496 Id. at 329.
491 Id. at 330.
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sion does not relate precisely what language in these writings was alleged to
be defamatory. Although the court might have concluded that the writings
contained evaluative opinions based on disclosed or known facts, the court
did not explain its holding in these terms, and its rationale is unclear.
A similar case is DRT Construction Co. v. Lenkei,498 in which the court
held that statements and a cartoon concerning the plaintiff land developers
published in flyers by the president of a home owner's association were
protected opinion. 99 One statement referred to the plaintiffs as "profit hun-
gry land abusers.""s Another "stated that a number of engineering reports
had warned about the dangerous condition of the mines under the lands
sought to be developed and had predicted collapses 'yet this project is still
being pushed by profit hungry developers to whom your life and mine is of
no concern."' 5 ° The cartoon depicted "three men with Hitler moustaches
on a bulldozer running over a deer calling for help. The men were waving
an ax, a hatchet and a shovel and one had money coming out of his pock-
ets."5 °2 The court determined that the phrase "profit hungry land abusers"
did not contain a provable false factual connotation, could not reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts, "and is the sort of 'loose, figurative or
hyperbolic language' that is constitutionally protected opinion. 01503 The
court further noted that "[t]he cartoon [could not] be interpreted as anything
other than the landowners' opinion concerning the effect of the development
upon the town of Amherst. ''15° It is likely that the statements and cartoon
could be construed as evaluative comments based on facts about the
plaintiffs' plans for development that were stated in the flyers or generally
known in the community, and therefore were pure opinion. The court, how-
ever, rested on conclusions and did not analyze the charges in terms of the
pure opinion rule.
B. The Significance of the Treatment of Opinion in the Lower Courts Since
Milkovich
This review of the lower courts' treatment of opinion since Milkovich
reveals no cases employing my interpretation of the decision as recognizing
immunity only for pure evaluative opinion and nonfactual invective. Several
lower court decisions, however, have immunized pure deductive opin-
4" 576 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1991), appeal denied, 79 N.Y.2d 753 (1992).




3 Id. (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)).
504 Id.
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ion.505
This review also shows many disparities among the decisions. The New
York Court of Appeals extends greater protection to opinion than does
Milkovich. °6 There are varying interpretations of Milkovich itself; for ex-
ample, some courts interpret Milkovich as protecting only pure opinion," 7
while others believe it permits a point-of-view approach'" or protection of
ambiguous language.5 9 Some courts that purport to apply Milkovich give
too little protection to nonfactual language,510 and some give too much pro-
tection to language that a factfinder could interpret as stating or implying
defamatory facts."' Professor Anderson has observed that "[l]ibel is a field
that cries out for some uniformity.""51 The disparities in the treatment of
opinion may chill the speech of interstate media, which "must tailor their
speech to the least protective state law to which they may be subject." '513
Inadequate protection for opinion in any state, therefore, may deter to a
significant degree speech that warrants First Amendment protection. Yet
excessive protection of language that states or implies defamatory facts also
exacts personal and social costs.5"4 The interests in freedom of speech and
reputation are fundamental and competing interests, neither of which can
receive total protection without the sacrifice of the other. Milkovich and the
5 See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
5 See supra notes 275-86 and accompanying text (discussing New York cases).
507 See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
508 See discussion supra part IV.A.3.
... See discussion supra part IV.A.5.
510 See Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1668
(1992); supra text accompanying notes 203-09 (discussing Spence).
5' See Miele v. Rosenblum, 603 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); supra
text accompanying notes 233-40 (discussing Miele).
512 Anderson, supra note 4, at 553.
513 Id.
"14 For a discussion of the reputational and social costs of the actual malice standard,
see id. at 524-36. Regarding reputational costs, Anderson states:
[F]or many centuries and in most of the civilizations of the world, the injuries
caused by defamation were thought to be harms for which the law can and should
provide remedies. Eloquent reasons for this virtually universal protection of repu-
tation have been advanced throughout history, but the contemporary consensus is
captured in Justice Stewart's classic explanation: "The right of a man to the pro-
tection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." It is proba-
bly safe to say that no major legal system in the world provides as little protec-
tion for reputation as the United States now provides.
Id. at 525-26 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring)). The social costs that Anderson identifies are the deterrence of
participation in public life, encouragement of the "journalism of scandal," and the "dep-
recation of truth in public discourse." Id. at 531-36.
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varying treatments of opinion by the lower courts since Milkovich represent
differing views on the proper weight to be given to these competing inter-
ests. Plainly, Milkovich has not produced a consensus in the lower courts on
the appropriate accommodation of these interests.
V. ISSUES GENERATED BY THE MILKOVICH OPINION
Milkovich generates difficult questions. First is the troublesome, perhaps
intractable, question whether a statement is provable as true or false on the
basis of objective evidence. Second is the question whether immunity for
evaluative but not deductive opinion strikes the proper balance between the
relevant interests. Third is the issue regarding the proper treatment of point-
of-view opinion and ambiguous language in a regime that immunizes
evaluative but not deductive opinion.
A. What Kinds of Statements Are Provable as True or False on the Basis of
Objective Evidence?
1. The Nonactionability of Evaluative Opinion under Milkovich
It is not necessarily the case that an evaluative opinion is insusceptible
to proof of truth or falsity; both philosophy and law have allowed such
proof. Some philosophers maintain that the word "true" has the function of
indicating confirmation, and that both evaluative and factual assertions are
open to confirmation, albeit in different ways. 5 ' Moreover, under common
law rules, the defense of justification is available in an action based upon
defamatory opinion.5"6 In English cases, at least, this defense is established
if the jury finds that the opinion was "true."5 7 Thus, the defense is estab-
lished when, in effect, the jury agrees with the opinion expressed. For ex-
ample, the defense of justification would protect the defendant from liability
for a charge of discreditable business conduct if the jury found the charge to
be true."'
... See, e.g., ALAN MONTEFIORE, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY
71-91 (1958); PAUL W. TAYLOR, NORMATIVE DISCOURSE 163-64 (1961).
516 See FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 371 (1956).
5 See, e.g., Sutherland v. Stopes, [1925] App. Cas. 47, 62 (H.L. 1924) (opinion of
Viscount Finley) ("It is clear that the truth of a libel affords a complete answer to civil
proceedings. This defence is raised by a plea of justification on the ground that the
words are true in substance and in fact. Such a plea in justification means that the libel
is true not only in its allegations of fact but also in any comments made therein.").
58 For example, in Broadway Approvals Ltd. v. Odhams Press, Ltd., I W.L.R. 805
(C.A. 1965), the plaintiff corporation alleged that the defendants defamed the corpora-
tion by implying that it "was guilty of discreditable and improper business conduct in
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When the Court in Milkovich stated that, under Hepps, the plaintiff must
prove falsity in order to succeed, 9 did the Court mean that, in a case in-
volving a pure opinion charging that the plaintiffs business practices were
"discreditable," the plaintiff could succeed if the plaintiff could convince the
jury that the plaintiff's conduct was not "discreditable"? Clearly not. In its
review of the relevant rules of defamation law, the Court summarized the
common law rules regarding opinion.20 That summary omitted any refer-
ence to the defense of justification. The Court stated that defamatory opin-
ion is actionable under common law rules "even though the truth or falsity
of an opinion-as distinguished from a statement of fact-is not a matter
that can be objectively determined and truth is a complete defense to a suit
for defamation. '
The Court's opinion required the plaintiff to prove falsity on the basis of
"objective evidence." '522 Can it be "objectively determined" whether one
[its] dealings with children." Id. at 808-09. The defendants asserted the defenses of
justification and fair comment. Id. The jury was asked the following questions and gave
the following answers:
(1) Is the article defamatory of the plaintiffs? Answer-Yes.
(2) If yes, have the defendants proved that its sting, that is to say its defamatory
implication, is substantially true? Answer-No.
(3) If no, does the article consist partly of allegations of fact and partly of ex-
pression of opinion? Answer-Yes.
(4) If yes, could a fair minded man in good faith have held the opinion expressed
having regard to such of the facts referred to in the article as proved? An-
swer-Yes.
(5) If yes, have the plaintiffs proved that in publishing the article the defendants
acted with malice? Answer-Yes.
Id. at 811. Interpreting the jury's answers, Judge Sellers stated:
The jury by its answer to question 3 clearly recognised that there were facts and
comments in the article and by their answer to question 4 must have been satis-
fied that the article was substantially true in its statement of facts and the facts so
proved justified the comments made on them....
The comments, as well as the facts and the inferences from both fact and
comment, in defamatory statements have to be proved to be true for the defence
of justification to succeed but if the facts are established and the comment is fair
the defence of fair comment can succeed. An honest and fair expression of opin-
ion on a matter of public interest is not actionable even though it be untrue and
fail of justification. It may be said in the appropriate circumstances that a man's
conduct is discreditable and it may be fair comment to make although a jury is
not prepared to find that the substance of the comment was true. That seems to be
the position here.
Id. at 817-18.
9 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
520 Id. at 12-14.
52 Id. at 13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977)) (em-
phasis added).
522 The Court held that a "determination of whether petitioner lied in this instance
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has engaged in "discreditable business conduct"? Whether one is a "bad"
mayor? Whether a book or a play is "trash" or "badly written" or "unorigi-
nal"?
Plainly, the type of comment generally viewed as evaluative would not,
in the Court's view, be provable as true or false on the basis of "objective"
evidence. Although others may agree or disagree with the comment, there is
no generally acceptable, objective measure of what is "discreditable." Unless
the evaluative comment implies the existence of an undisclosed factual pred-
icate warranting the comment, it is protected opinion.523
A different conclusion, however, can be reached with regard to deduc-
tive comments.524 An opinion may state a "factual" inference from estab-
lished facts; that is, the inference may be provable as true or false on the
basis of objective evidence. In this situation, there is a generally acceptable,
objective measure of truth or falsity. Under my interpretation of Milkovich,
the deductive comment does not confer immunity from liability, but instead
receives the same constitutional protections afforded to other statements of
fact.
The defamatory connotation of a statement of an opinion or belief that
another has committed perjury can be proved true or false on the basis of a
generally acceptable, objective measure drawn from the criminal law. Be-
yond a deductive opinion that another has committed a crime, however, the
determination that an assertion is provable as true or false on the basis of
objective facts is problematic. For example, is it an evaluative or a deduc-
tive opinion to say that "[Professor] Ollman has no status within the profes-
sion?" '25 In Olman v. Evans, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit sharply divided on whether this statement was
[could] be made on a core of objective evidence," id. at 21, and it stated that "'[u]nlike
a subjective assertion the averred defamatory language [was] an articulation of an ob-
jectively verifiable event,"' id. at 22 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699,
707 (Ohio 1986)).
523 As the Court stated in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988):
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental im-
portance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and
concern .... We have therefore been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual
expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions. The
First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a "false" idea.
Id. at 50-51.
524 Professor Page Keeton was perhaps the first author to distinguish between eval-
uation and deductive opinions in defamation cases. See Keeton, supra note 36. "A de-
ductive opinion could be characterized as an imputation of past misconduct or purport-
edly existing fact, drawn as an inference from the existence of other facts. By contrast,
an evaluative opinion is simply a condemnation of the defendant for having committed
certain conduct." Id. at 1233.
525 Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).
554 [Vol. 3:2
A MATTER OF OPINION
verifiable. 26
The fact/opinion dichotomy is not necessarily the same in all contexts.
The distinction may be different for purposes of the physical sciences, the
rules of evidence, and the law of defamation. 27 Ultimately the decision as
to when the truth or falsity of a comment should or should not be subjected
to judicial measurement must be based upon an effort to strike the proper
balance between the interest in freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment and the interest in reputation protected by the law of defama-
tion. A decision that a comment is evaluative and does not imply defamato-
ry facts immunizes the comment, totally sacrificing the interest in reputation.
The basic issue centers upon the kinds of defamatory comment that warrant
absolute protection, giving due consideration to the competing interest in
reputation. 28
526 The majority held that the statement, in its context, "would plainly appear to the
average reader to be 'rhetorical hyperbole."' Id. at 990. A concurring judge regarded the
charge as unverifiable. Id. at 1013 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Three judges who
dissented in part regarded the charge as verifiably true or false. Id. at 1032 (Wald, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1035 (Edwards, J., dissenting); id. at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 11-20 (discussing Oilman).
527 Describing modem rejection of the medieval concept of intelligible essences,
Roberto Unger states: "We cannot decide in the abstract whether a given classification
is justified. The only standard is whether the classification serves the particular purpose
we had in mind when we made it," ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
32 (1975).
528 In Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988), Judge Easterbrook stated:
Courts trying to find one formula to separate "fact" from "opinion"... are en-
gaged in a snipe hunt, paralleling the debates between positivist and deontological
thinkers in philosophy. Perhaps the Constitution requires the search for this en-
dangered species, but more likely the difference between "fact" and "opinion" in
constitutional law responds to the pressure the threat of civil liability would place
on kinds of speech that are harmless or useful, not on the ability to draw a line
that has vexed philosophers for centuries .... It is the cost of searching for
"truth"-including the cost of error in condemning speech that is either harmless
or in retrospect turns out to be useful, a cost both inevitable and high in our im-
precise legal system-that justifies the constitutional rule. Like other attempts to
compare things that can be neither quantified nor reduced to a common metric
(how much does the value of free speech "weigh" compared with the value of
reputational injury?), this will never yield a rule.
Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
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2. The Distinction Between Fact and Opinion-Striking the Proper Balance
Between the Interest in Free Speech and the Interest in Reputation
a. The Balance Struck by the Court in Erroneous Fact Cases
The Court's decision in Milkovich must be placed in the context of the
development of the erroneous fact privileges recognized in New York Times,
Butts, and Gertz.29 In holding that public officials and public figures may
recover damages for defamatory statements of fact only upon clear and
convincing proof that the defendant spoke with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth,53 the Court struck a balance between the
constitutional interest in freedom of speech upon public issues and the le-
gitimate state interest in protecting reputation. In New York Times, the Court
asserted that there is "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials."53' The Court however,
stopped short of immunizing such debate.
In Gertz, the Court stated that "there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact," '32 but it also recognized that "[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that mat-
ters. ' 533 It went on to state:
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is,
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this
Court would have embraced long ago the view that publish-
ers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible
immunity from liability for defamation .... Such a rule
would, indeed, obviate the fear that the prospect of civil
liability for injurious falsehood might dissuade a timorous
press from the effective exercise of First Amendment free-
doms. Yet absolute protection for the communications media
requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by
the law of defamation.
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is
529 In New York Times, the Court recognized a conditional privilege for honest mis-
statements of fact. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278, 282 n.21,
292 n.30 (1964).
530 Id. at 279-80.
531 Id. at 270.
532 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
"I Id. at 341.
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the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on
them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require
the State to abandon this purpose, for, as Mr. Justice Stewart
has reminded us, the individual's right to the protection of
his own good name
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The
protection of private personality, like the protection of
life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not
mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by
this Court as a basic of our constitutional system.534
The Court determined that "[t]he New York Times standard defines the
level of constitutional protection appropriate to the context of defamation of
a public person," but that a different level is appropriate in the context of
defamation of a private person.535 The state interest in providing a means
to protect the reputations of individuals is more limited in the case of public
persons than in the case of private persons.53 s One reason concerns media
access:
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract
false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.
Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury,
and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly
greater.537
Another reason concerns assumption of risk:
[T]he communications media are entitled to act on the as-
sumption that public officials and public figures have volun-
tarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption
is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not
accepted public office or assumed an "influential role in
3 Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
3 Id. at 342.
536 Id. at 344.
... Id. (footnote omitted).
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ordering society.' ' 3a
Thus, considerations regarding media access and assumption of risk
dictate different levels of protection for statements of defamatory fact about
public and private persons involving matters of public concern. Such state-
ments, however, do not warrant absolute protection because defamatory
falsehoods invade the individual's interest in reputation, an interest involv-
ing "the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty" and a "right ... entitled
to ... recognition [by the Court] as a basic of our constitutional sys-
tem." '539 The Court has tried to strike the appropriate balance between First
Amendment interests involving defamatory speech and the states' interest in
protecting reputation because both are important interests in a decent system
of ordered liberty and neither should take absolute precedence over the
other.
b. The Proper Balance in Distinguishing Between Fact and Opinion-An
Analysis of the Post Approach
The problem of distinguishing between fact and opinion in defamation
law is intractable because attempts to define these terms have been unsuc-
cessful. The Court's distinction in Milkovich between "subjective assertions"
and an "objectively verifiable event"54 is subject to the criticism that it re-
flects the discredited theories of logical positivism.54" ' Yet the judicial task
538 Id. at 345 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring in result)).
... Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
540 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (quoting Scott v. News-
Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986)).
54' The book Language, Truth and Logic, by Alfred J. Ayer, is the leading Anglo-
American work on logical positivism. See Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Con-
sensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 43,
81-85 (1993). According to Ayer's verifiability principle, the only meaningful state-
ments are either "analytic" or "synthetic." Id. at 60. Analytic statements are tautologies
and are verifiable "solely in virtue of the meaning of [their] constituent symbols." AL-
FRED J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 16 (1946). Synthetic statements are in
theory subject to verification by empirical observations. Id. at 35.
The verifiability principle does not survive close scrutiny:
This idea of "[empirical] foundations" for knowledge and meaning has been sub-
jected to sustained and effective attack ever since it was identified as an essential
"dogma" of the empiricism invoked by Ayer and the logical positivists. Observa-
tion statements cannot acquire their epistemological or semantic credentials direct-
ly from experience because, as Quine and others have urged, no statement ever
faces "the tribunal of experience" individually but only as a component of a net-
work of statements, some more observational than
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is to determine what speech is subject to a jury finding of falsity in defama-
tion actions. Unless the courts abandon defamation law, they cannot avoid
that question.
To determine what kinds of statements warrant absolute protection as
opinion, the courts must confront two very troublesome points. First, al-
though the philosopher can make the convincing assertion that the world is
"out there" but truth is not,"' courts cannot avoid making the fact/opinion
distinction. Second, no satisfactory formula is available for making the dis-
tinction; the courts can define fact and opinion only by looking to the pur-
poses for which the distinction is made.
In a recent article, Professor Post used sociological concepts to elucidate
important features of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurispru-
dence.543 This section analyzes his proposed distinction between fact and
opinion and draws upon some of his insights. In summary, Post makes a
convincing case that statements warrant absolute protection as opinion when
their validity depends upon community standards, whereas statements should
not be immunized when their validity is determinable without reference to
those standards.' This distinction strikes the proper balance between free
speech and reputational interests because it preserves the neutrality of public
discourse from the domination of community mores. Post, however, makes a
less convincing case for how to decide when a statement's validity depends
upon community standards and when it does not.
Post's concept of "the paradox of public discourse"54 5 demonstrates
why the courts cannot avoid drawing a distinction between fact and opinion.
Post examines First Amendment doctrine in light of the sociological con-
cepts of identity and community, and the concept of the public.5 He rea-
sons:
others, which has to conform to the contours of experience as best it can.
Barry Gower, Introduction: The Criterion of Significance, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM IN
PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 10 (Barry Gower ed., 1987)
(footnote omitted). Additionally, the logical positivists have never adequately identified
how one determines what empirical observations are necessary or adequate to support a
synthetic assertion. Id. at 11-15; see also Hansen, supra, at 81-85. Hansen asserts that
in both logical positivism and the Milkovich opinion, "the relationship of statements de-
scribing empirical (objective) facts to the states of affairs they purport to describe is
presumptively stable." Id. at 65. He criticizes the Court for ignoring the effect of con-
text on the meaning of an assertion. Id. at 69, 96-99. My disagreement with Hansen on
this point is discussed infra part V.C.
42 See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 4-5 (1989).
543 Post, supra note 11.
54 Id. at 604-05.
" Id. at 643 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977)).
1 Id. at 604-05.
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A public ... is constituted precisely by the ability of persons
to speak to one another across the boundaries of divergent
cultures. From this perspective, of course, the social function
of first amendment doctrine, as reformulated during the
1930's and 1940's, becomes plain enough: it is to establish a
protected space within which this communication can oc-
cur.
547
The "paradox of public discourse" reflects the conflicting interests in
free speech and reputation. Post defines the conflicting interests as incom-
patible requirements for the existence of public discourse:
Public discourse ... entails two distinct and incompatible
requirements. There is, first, the requirement of negativity, of
freedom from the boundaries of community expectations and
norms. This requirement initiates the very possibility of
public discourse by distinguishing it as pure communication
able to reach out beyond the confines of any single commu-
nity. This is the requirement of critical interaction. But there
must also be a second requirement, one of rational delibera-
tion, which entails consideration and evaluation of the vari-
ous positions made possible by the space of critical interac-
tion. The constitutional purpose of public discourse requires
that rational deliberation be civil and noncoercive, which is
to say that it must be consistent with the very norms that are
negated by critical interaction. 48
54 Id. at 634.
48 Id. at 642. Post continues:
The two requirements of public discourse thus stand in contradiction. The aspi-
ration to be free from the constraints of existing community norms (and to attain
a consequent condition of pure communication) is in tension with the aspiration to
the social project of reasoned and noncoercive deliberation. The first aspiration is
sustained by the values of neutrality, diversity, and individualism; the second by
the deliberative enterprise of democratic self-governance. Although the success of
public discourse depends upon both requirements, the primary commitment of
modern first amendment jurisprudence has unquestionably been to the radical
negativity that characterizes critical interaction, which defines the initial, distin-
guishing moment of public discourse. As a consequence the constitutional struc-
ture that regulates the domain of public discourse denies enforcement to the very
norms upon which the success of the political enterprise of public discourse de-
pends.
This contradiction is deeply disturbing. As Sabina Lovibond has recently
reminded us, "the norms implicit in a community's ... social practices are 'up-
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Given the conflicting requirements of public discourse, it may be im-
possible to develop a coherent theory of the distinction between fact and
opinion. Yet defining an "objective measure" of truth is not a purely ab-
stract endeavor in defamation law. A court may decide that a claim is opin-
ion even though a measure of its validity is available; the decision indicates
that a judicial test of validity is inappropriate-the claim should be mea-
sured only in "the marketplace of ideas." In reaching this conclusion, the
court must take into account two significant First Amendment values. First,
as the Court has stated, false and defamatory facts "are particularly value-
less; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of
ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily
be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective." '549 Hence,
care must be taken to immunize judgments that should be tested only in the
"marketplace of ideas," and to provide an appropriate degree of protection
against false statements of defamatory fact, which hamper the truth-seeking
function of the "marketplace of ideas" and find inadequate deterrence in that
marketplace alone. Post agrees that false statements of fact impair the in-
tegrity of public discourse.55° Indeed, there seems to be general agreement
held,' in quite a material sense, by the sanctions which the community can bring
to bear upon deviant individuals." The sanctions that the law can bring to bear to
support civility rules are unique, not so much because of their monopoly of physi-
cal force, but because they alone purport to define social norms in accents that are
universal. These norms can, of course, continue to be enforced by means of pri-
vate and social pressure. But in the heterogeneity of contemporary culture only
the law can authoritatively speak for norms that define a common ideal of ratio-
nal deliberation. Only the law can rise above the particularity of specific social
groups and definitively articulate those irreducible, minimum constraints of decen-
cy whose violation would be "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." To
the extent that a constitutional commitment to critical interaction prevents the law
from articulating and sustaining a common respect for the civility rules that make
possible the ideal of rational deliberation, public discourse corrodes the basis of
its own existence.
This might be called the "paradox of public discourse ......
Id. at 642-43 (footnotes omitted) (quoting SABINA LOVIBOND, REALISM AND IMAGI-
NATION IN ETHICS 61 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (-1977)).
9 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
550 Post states:
It is true that the punishment of false statements of fact appears, at first blush, to
be inconsistent with the requirement of an ideal speech situation that all force be
excluded "except the force of the better argument." But statements of fact are not
arguments, and the very ability to argue presupposes accurate facts. "Freedom of
opinion," as Arendt notes, "is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and
the facts themselves are not in dispute. In other words, factual truth informs polit-
ical thought .... "Thus the integrity of public discourse itself depends upon fac-
tual accuracy, a point to which Falwell itself appealed.
Post, supra note 11, at 659 (footnotes omitted) (quoting JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THE-
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among First Amendment scholars on this point.5 ' Of course, there is a
logical dilemma in saying that false statements of fact impair public dis-
course, without providing the definition of a fact. Nevertheless, there is
general agreement that some false assertions harm the "truth-seeking func-
tion of the marketplace of ideas." '552
Second, as Post states, a central First Amendment concern is "the pres-
ervation of the neutrality of public discourse from the domination of com-
munity mores."5 3 Thus, if a defamatory judgment were condemned as
false when different communities in our society hold different views of its
validity, then the standards of one or more groups would be imposed upon
another:
[B]ecause the truth or falsity of judgments is determinable
only by reference to the standards of a particular community,
any government effort to penalize false judgments in public
discourse would in effect use the force of the state to impose
the standards of a specific community. This would of course
violate the constitutional principle that the arena of public
discussion be neutral as to community standards. It might
well be said, therefore, that from a constitutional point of
view the evaluation of such statements must be left to the
free play of speech and counterspeech through which com-
munities compete within public discourse for the allegiance
of individuals.554
Post's thesis that a central concern of the First Amendment is to pre-
serve the neutrality of public discourse from the domination of community
mores has important implications for the fact/opinion distinction. A test of
opinion that is either too narrow or too broad violates this principle of neu-
ORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 25 (T. McCarthy trans., 1987); HANNAH ARENDT,
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 238 (1968)).
5 See Hansen, supra note 541, at 66-68.
552 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52.
... Post, supra note 11, at 660. In Falwell, the Court stated that "it is a central tenet
of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas." Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978)). Post comments:
The difficulty with this gesture, however, is that, like most modem commentary,
it conceives of neutrality only at the level of ideas, rather than at the more general
level of the structures that establish communal life. We might correct this difficul-
ty by saying that the concept of public discourse requires the state to remain neu-
tral in the "marketplace of communities."
Post, supra note 11, at 632.
.. Post, supra note 11, at 659.
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trality:
[F]irst amendment doctrine ... [has maintained] a sphere of
public discourse in which communities themselves develop
through competition for the allegiance of individual adher-
ents. The constitutional "shield" established by Cantwell
ensures that this competition occurs on a level playing field,
in which no particular community can obtain an unfair ad-
vantage and use the power of the state to prejudge the out-
come of this competition by enforcing its own special norms
or civility rules.555
The concept of a level playing field-fair competition in the marketplace of
ideas-supports the conclusion that too narrow an interpretation would re-
sult in the imposition of the values of one or more communities upon anoth-
er. This concept also supports the view that an arbitrary interpretation of
opinion would have the same result.
The point can be illustrated by two hypotheticals. First assume that all
statements of defamatory fact were immunized-that the law of defamation
was abolished. In this situation, would the courts be "neutral" with regard to
community mores? In this situation there would not be free competition in
the marketplace of ideas because the marketplace would be dominated by
"bullies" or by the most popular. The interest in reputation would be sacri-
ficed, and the kind of public discourse that permits the existence of a "pub-
lic" could not be carried on. Unpopular speech would be deterred. The
courts would not be "neutral"; rather, they would cast their weight on the
side of those with the greatest power of speech, or with popularity.
In the second hypothetical, assume that the definition of opinion is arbi-
trary, as the Olman approach appears to be.556 Under this approach, there
is a serious danger that judges may make unprincipled determinations on the
fact/opinion issue. Such an approach would permit judges to "play favorites"
among communities; at a minimum there would be a public perception of
bias.5" An overly broad definition of opinion would sacrifice the interests
... Id. at 630 (footnote omitted) (referring to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940)).
556 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
... A perception of a court's playing favorites is evident in Justice Brown's dissent in
Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 721 (Ohio 1986) (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court was presented with a libel suit filed by the super-
intendent of Milkovich's school. The court reversed its earlier decision in Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 473 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1984), which originally held that the
Diadiun article contained actionable statements of fact. Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 709. Justice
Brown sharply accused the majority of setting its "own... jurisprudential agenda" and
playing up to the media. Id. at 725 (Brown, J., dissenting). He asserted that, "[iln order
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in both reputation and neutrality. It would discourage unpopular speech,
engendering fear that, if one spoke out, one might be subjected to a defama-
tory attack without any recourse."'
Thus, an appropriate constitutional balance in distinguishing fact from
opinion requires recognition that some defamatory statements have no in-
trinsic value in the marketplace of ideas and that the neutrality of public
discourse must be protected from the domination of the mores of particular
communities. Moreover, fair competition in the marketplace of ideas-a
level playing field-requires an approach to the protection of opinion that is
neither too narrow nor too broad.
Although Post's analysis of the neutrality principal is elucidating, his
formulation of a method to effectuate it in the fact/opinion distinction is not
very helpful. Post argues:
We can thus advance a rough justification for the position
adopted in Falwell that false statements of fact have no con-
stitutional value within public discourse, but that false opin-
ions can only be regulated by the marketplace of ideas. The
justification depends upon reformulating the constitutional
distinction between fact and opinion in the following man-
ner: statements of fact make claims about an independent
world, the validity of which are in theory determinable with-
out reference to the standards of any given community, and
about which we therefore have a right to expect ultimate
convergence or consensus. Statements of opinion, on the
other hand, make claims about an independent world the
validity of which depends upon the standards or conventions
of a particular community, and about which we therefore
cannot expect convergence under conditions of cultural heter-
ogeneity. If this reformulation is correct, it implies that
Falwell's distinction between fact and opinion stems from
the same central first amendment concern as that which guid-
ed Falwell's other characterizations of public discourse: the
preservation of the neutrality of public discourse from the
to curry favor with the media at large in an election year .... a majority of four rushes
hell-bent to overrule Milkovich." Id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
558 Some believe that the state of defamation law today is not far from the second
hypothetical situation I have posed in the text. Professor Anderson has stated that libel
law today provides "not a general remedy with exceptions, but a general scheme of
nonliability that permits a remedy only in exceptional cases." Anderson, supra note 4,
at 510. The social costs he attributes to this situation include deterrence of participation
in public life, the "journalism of scandal," and the "deprecation of truth in public dis-
course." Id. at 531-34.
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domination of community mores.559
This formulation of the fact/opinion dichotomy is useful in some re-
spects, but it presents some problems in application. First, when does a
statement make claims about an independent world, the validity of which is
determinable "in theory" without reference to the standards of any given
community? Post defines community as "a social formation that inculcates
norms into the very identities of its members.""56 It quickly becomes clear
from this definition of community that Post's fact/opinion distinction would
produce unworkable results unless the word "standard" in his fact/opinion
definitions means a "norm"--a term he does not define. A hypothetical
illustrates the problem. Assume that Doe is a member of a Holocaust revi-
sionist organization. Membership in this organization appears to be based
upon a "standard" that forms an important part of the identity of these revi-
sionists-the belief that traditional historical accounts of the Holocaust are
inaccurate.56" ' Suppose Doe asserts that Roe's published accounts of her
experiences at Auschwitz are fabrications or the product of her imagination.
Roe sues Doe for libel. To maintain neutrality with regard to public dis-
course, must a court decline to adjudicate whether Roe's accounts are true?
An affirmative answer would be ludicrous. The only way to avoid that re-
sult, however, is to assert that the Holocaust revisionists are not a "commu-
nity" in Post's sense of the term. Their claims are factual rather than norma-
tive. Doe's assertion is a claim of fact because it makes "claims about an
independent world, the validity of which are in theory determinable without
reference to the [norms] of any given community." '62 Yet the task remains
of defining what is normative.
The second problem with Post's fact/opinion dichotomy is the question
of when we have a "right to expect" ultimate convergence or consensus.
Post acknowledges that "[a]ll knowledge ... ultimately depends, to one
degree or another, upon social processes of discussion." '563 At the time of
trial, a consensus probably will not have been reached.5" Moreover, Post
acknowledges that all community groups in a society may agree upon cer-
tain norms, and all may agree on the "validity" of an assertion that never-
theless warrants protection as opinion.565 Thus, we cannot tell fact from
... Post, supra note 11, at 660 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 645 (footnote omitted).
561 On the Holocaust revisionist movement, see PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, ASSASSINS
OF MEMORY-ESSAYS ON THE DENIAL OF THE HOLOCAUST (1992).
562 Post, supra note 11, at 660.
563 Id. at 657 (footnote omitted).
6 Post argues that "whenever the state attempts definitively to determine the truth or
falsity of a specific factual statement, it truncates a potentially infinite process of inves-
tigation and therefore runs a significant risk of inaccuracy." Id. at 659.
565 Post summarizes this point:
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opinion on the basis of whether there is consensus among communities on
the validity of an assertion. If present consensus is an improper basis, then
the "right to expect" convergence is an illusive basis for the distinction, too.
Post argues:
[T]he distinction between convergent and nonconvergent
assertions does not predict whether convergence "will actu-
ally occur," but instead the point of the contrast is that even
if [convergence on ethical matters] happens, it will not be
correct to think that it has come about because convergence
has been guided by how things actually are, whereas conver-
gence in the sciences might be explained in that way if it
does happen. This means, among other things, that we un-
derstand differently in the two cases the existence of conver-
gence or, alternatively, its failure to come about. 66
We have come full circle. Fact is distinguished from opinion on the
basis of whether we have a right to expect ultimate convergence, but, when
there is ultimate convergence, we know we are dealing with fact only if the
convergence has been guided by "how things actually are." We know "how
things actually are" only if we have a right to expect ultimate convergence.
The view is persuasive that some statements should be treated as opinion
even if all communities agree on their invalidity; individuals should be free
to advocate the formation of new communities.56 Yet the convergence
theory is not helpful in separating fact from opinion. Neither the existence
nor the expectation of a convergence regarding an assertion can confirm
Falwell illustrates the depth of the Court's commitment to preserving the neutrali-
ty of public discourse from the imposition of these kinds of norms. Although the
Court assumed that the Hustler parody would "doubtless [be] gross and repugnant
in the eyes of most," it nevertheless refused to permit the parody to be penalized.
This result comports with the reasoning of Cantwell: if public discourse is consti-
tutionally protected because it is the medium for the formation of future commu-
nities, its structural independence from all civility rules must be guaranteed, even
if such rules in fact are accepted by every contemporary community. The "mar-
ketplace of communities" must thus be understood as extending in time, as well
as in space. The individualist methodology of first amendment doctrine ultimately
means that individuals must be free within public discourse from the enforcement
of all civility rules, so as to be able to advocate and to exemplify the creation of
new forms of communal life in their speech.
Id. at 647 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
'6 Id. at 658 n.295 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citing Bernard Wil-
liams, The Scientific and the Ethical, in OBJECTIVITY AND CULTURAL DIVERGENCE 209,
212 (Stuart C. Brown ed., 1984)).
567 See supra note 565.
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whether the assertion is one of fact; the question is whether we believe that
the actual convergence or expected convergence is or will be guided "by
how things actually are."
It must be noted that Post does not state the right-to-expect-convergence
test as a test separate from the first portion of his definition. Rather, he
states that "statements of fact make claims about an independent world, the
validity of which are in theory determinable without reference to the stan-
dards of any given community, and about which we therefore have a right
to expect ultimate convergence or consensus." '568 The problem with using
the community standards and convergence concepts in this manner is that,
as noted previously, Post provides no definition of community norms; con-
sequently, the community standards concept cannot reveal when we have a
right to expect ultimate convergence.
Post's fact/opinion test is useful, nonetheless, because of its focus on the
necessity of the preservation of the neutrality of government with regard to
the domination of community mores-a central tenant of modem First
Amendment theory.569 A defamatory comment should not be condemned
as false when there is diversity among communities, based upon community
values, regarding its validity.570
568 Post, supra note 11, at 660 (emphasis added).
569 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the
Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL.
L. REv. 267, 271 (1991) ("[T]he edict of viewpoint neutrality [is] widely deemed to be
the essential element of modem free speech theory."); see also id. at 281-82.
570 Post remarks:
It is possible ... to make sense of the Court's analysis [in Falwell] if it is refor-
mulated to take account of "the accepted contrast between" statements "which are
expected to be highly diverse, and which are not expected and which are not re-
quired, to converge on the one hand," and statements "where there is a well estab-
lished expectation of convergence" on the other. In the area of "scientific enqui-
ry," for example, "there should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the
best explanation of that convergence involves the idea that the answer represents
how things are, whereas in the area of the ethical ... there is no such coherent
hope."
We expect scientific hypotheses ultimately to converge on a single answer
because such hypotheses, in the words of Gilbert Harman, are "tested against the
world," and the world exists independently of our perceptions of it. This abstract
appeal to a "world" affects only the kind of claims we understand scientific state-
ments to make; it does not affect the substance of those claims by naive reliance
upon "brute data." Thus we recognize a claim as scientific if it purports to de-
scribe something independent of scientific investigators in such a way that, given
enough time and effort, we would expect the claim to be confirmed or
disconfirmed by a consensus of investigators. The origins of this way of thinking
go back to the work of Charles Peirce, who defined scientific truth as the "opin-
ion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate," and who
defined reality as "the object represented in this opinion." For Peirce, reality was
1994]
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The appeal to "norms," "values," or "mores," however, is problematic
because it relies on the verification principle of logical positivism-an asser-
tion is verifiable or falsifiable if it is possible to identify what kind of obser-
vations are required to confirm or discredit the assertion. " ' The difficulty
lies in defining such observations. Some people once thought they could
determine whether a person was a witch by dunking him or her in water for
a protracted period of time."' Thus, people's views may change over time
as to what kinds of observations may confirm or refute a factual hypothesis.
Both fact and opinion are contingent; "[s]cience does not find hard 'facts'
independent of theory and debate and existing forever." '573 As Post ob-
served, it is erroneous "to conceive of factual truth as independent of social
thus "independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or
I or any finite number of men may think about it."
Post, supra note 11, at 657-58 (footnotes omitted).
571 Other methods of defining factual claims are subject to the same difficulties, at
least for the purposes of defamation law. Thus, in describing the principle of verifica-
tion, Montefiori states:
To start with the notion of verification was required simply to serve as the criteri-
on by which genuine hypotheses could be distinguished from those that were
empty or bogus. If it was possible to say what sort of observations would be or
would have been needed to confirm the theory, this showed that it was a genuine
one and empirical in nature-that is to say, with some genuine relation to possible
experience. The fact that there might be no known means of actually making the
observations necessary to test the theory was from this point of view neither here
nor there. Even in the days when it still seemed beyond all possibility to go and
have a look at the other side of the moon, people could say what sorts of observa-
tions would establish that there were ranges of mountains there. So this suggestion
was and is an empirically meaningful one, quite apart from considerations of
rockets and space travel .... This criterion of verifiability is based obviously
enough directly on such considerations as to the nature of empirical, scientific
assertions. It is true that some people have in fact objected to talking of verifica-
tion in such contexts on the grounds that although scientists may often reject
theories as a result of the outcome of one or more experiments, there is an impor-
tant sense in which no theory can ever be completely verified. But this does not
matter either. One could as well talk of a falsification as of a verification theory
of meaning; and some in fact have preferred to do so. All that is essential is that
one must be able to say what would count for the theory and what would count
against it.
MONTEFIORE, supra note 515, at 30-31 (footnote omitted). Under this test of a factual
or empirical proposition, it must be possible to say what sort of observations would be
needed to confirm or refute the theory.
572 See, e.g., GEORGE LYMAN KITTREDGE, WITCHCRAFT IN OLD AND NEW ENGLAND
233 (1929) (reissued 1956) (describing English "swimming tests" whereby the accused
would be adjudged innocent if she sank and did not reemerge, and guilty if she floated).
17' Nicholas Wolfson, Equality in First Amendment Theory, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
379, 387 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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processes of discussion and communication. ' 574
Attempting to avoid the difficulties of the verifiability principle, Martin
Hansen recently proposed that "a statement should be actionable only if
there exists a substantial degree of consensus within the relevant community
or audience over the kinds of facts that would support finding the chal-
lenged statement to be true or false."5 75 There are at least two problems
with this proposal. First, it would immunize ambiguous statements. 576 In
addition, it fails to take account of Post's insights regarding the need for
judicial neutrality towards community norms. Thus, there may be wide-
spread consensus on what criteria would support finding an assertion false,
even when the assertion is the kind that should carry immunity to enable
individuals to advocate the creation of new communities. 77
Although no definition of the fact/opinion distinction seems satisfactory,
the role of norms in distinguishing between fact and opinion has relevance
to the maintenance of judicial neutrality among communities. We generally
understand that to employ a standard, norm, or rule is to make a social,
rather than a factual claim-a claim that appeals for the allegiance of other
people.17' Thus, in distinguishing between value judgments and factual as-
sertions, it is useful to ask whether a statement can be justified only on the
basis of a rule or standard-a social claim. The reasoning remains flawed,
but the concepts are familiar. Montefiore argued that: "The distinction be-
tween value judgments and statements of fact must be regarded as funda-
mental, but ... it seems to be impossible to justify [the distinction] solely
as a matter of logic .... [W]e must be content to recognise its existence as
574 Post, supra note 11, at 656.
17' Hansen, supra note 541, at 73 (footnote omitted).
376 Hansen argues that "extending First Amendment protection only to statements
around which at least a substantial consensus exists as to their verifiability criteria en-
sures that defendants will not effectively be required to shoulder the expense of poten-
tially defamatory speech that is legitimately open to varying interpretations yielding
disparate truth functions." Id. at 75. For a discussion of ambiguous statements, see dis-
cussion infra part V.D.
... See supra note 565.
.78 Montefiore states:
To lay down a standard is, usually at any rate, to make a social claim; it is to
claim other people's allegiance to the standard and their disapproval of those who
deliberately reject it. The reasons it will supply for particular value judgments are
claimed as reasons why anyone else should make the same value judgments.
MONTEFIORE, supra note 515, at 144. Similarly, A.J.M. Milne states:
The use of evaluative terms such as 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'bad', is not
confined to the expression of emotion. To say that an act is right is to say that it
is correct, i.e., that it complies with the requirements of a relevant rule of conduct
in the context in question.
A.J.M. Milne, Values and Ethics: The Emotive Theory, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM IN PER-
SPECTIVE 89, 97 (Barry Gower ed., 1987).
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a fact of personal experience."" 9 Under the view of norms as social
claims, the ultimate test remains, what kinds of defamatory assertions must
carry immunity in order for communities to coexist as a "public"?
Judicial neutrality among communities serves the need of community
coexistence. In its exposition of classic marketplace theory in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,58° the Supreme Court reiterated its longstanding
commitment to the view that a free exchange of ideas is necessary: to en-
sure that government is responsive to the people; to allow the pursuit of
truth without governmental interference; to achieve stable government,
which is menaced by public ire; and to avoid the tyranny of the majori-
ty.5 ' The question, then, is whether subjecting a given claim to a judicial
test of its validity advances or threatens the type of public discourse nec-
essary for a responsive and stable government, and for a multicultural soci-
ety that is both dynamic and durable. Communities must be able to coexist,
interact, and compete on a level playing field for the allegiance of others
and for influence on political and social policies. Defamatory facts are
claims that should be subject to a judicial validity test because they impede
such public discourse; defamatory opinions are normative claims that should
not be subject to a judicial validity test because they advance such dis-
course.
Thus, for example, a charge that one who has crossed a picket line is
immoral (or is a "scab" or a traitor to fellow workers) is a normative claim
that advances public discourse. Though uncivil and divisive, it is the kind of
claim by which union advocates appeal for adherence to their cause. A judi-
cial test of validity would not be neutral as to the values of different com-
munities that disagree about the value of unions. It is the kind of claim that
should not be deterred by fear that a judge or jury will disagree.
In contrast, the charge of a Holocaust revisionist that an eye-witness
account of events at Auschwitz is a lie is a factual claim that, if false, im-
pairs public discourse. False claims about historical events impair the ability
of communities to coexist, and to search for the truth. Courts maintain neu-
trality about communities' normative claims when they make judicial deter-
minations of the validity of such historical claims. The soundness of norma-
tive judgments such as the value of Zionism are influenced by the experi-
ence of Jews in the Holocaust, and actions of bigotry may be encouraged by
the false claims of Holocaust revisionists. The lack of a judicial forum for
the resolution of such claims would be highly detrimental to community
coexistence. A similar case would arise if a proponent of racial segregation
proclaimed, "You should vote against Joe Smith, the black candidate for
mayor, because, as a black, he is of a different species, inferior to whites."
5 MONTEFIORE, supra note 515, at 120.
580 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5' See id. at 269-70.
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If such a statement were made not as invective or hyperbole, but to invoke
the theory of special creation, the charge that Smith belongs to an inferior
species should be treated as factual." 2
The claim that one has engaged in criminal conduct is also a claim of
fact that, if false, impairs public discourse. Its validity cannot be resolved
adequately through public debate, and choices about important political,
social, and personal issues would be adversely affected without the possi-
bility of a judicial determination of falsity. Of course, considerable protec-
tion is given to false claims of facts on matters of public concern, including
the requirements that the plaintiff prove falsity and fault as to falsity. The
question addressed here is whether charges of criminal conduct should be
subject to question in a defamation action at all.
Such claims are not normative advocacy claims appealing for adherence
to belief in a system of values. They frequently are made in the course of
advocacy for a cause. Holocaust revisionists may be attempting to advance
the merits of fascism by their denials of the Holocaust. Similarly, Senator
Joseph McCarthy attempted to promote the dangers of communism by his
accusations that individuals were communists.5"3 Without the deterrent val-
ue of the possibility of a judicial determination of falsity, such claims easily
proliferate. Members of the public would have little basis for deciding the
validity of the charges. The more popular community, or the one with the
greater media access, might gain the most adherents. There would not be a
level playing field for the advocacy of different normative positions. Judg-
ments about the fitness of a candidate for public office, or the fitness of a
coach or teacher for a position of influence over children, would not be
informed judgments. The McCarthy era is illustrative. A charge that com-
munism is an evil system is a claim of opinion. A claim that particular
individuals are communists is a claim of fact. Those black-listed during the
McCarthy era did not find public discourse a good remedy for their loss of
reputation. Moreover, judgments about the nature of the communist threat
probably were impaired by false claims that many individuals in positions of
power were communists.
582 Moral standards may be based on factual premises. The hypothetical in the text is
derived from the following observations of A.J.M. Milne:
[A]ccording to the Dutch Reform Church, there are theological grounds for re-
garding the physical difference of colour as morally relevant. Included in these
grounds, however, is the theory of special creation, a theory of the origins of
species which has been superseded by the theory of evolution in modem biologi-
cal science. This is enough to discredit the Dutch Reform Church's moral position
on race relations. It is a markedly unenlightened position, resting as it does upon
ideas about the physical differences between human beings which have no scien-
tific warrant.
Milne, supra note 578, at 106-07.
583 See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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Of course, many claims that are false and defamatory have nothing to do
with appeals for allegiance to a community. Such claims may be made for
reasons of purely personal advantage and may impair important judgments
about the qualification of a person for a job or the desirability of associating
with that person in other ways that may be of great importance to the de-
famed individual. Public discourse is not advanced by leaving such claims
to the exclusive remedy of public discourse.
The distinction between fact and opinion in defamation law thus must
rest on the purpose for making the distinction. A remaining question con-
cerns whether the distinction should be influenced by a distrust of the fact-
finding process. As Post observes, legal fact-finding may be inaccurate and
influenced by community biases; consequently, First Amendment theory
should allow for this phenomenon, which probably explains, in part, the
requirement of fault concerning falsity.584 Other constitutional require-
ments, such as the rule of independent appellate review585 and the re-
quirement of placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove falsity,586 also help
protect speakers from the danger that juries may punish unpopular opinion.
In his separate opinion in Olman v. Evans, however, Judge Bork argued
that a court has the constitutional duty to decline to allow a jury to decide
the truth or falsity of an issue when the issue "is inherently unsusceptible to
accurate resolution by a jury." '587 He believed that the defendants' charge
584 Post argues:
Whenever the state attempts definitively to determine the truth or falsity of a
particular factual statement, it truncates a potentially infinite process of investi-
gation and therefore runs a significant risk of inaccuracy. Thus although legal
fact-finding may in theory be neutral, in practice we can expect it to be often
inaccurate and inappropriately influenced by particular community sentiment and
prejudice. Any respectable First Amendment theory should allow for this phenom-
enon, and it is no doubt part of the underlying explanation of why the Court in
Falwell did not permit liability to be imposed for false statements of fact simplici-
ter, but instead imposed the additional requirement of "actual malice," so as "to
give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment."
Post, supra note 11, at 659-60 (footnotes omitted).
585 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499
(1984) ("[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an
appellate court has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole
record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intru-
sion on the field of free expression."' (citation omitted)).
586 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775, 777 (1986) (not-
ing that a public-figure plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity, and holding that a
private-figure plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of speech on a matter of
public concern when the defendant is a media defendant).
587 0llman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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that Professor Olman had "no status" within his profession was incapable
of accurate resolution."' He argued, for example, that allowing evidence
of poll results would require the jury to resolve difficult questions regarding
the methodological soundness of the polls." 9 In effect, Judge Bork would
require that a statement be immunized absent a consensus on what objective
measure should be used to test the truth or falsity of the charge. Such a re-
quirement is particularly harsh when the defendant's own choice of language
created the problem of proof. °90 Moreover, the requirement hardly would
strike the proper balance between the interests in reputation and free
speech-between rational deliberation and critical interaction. Any contested
issue of falsity may involve evidence that one community or another be-
lieves is an invalid measure of a claim's validity. For example, eyewitness
testimony about what occurred at the high school wrestling match that gave
rise to the Milkovich case might be distrusted by the wrestling fans of one
team or another. Likewise, expert witnesses belonging to different schools
of thought might disagree on the significance of various historical docu-
ments; in the hypothetical Holocaust revisionist case, revisionist historians
would disagree with other historians about whether the events described by
Roe could have taken place. To require agreement among communities on a
proper objective measure of truth, however, probably would abolish the
defamation action."' It seems preferable to trust in the soundness of the
judicial fact-finding system, along with the protective procedures that the
Supreme Court has applied to defamation cases, to give "breathing space"
for true assertions, than virtually to abolish the defamation action. As argued
above, the marketplace of ideas would be harmed, not invigorated in a use-
ful way, by withdrawing all recourse for defamation. An effective refutation
of Judge Bork's position lies in the words of Justice White:
It might be suggested that courts, as organs of the govern-
ment, cannot be trusted to discern what the truth is. But the
logical consequence of that view is that the First Amendment
588 Id. at 1007.
119 Id. at 1006-07.
" Phillips observes:
If complexity of determination were the criterion for deciding whether or not a
dispute was capable of judicial resolution, probably the majority of issues now
considered by the courts would be eliminated. The New York Court of Appeals
said in the context of an action for tortious injury to a fetus: "[I]t is an inadmis-
sible concept that uncertainty of proof can ever destroy a legal right." The courts
are particularly disinclined to deny plaintiff a cause of action where, as here, the
difficulty of proof is attributable to the defendant's own misconduct.
Phillips, supra note 11, at 658 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Woods v. Lancet, 102
N.E.2d 691, 695 (N.Y. 1951)).
591 Cf id.
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forbids all libel and slander suits, for in each such suit, there
will be no recovery unless the court finds the publication at
issue to be factually false. Of course, no forum is perfect,
but that is not a justification for leaving whole classes of
defamed individuals without redress or a realistic opportunity
to clear their names. We entrust to juries and the courts the
responsibility of decisions affecting the life and liberty of
persons. It is perverse indeed to say that these bodies are in-
competent to inquire into the truth of a statement of fact in a
defamation case. I can therefore discern nothing in the Con-
stitution which forbids a plaintiff to obtain a judicial decree
that a statement is false-a decree he can then use in the
community to clear his name and to prevent further damage
from a defamation already published.592
The distinction between evaluative and factual assertions necessarily is
difficult in defamation law. The philosopher Alan Montefiore states:
[There are] many primarily descriptive words which, because
certain standards are widely recognised, regularly convey
certain evaluative information; a word like 'cheat' is normal-
ly used both to describe and to disapprove at the same time.
There is never a completely clear cut border between value
terms and descriptive terms ....
Montefiore's description of words that both describe and disapprove at the
same time is a workable definition of at least some forms of defamatory
fact.594 Given that even statements of defamatory fact often are evaluative,
it seems inevitable that it will often be difficult to decide whether a defama-
tory assertion is '"purely" evaluative.
Professor A.E. Dick Howard has said that "First-Amendment-speech
jurisprudence is essentially ad hoc, intuitive, episodic and oftentimes quite
asymmetrical."'5 95 Like obscenity, the fact/opinion dilemma illustrates the
point.596 Post's theory of the "paradox of public discourse" demonstrates
592 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 768 n.2 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
..3 MONTEFIORE, supra note 515, at 61.
'94 Compare the Restatement's definition of a defamatory communication: "A com-
munication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
... The Brennan Legacy: A Roundtable Discussion, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 57.
51 On obscenity, see TRIBE, supra note 48, at 904-19.
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that courts must differentiate between fact and opinion. It is clear, however,
that no "bright-line" test is available for making the distinction. The courts
can differentiate only by determining whether use of a judicial test of the
validity of the speech in question will promote or impair public discourse.
B. Should Deductive as well as Evaluative Opinions Be Nonactionable?
Does a rule immunizing pure evaluative opinion, but not pure deductive
opinion, strike the proper balance between free-speech interests and the
interest in reputation? The Restatement597 and Justice Brennan's dissent in
Milkovich... draw no distinction between pure deductive and pure
evaluative opinion. Both forms warrant immunization because the recipients
of the communication can judge for themselves the soundness of the opin-
ion. In this situation, arguably the values of intelligent debate are sufficient-
ly advanced to outweigh any damage to the subject of the defamatory opin-
ion, and the damage inflicted is only in proportion to the recipients' judg-
ment of the soundness of the opinion, given its factual basis.599 The Re-
statement view gives strong protection to the concept of individual autono-
my reflected in First Amendment jurisprudence.' In the marketplace of
ideas, individual autonomy and choice require the freedom to espouse ideas
and to choose among those espoused by others, unencumbered by the
government's enforcement of civility rules."° The Restatement opinion
rules give absolute protection to such autonomy as long as the listeners to a
message can make judgments about its soundness.
In contrast to this view, Judge Friendly took the position in Cianci v.
New Times Publication Co.6"2 that deductive opinions should not be immu-
nized, because the law of libel could be circumvented too easily by the
publisher's use of the words "I think," and because these are not the types
of statements the validity of which can be tested only in the marketplace of
ideas. 3
Judge Friendly's is the more defensible view. As long as the plaintiff
must prove both falsity and fault,6" the appropriate balance between free
speech interests and the interest in reputation is struck by immunizing only
evaluative opinions, the factual bases of which are stated or available. The
view that damage to reputation may be minimized by the recipients' ability
... See discussion supra part III.B. 1.
598 See discussion supra part III.B.3.
9 See discussion supra part III.B.1.
See Post, supra note 43, at 734 & n.231.
601 See id. at 733-34.
6o2 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
13 See supra text accompanying notes 132-45.
6 See discussion infra part V.D.2.
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to judge the soundness of the opinion is naive. Dean W. Page Keeton ob-
served:
Although people are in a position to judge for themselves
whether an opinion is justified so long as the alleged facts
utilized as a basis for the opinion are proven to be true and
are available to them, most, if not all, people are often influ-
enced by others, especially by the press and the media, in
formulating their opinions. Moreover, the reader of a book or
an article may have difficulty in assimilating all the facts set
forth as the basis for an opinion; as a result, the reader is apt
to be more influenced by the opinion than the facts set forth
to justify it.605
The facts of Milkovich itself illustrate this point. Probably at least some
readers of Diadiun's column would not have taken the trouble to read it
carefully enough to judge for themselves the soundness of his conclusion
that "[a]nyone who attended the [wrestling] meet ... knows in his heart that
Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn
oath to tell the truth. 60 6 Moreover, many of those who read the column
carefully probably were influenced in formulating their own opinions by the
authoritative status of a sports writer for a newspaper. 67 Thus, defamatory
deductive opinions may be just as damaging to reputation as other defama-
tory facts.
This point, though, applies equally to evaluative and deductive opinions.
On what basis, then, can immunity be justified for evaluative but not deduc-
tive opinions? Dean Keeton distinguishes between the two on the following
bases:
In the first place, generally speaking, a person's reputation
suffers greater harm from an opinion statement that infers
605 Keeton, supra note 36, at 1244.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 5 (1990).
In holding that Diadiun's charge was opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court observed
that readers generally expect "cajoling, invective, and hyperbole" on the sports page and
that readers probably would construe Diadiun's charge as opinion because they do not
expect sports writers to be experts on legal issues such as due process and perjury.
Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ohio 1986). It seems likely, nevertheless,
that Diadiun's status as a reporter would influence many readers to believe that his
point of view was valid. In support of his authoritative status, Diadiun asserted, "I was
among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which the trouble broke out, and I also
attended the hearing before the OHSAA, so I was in a unique position of being the only
non-involved party to observe both the meet itself and the Milkovich-Scott version
presented to the board." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 6 n.2.
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specific misconduct from other proven conduct than from an
opinion statement that simply purports to evaluate the right-
ness or wrongness of proven conduct. In the second place, it
is often very difficult to decide whether those or some of
those who receive a published statement will regard a charge
of misconduct as an inference drawn solely from information
set forth or known to both parties or drawn in part from
other information not disclosed or not assumed to be known
by those receiving the communication. Without this difficul-
ty, I would be disposed to make deductive opinions
nonactionable under any circumstances. Because of this prac-
tical difficulty in administration, however, all imputations of
factual misconduct could well be regarded as actionable if
but only if fault with respect to the truth or falsity of the
matter asserted constitutes a prerequisite to recovery. 8
Keeton's first point-that deductive opinions are more damaging to
reputation than evaluative opinions-may be correct, although I know of no
empirical evidence to support it. His second point-that it is difficult to
decide whether an opinion would imply to the recipients facts other than
those stated or otherwise available-applies equally to deductive and
evaluative opinions; therefore it does not justify treating them differently.
What does warrant differential treatment, however, is the different roles
that fact and opinion play in public discourse. A speaker should be immune
from liability for the expression of a pure evaluative opinion on a matter of
public concern because its First Amendment value is of the highest order.
The requirement that a factual predicate be presented along with the opin-
ion, or be generally available to the recipients as members of the public,
provides some protection for reputation because it enables the recipients to
judge for themselves the soundness of the opinion. This requirement also
promotes intelligent debate on the merits of the comment. Moreover, the
speaker may "libel himself rather than the subject of his remarks."'
There is no doubt that evaluative opinions, even when supported by a factu-
al predicate, may do great harm to a person's standing in the community. In
this situation, however, the speech warrants absolute protection because its
value outweighs the interest in reputation. Under Judge Friendly's analysis
in Cianc, pure evaluative opinions are views that should be tested only in
the "marketplace of ideas."6 ° Under Post's analysis, if courts assume to
evaluate the soundness of evaluative opinions, they impose the values of one
608 Keeton, supra note 36, at 1251.
' See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
610 See discussion supra part III.B.2.
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community upon another.61" ' For these views, "public debate is the best
solvent."6 2 Discouraging the suppression of such views by subjecting the
speaker to liability for defamation would be unacceptable in a society that
values the basic tenets of the First Amendment.
In his opinion for the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 13 Jus-
tice Brennan observed that there is a "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... "64 The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."61 Free speech is necessary to ensure both
an unfettered search for the truth and stable government. Justice Brennan
noted:
The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, "presup-
poses that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of au-
thoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all." Mr. Justice
Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. Califor-
nia,... gave the principle its classic formulation:
Those who won our independence believed ... that pub-
lic discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are
subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagina-
tion; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely sup-
posed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing
in the power of reason as applied through public discus-
sion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argu-
ment of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occa-
sional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended
the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should
61 See supra notes 553-54 and accompanying text.
61 Cianci, 639 F.2d at 62. This is Judge Friendly's phrase for the kind of speech that
the Court was referring to in its Gertz dictum, set forth in the text supra note 1.
613 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
614 Id. at 270.
61' Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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be guaranteed." 6
The expression of ideas should receive absolute protection, then, when
the ideas cannot be proved true or false on the basis of "objective evi-
dence," but are debatable, having no generally acceptable, objective measure
by which they can be tested. In the terms of "marketplace" First Amend-
ment analysis, the inhibition of such ideas would hamper the kind of search
for truth essential to a vigorous intellectual community that cares about
ultimate values. It would impede political and social change and menace
stable government. There should be complete autonomy for speakers to es-
pouse ideas and for listeners to choose among them, but speakers should not
be free to mislead listeners with false statements of facts that infringe upon
dignity interests with no compensating gain.
False statements of fact interfere with the truth-seeking functions of the
marketplace of ideas. The courts' neutrality with regard to community mores
would be compromised if the courts permitted false and defamatory state-
ments of fact, made with fault, to go unredressed. There would be unfair
competition in the marketplace of ideas. Even when the factual predicate is
stated along with the opinion, a deductive comment may cause significant
damage to reputation.
For example, consider a hypothetical assertion in an editorial about John
Doe, a candidate for city attorney: "In my opinion, John Doe is an incompe-
tent lawyer because he was accepted into law school under an affirmative
action program and would not have been admitted under the school's stan-
dards for whites." Even if the premises of this statement are true, a false
assertion that Doe is an incompetent lawyer can be very damaging, causing
readers to make judgments based on false premises. In part this pure deduc-
tive opinion may be persuasive because readers are ill informed; some may
assume that the writer is correct that only those who entered law school
under the standards applied to "whites" can be competent lawyers. The
assertion should be subject to challenge in a defamation action because it
does not advance free speech values, and because it is not the type of public
discourse that contributes to intelligent decision making or promotes a
multicultural society that is both dynamic and durable. If such an assertion
were made with actual malice, it should not enjoy protection.
C. Should "Point of View" Opinion be Nonactionable?
If deductive opinion should be actionable, a fortiori mere "point of
view" opinion also should be actionable. As previously noted, the "point of
view" analysis of opinion does not require the statement or accessibility of
616 Id. at 270 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(D.S.D.N.Y. 1943); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)).
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supporting facts, but rather immunizes any expression of the speaker's belief
that the stated facts are true.6"7 The harmful effect of false statements of
fact on First Amendment objectives is not materially reduced by expressing
the statement as the speaker's viewpoint; moreover, adequate leeway for
false statements of fact in robust debate is provided by placing the burden
on the plaintiff to show falsity and fault.
The case for treating the expression of one's point of view as
nonactionable appears to derive from the proposition that the expression
merely reveals the speaker's state of mind and does not represent as true or
false the inference asserted. Some courts hold that such an expression im-
plies the existence of supporting facts if they are not stated or available;
others go further and hold the expression nonactionable, with or without
supporting facts.6"8 Under either approach, the rationale appears to be that
the only issue of truth or falsity that the expression raises is whether the
speaker actually holds the belief expressed. Thus, Justice Brennan stated in
his Milkovich dissent that, at least when the factual basis for an inference is
stated along with the opinion, the issue of truth or falsity turns on whether
the speaker in fact has drawn the inference, and not on whether the infer-
ence itself is true or false.619
Martin F. Hansen, in a recent article, explores the views of language
philosophers in an attempt to develop a test for nonactionable expres-
sions.62 Hansen explicitly rejects the immunization of expressions on the
ground that they assert points of view,621 yet he implicitly incorporates a
point-of-view approach in his critical analysis of Milkovich.622 An exami-
nation of the insights of some of the language philosophers indicates the
flaw in Justice Brennan's analysis in Milkovich, and in the point-of-view
approach in general.
Hansen criticizes Milkovich as reflecting the viewpoint of logical posi-
tivism, by which "verifiability divides all nonanalytic statements into two
distinct and mutually exclusive categories. '  Synthetic statements are
those expressions that are verifiable on the basis of empirical observa-
tion;624 evaluative statements are simply expressions of emotion that are
neither true nor false. 625 Hansen asserts that, like logical positivism,
Milkovich fails to consider context in determining whether a statement is
617 See discussion supra part IV.A.3 (discussing "point of view" analysis).
618 See discussion supra parts IV.A.2-3.
619 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
620 See Hansen, supra note 541.
621 See id. at 87 n.228.
622 See infra text accompanying notes 640-48.
623 Hansen, supra note 541, at 62 (footnote omitted).
624 Id. at 60.
625 Id. at 62.
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one of fact or opinion.626 Under both approaches, "the relationship of
statements describing empirical (objective) facts to the states of affairs they
purport to describe is assumed to be more or less constant."62
Both approaches, Hansen says, ignore the effect of context on the way
in which an audience understands speech.62 He argues that "the use to
which the audience understands the speaker to be putting the statement...
[is] [a]n important factor in deciding what truth criteria an audience is likely
to associate with a statement." '629 Hansen notes that the performative theo-
rists, who rejected logical positivism, have focused upon the functional
aspects of speech.630 J.L. Austin, a leading performative theorist, initially
distinguished performative utterances from constatives, or statements.63
Under Austin's analysis, performative utterances are those "whose truth
adhere[s] in the simple act of their utterance." '632 Examples are the state-
ments "'I do' in a wedding ceremony, and 'I accept' in contractual deal-
ings." '633 They also include other speech acts such as bets, warnings, and
advice.634 Performatives have "felicity conditions," but not the trait of be-
ing true or false.635 Hansen seems to imply that statements of opinion, if
clearly understood as such, are performatives.636
Hansen recognizes that performative theorists eventually rejected the
626 Id. at 68-69.
611 Id. at 65.
628 Id. at 68-69.
629 Id. at 70.
630 Id.
631 J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 235 (3d. ed. 1979).
632 Hansen, supra note 541, at 70.
633 Id.
634 See AUSTIN, supra note 631, at 235, 251.
635 Hansen, supra note 541, at 71. "Felicity conditions" exist when statements have
meaning within the context of their utterance. See id.
636 Hansen recognizes that conventions of speech may cause an audience to construe
a statement in the form of an opinion as an assertion of fact:
[A]s the Milkovich majority correctly noted, the statements "In my opinion, Jones
is a liar" and "Jones is a liar" may have virtually identical defamatory impact.
Even if the audience recognizes the intent behind the former as an expression of
opinion, it nevertheless might assume that one of the conditions under which it is
appropriate for a person to express an opinion is if the person has good grounds
for holding it. Presumably the basis for the opinion, in certain contexts, would be
nearly identical to the grounds underlying the statement "Jones is a liar." Instead,
one might view the explicit performative "in my opinion" more properly as the
speaker's attempt to convey the type of communicative act she seeks to perform,
rather than as that which makes it the case that the speaker is asserting an opin-
ion.
Id. at 79-80 (footnotes omitted). The negative implication of this discussion seems to be
that an expression of opinion is a performative utterance if the audience clearly under-
stands it as opinion.
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notion that constatives and performatives are distinct speech categories.637
Austin, for example, came to the conclusion that constatives are a form of
performatives, and that at least some performatives have verifiability condi-
tions."' Thus, Hansen does not expressly take the position that
performative utterances are unverifiable as true or false-that their truth
exists in their very utterance. His position is that "a statement should be
actionable only if there exists a substantial degree of consensus within the
relevant community or audience over the kinds of facts that would support
finding the challenged statement to be true or false." '639
The difficulty lies with Hansen's analysis of Milkovich. Although he
purports to be applying his test, he gives a significant amount of weight to
what he sees as the conjectural nature of Diadiun's accusation that
Milkovich committed perjury. Hansen argues that Diadiun's references to
statements made by an athletic association commissioner that Milkovich's
statements at the court hearing "sounded pretty darned unfamiliar" and "dif-
ferent from what they told us," are nonactionable. 4° Under Hansen's test,
these statements fall "significantly short of accusing Milkovich of ly-
ing."' Hansen also finds nonactionable Diadiun's comment "that
Milkovich and Scott, by the time of the court hearing, 'apparently had their
version of the incident polished and reconstructed, [so that] the judge ap-
parently believed them."'' 2 Hansen says "there is likely to be relatively
little consensus among readers over the verifiability criteria of the statement
that Milkovich 'polished and reconstructed' his account of his actions at the
meet."' 3 Although Hansen believes that the perjury charge is stronger than
the others, "a reader would almost certainly realize that it, too, was based
upon Diadiun's conjecture about what Milkovich said at the state court
hearing based on the commissioner's statements and the result of that hear-
ing."' The broader context also "would have tipped off the average read-
er that the author's statements were not to be understood as neutral report-
age or bald statements of brute fact."" Hansen criticizes the Court for
overlooking the context that would lead a reader to these conclusions. "6
637 id.
638 Id.
639 Id. at 73; see supra notes 575-77 and accompanying text (discussing the difficul-
ties inherent in this test).
640 Id.
64' Id. at 96.
642 Id. at 96-97.
643 Id. at 97.
6" Id.
645 Id.
60 Hansen asserts that "the Court ignored contextual cues, such as the article's con-
jectural language and format, that supported the state court's conclusion that Diadiun's
comments qualified as opinion." Id. at 56 (footnote omitted).
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Hansen's conclusions about the perjury charge are problematic in two
respects. First, he finds the perjury charge unverifiable because it was based
on the statements of the commissioner and Diadiun's conjectural assertion
that Milkovich had "polished and reconstructed" his version of the facts." 7
Hansen says there would be no reader consensus on the verifiability criteria
of those statements; because the reader would know the basis for the perjury
assertion, it too is unverifiable. The problem with this reasoning is that the
specific charge of perjury apparently becomes unverifiable by reason of the
vagueness of the other two references. The ieverse of this reasoning is more
plausible. Even if one accepts Hansen's test, it seems that the sounder anal-
ysis is that the very specific charge of perjury removes any ambiguity from
the looser assertions. By saying Milkovich committed perjury, Diadiun dem-
onstrated that he understood the commissioner's statements as implying
perjury, and that his assertion that Milkovich had "polished and reconstruct-
ed" his version of events was an assertion that Milkovich committed perju-
ry.
The second and more fundamental problem with Hansen's analysis lies
in his emphasis on the point that readers would understand Diadiun's charge
as conjecture. To the extent that he means that conjecture should be
nonactionable, the flaw in his analysis is the same as the flaw in Justice
Brennan's analysis that, at least when the factual basis for an inference is
stated along with the opinion, the issue of truth or falsity turns on whether
the speaker in fact has drawn the inference, and not on whether the infer-
ence itself is true or false.6" 8 The flaw is also the same as that in early
performative theory-that there is a distinction between constatives and
performatives.
Austin rejected the performative-constative distinction in his later writ-
ings and concluded that there is no verbal criterion for distinguishing be-
tween these categories; that at least some performatives can be invalid on
bases other than infelicity; that constatives are subject to infelicity as well as
falsity; and that, like performatives, constatives in fact are speech-acts." 9
He concluded, therefore, that the constative-performative antithesis had
failed and that a more general theory of speech-acts was required.65 ° He
adopted the term "illocutionary acts" to embrace what he previously had
In his analysis of Milkovich, Hansen also applies his test that "a statement should
be actionable only if there exists a substantial degree of consensus within the relevant
community or audience over the kinds of facts that would support finding the chal-
lenged statement to be true or false." Id. at 73. Indeed, his analysis is somewhat unclear
because he does not explicitly use a point-of-view approach.
64 Id. at 97.
48 See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 26-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 J.L. Austin, Performative-Constative, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 13, 20-
21 (J.R. Searle ed., 1971).
650 Id. at 20.
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considered separate categories of performatives and constatives, contrasting
illocutionary acts with "perlocutionary acts, which produce certain effects on
hearers, such as persuasion, fright, or boredom."65'
In deciding that at least some performatives are subject to a truth-falsity
or validity test, Austin presaged a rethinking of what various speech-acts
require to be successful-that is, to achieve their point or goal. As an exam-
ple, he determined that statements of advice can be questioned as true or
false." 2 More recent writers hold that "advise" is an illocutionary verb
that, depending on its use, ma be an "assertive," subject to a truth-falsity
test.653 The philosophers John R. Searle and Daniel Vanderveken have
developed and refined Austin's ideas, constructing a formal theory of
illocutionary acts."" The Searle-Vanderveken theory contradicts the idea
that the expression of a conjecture or hypothesis is merely performative in
the sense that it is true or false only on the basis of the genuineness of the
expression. Such expressions are "assertives. '655 The point or purpose of
an assertive is to represent "how the world is"; the assertive has a world-to-
word "direction of fit." '656 Searle and Vanderken explain that "[i]n general,
the direction of fit of an illocution is the same as that of its expressed psy-
chological state." '657 They further state:
65' J.R. Searle, Introduction, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, supra note 649, at
1, 7-8.
652 Austin provides the following example:
Let us suppose that I say to you 'I advise you to do it'; and let us allow that all
the circumstances are appropriate [for making the utterance performative]...
There does still arise, all the same, a little question: was the advice good or bad?
Agreed, I spoke in all sincerity. I believed that to do it would be in your interest;
but was I right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? Or
again-though perhaps this matters less-was it in fact, or as things turned out, in
your interest? There is confrontation of my utterance with the situation in, and the
situation with respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified perhaps, but
was I right?
J.L. Austin, supra note 649, at 20.
653 See JOHN R. SEARLE & DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF
ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 181 (1985). See the ensuing discussion in the text for an expla-
nation of "assertives."
654 See id.
655 Searle & Vanderveken divide illocutionary forces into five language use catego-
ries:
One can say how things are (assertives), one can try to get other people to do
things (directives), one can commit oneself to doing things (commissives), one
can bring about changes in the world through one's utterances (declarations), and
one can express one's feelings and attitudes (expressives).
Id. at 52.
656 Id. at 53-54, 94.
657 Id. at 94.
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The way in which a propositional content is related to a
world of utterance we call its direction of fit. Intuitively the
idea of direction of fit is the idea of responsibility for fitting.
For example, in the case of a description [an "assertive"], the
propositional content of the speaker's utterance is supposed
to match some independently existing state of affairs and to
the extent that it does so we say that the description is true
or false, accurate or inaccurate. But in the case of an order [a
"directive"] the propositional content is not supposed to
match an independently existing reality but rather the hearer
is supposed to change his behavior to match the proposition-
al content of the order. To the extent that he does that we do
not say that the order was true or accurate but rather that it
was obeyed or disobeyed.65
Thus, to achieve a successful fit, "the propositional content of [an assertive]
fits an independently existing state of affairs in the world." '659
Included in the category of assertives are illocutions that state, argue,
opine, criticize, conjecture, and hypothesize.66 ° These assertives vary in
their strength of point or force,66' but all are assertions of a belief in the
658 Id. at 52.
659 Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). Illocutions other than assertives also have directions
of fit:
Both the commissive and the directive illoctionary points have the world-to-word
direction of fit. Part of the point of a commissive or directive illocution is to get
the world to match the propositional content, and in a speech situation responsibil-
ity for bringing about success of fit can be placed on either the speaker or the
hearer. In the case of a commissive illocution, responsibility for achieving success
of fit rests with the speaker; in the case of a directive illocution it rests with the
hearer. Speaker and hearer play such crucial roles in discourse that we distinguish
between a speaker based world-to-word direction of fit (commissives) and a hear-
er based world-to-word direction of fit (directives). The double direction of fit is
found in the declarative illocutionary point. In a declarative illocution the speaker
makes the world match the propositional content simply by saying that the propo-
sitional content matches the world. Finally, utterances with the expressive
illocutionary point have the null direction of fit. The point of an expressive
illocution is not to say that the propositional content matches the world, nor to get
the world to match the propositional content, but it is simply to express the
speaker's attitude about the state of affairs represented by the propositional con-
tent.
Id. at 53-54.
660 Id. at 99, 182-83.
661 Id. at 14, 54.
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proposition stated and thus have a "world-to-word direction of fit. 62
Thus, statements and conjectures belong to the same categories of speech
acts, and differ only in their degree of strength or force." 3 For purposes of
defamation law, the strength of the assertion would go to the issue of dam-
ages-the degree of harm, if any, done to the plaintiff's reputation. Con-
versely, whether the point of a conjecture is an assertion of the proposition
stated, or merely an expression of the speaker's state of mind, goes to the
question of its actionability.
The idea that a conjecture or hypothesis is an assertive is consistent with
the linguistic principle that, although a statement of opinion focuses atten-
tion upon the speaker, an evaluative assertion focuses attention upon the
object of the statement. 64 Thus, "when we disagree with other people's
value judgments, we do not dispute them on the grounds that they are lying
or mistaken about what they really approve of. '665 Professor Post explains:
[S]tatements that merely express or describe the "private
feelings" of a speaker must be distinguished from statements
which make judgments about aspects of the world indepen-
dent of a speaker. The first kind of statements, which I shall
call "preference expressions," are a kind of report on the
inner condition of a speaker, and the only possible claim to
truth they might contain lies in the factual accuracy of that
report. The sentence "I don't like Jerry Falwell" is an exam-
ple of a preference expression. Although the sentence does
claim to be true, this claim is at most limited to the validity
of its factual characterization of the subject of the pronoun
"I." The second kind of statements, which I shall call "judg-
ments," do not simply make known the private feelings or
attitudes of a speaker, but rather make claims about aspects
of the world that are independent of the speaker and that do
not appear to be merely factual in nature. The sentence "Jer-
ry Falwell is a hypocrite" is an example of a judgment. The
claim of the sentence to be true does not turn on the attrib-
utes of its speaker, and we intuitively understand the claim
to involve evaluation rather than merely factual descrip-
662 Id. at 53-54.
66' Id. at 20 ("The illocutionary force of a conjecture differs from assertion in that
the speaker who conjectures commits himself to the truth of the propositional content
with a weaker degree of strength than the degree of commitment to truth of an asser-
tion.").
64 See, e.g., MONTEFIORE, supra note 515, at 67.
665 Id. at 49.
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tion.6"
This distinction between preference expressions and judgments also
applies to the distinction between preference expressions and expressions of
belief in a state of facts. Thus, the statement "I think Jones lied" focuses
attention upon Jones and whether he lied, rather than on the speaker and
whether he really had drawn the inference that Jones lied."7 Post makes
this point to show that the reasons for rejecting preference expressions as
actionable cannot be used to distinguish between fact and opinion." His
point, however, also indicates that expressing an opinion calls attention to
the opinion, and not simply to the state of mind of the speaker.
Treating the expression of conjecture or point of view as an assertive
makes sense in defamation law. In the context of defamation law, courts
must make the fact/opinion distinction in light of the interest that the law of
defamation seeks to protect and the interests of the First Amendment that
are implicated. As argued in the preceding section of this Article, even a
pure deductive opinion creates a significant potential for damage to reputa-
tion."9 Hansen's analysis takes into account only one effect that the col-
umn would have on the mind of the reader-that the column expressed
Diadiun's point of view-ignoring the serious potential for damage to repu-
tation that such a charge creates. The Searle-Vanderveken notion that a
hypotheses is an assertive, the point or focus of which is to express a belief
in the proposition expressed, is more appropriate. Both the broad and nar-
row contexts of Diadiun's charge-including the captions "T.D. Says"670
and "Diadiun says Maple told a lie,' 671 and the emotive language that any-
one who attended the meet knows "in his heart" that Milkovich
lied67 2-clearly signaled the reader that Diadiun believed very strongly that
Milkovich committed perjury. Diadiun's column, in fact, was more than
conjecture, it was argumentation.6 73 The reader would understand clearly
66 Post, supra note 11, at 652-53 (footnotes omitted).
17 Cf Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[T]here
remains much truth in the old adage: 'You should not say it is not good. You should
say you do not like it, and then, you know, you're perfectly safe."').
668 Post, supra note 11, at 653-54.
66 See discussion supra part V.B.
670 Hansen, supra note 541, at 97.
671 Id.
672 Id.
673 Searle and Vanderken rank argument as considerably stronger in force than con-
jecture. With "P" standing for the proposition asserted, they observe: "Arguing is al-
ways either for or against a certain thesis. When one argues that P one asserts that P
and gives reasons which support the proposition that P, normally with the
perlocutionary intention of convincing the hearer that P." SEARLE & VANDERKEN, supra
note 653, at 184.
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that the whole point of Diadiun's article was to convince the audience that
he was right. Even though Diadiun's charge informed the reader of his own
state of mind, more importantly it sought to persuade the reader that he was
correct. Everyday experience indicates that this kind of journalism is very
effective in shaping the public's view of the person charged. The effect of
the article would be to cause debate about the character of Milkovich,
whether or not it caused debate about Diadiun. People with a positive view
of Diadiun's reporting, and little if any acquaintance with Milkovich, no
doubt would be inclined to believe Diadiun. If readers believed the charge
of perjury, and it was false, their ability to make informed judgments about
the behavior and qualifications of a public official would be hampered, not
enhanced. If the threat of liability for this type of language makes colum-
nists more cautious about making such charges, it is difficult to see how
First Amendment interests would be harmed.
As noted above, Hansen criticizes the Court for overlooking the context
that would lead a reader to understand that Diadiun's charge was conjectur-
al.674 It seems unlikely, however, that the Court overlooked the effect of
context on the reader's impressions; rather, the Court considered it irrelevant
that the reader would understand the conjectural nature of the charge.67
Hansen's focus on context does not go far enough. It is insufficient to ask
whether the context would cause readers to understand that the charge was
conjectural; the crucial question is whether the context would tend to cause
them to believe that the conjectural charge was true. Like other courts ap-
plying traditional defamation rules, the Supreme Court rightly viewed the
conjectural nature of the charge as irrelevant in Milkovich.
674 See Hansen, supra note 541, at 56.
675 The Court has payed close attention to context in determining whether language
can be understood in a literal sense or as rhetorical hyperbole. See, e.g., Letter Carriers
v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S.
6 (1970). Nevertheless, Hansen opines that
the Court seemed to suggest [in Milkovich] that the context surrounding a chal-
lenged statement is relevant only to determine whether it qualifies as "rhetorical
hyperbole," loose or figurative language, and the like, which the court character-
ized as a distinct "type" of speech it had previously held entitled to full First
Amendment protection.
Hansen, supra note 541, at 53-54. It would seem unusual for the Court to find that the
meaning of language must be determined from its context when considering rhetorical
hyperbole, but to blind itself to context for purposes of the fact/opinion distinction. My
interpretation of Milkovich avoids such an improbable dichotomy by concluding that,
for policy reasons, the Court viewed conjectural charges of criminal conduct as action-
able.
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D. The Problems Posed by Ambiguity
Ambiguous language poses special problems in First Amendment juris-
prudence. First is the practical problem of how a plaintiff can prove falsity
when the defamatory charge is broad and has multiple meanings. Some
courts hold that ambiguous language cannot be proved false because to suc-
ceed, the plaintiff would have to prove false all possible meanings of the
charge.676 This position is unsound. In some cases, the plaintiff should be
able to reach the jury on the issue of falsity, despite the ambiguity of the
charge. The second and more significant issue involves the special risks that
ambiguous language poses to First Amendment concerns, regardless of
whether it is immunized. A fault requirement on the meaning the language
conveys should minimize these risks.
1. Proving the Falsity of Ambiguous Language
In Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications,677 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held:
Many of the statements cited in the complaint and appellate
brief either constitute obviously protected hyperbole or are
not susceptible of being proved true or false. Such, for ex-
ample, is the language in "The phantom of the 'Phantom'
quoting a critic who described the Hill production as "a rip-
off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job." Not only is this
commentary figurative and hyperbolic, but we also can imag-
ine no objective evidence to disprove it. Whether appellant's
"Phantom" is "fake" or "phony" is similarly unprovable,
since those adjectives admit of numerous interpretations.678
In contrast, however, in Yetman v. English,679 the Arizona Supreme Court
held that a charge that plaintiff was a communist was susceptible of proof of
falsity. The court determined that "a reasonable fact finder could determine
from evidence presented whether Yetman did, in fact, espouse and practice
communist philosophy or tactics such as denying citizens the opportunity to
676 See discussion supra part IV.A.5.
677 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992); see also notes 211-
18, 367-69 and accompanying text.
678 Phantom, 953 F.2d at 728.
679 811 P.2d 323 (Ariz. 1991) (en banc).
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petition government officials."6'0 At first blush, the multiple meanings of
the terms "a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job" and "communist philosophy
or tactics" would seem to defy proof of falsity. Indeed, the American Law
Institute recognizes that "placing the burden on the party asserting the nega-
tive necessarily creates difficulties, and the problem is accentuated when the
defamatory charge is not specific in its terms but quite general in na-
ture.
681
Properly understood, the pleading and proof rules of defamation law
may enable the plaintiff in a Yetman type of case to reach the jury, despite
the plaintiffs burden of proving falsity. Under common law rules, with truth
as a defense, the plaintiff controls the truth/falsity issue:
The factual allegations a truth defense requires are dictated
by the way the plaintiff frames the allegation of defamation;
the defense must be "as broad, and as narrow, as the defam-
atory imputation itself." The defendant must justify, or prove
as true, the "gist" or "sting" of the libel-that is, the par-
ticular aspect of the defendant's statement that the plaintiff
claims was damaging to him.682
Although the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity, the plaintiff still
controls the truth/falsity issue. The plaintiff must prove false the particular
aspect of the defendant's statement that the plaintiff claims was damaging to
him, provided that the plaintiffs claim regarding the meaning of the lan-
guage is supportable.8 3 When a defamatory charge is ambiguous, the
plaintiff must explain the meaning of the defendant's charge.6 4 Under
common law defamation pleading rules, the plaintiff sets forth the alleged
defamatory meaning in an allegation called the "innuendo. 6 5 The mean-
ing of the charge "is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but
reasonably, understands that it was intended to express. '6 6 The court de-
termines whether the charge is capable of bearing the meaning asserted by
the plaintiff, and the jury determines whether a charge capable of bearing
that meaning was so understood by its recipient.6 7
680 Id. at 333 (footnote omitted).
611 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. j (1977).
682 Kathryn Dix Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Con-
stitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 504 (1979) (quoting WIL-
LIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 798 (4th ed. 1971)).
683 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. c (1977).
684 Id.
685 Id. § 563 cmt. f.
686 Id. § 563.
687 Id. § 614.
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In a proper case, these rules permit the plaintiff to narrow an ambiguous
charge to manageable proportions on the falsity iss.ue."' Thus, in Yetman,
the plaintiff may have alleged and produced evidence that, to those attend-
ing the luncheon, the charge of communism meant that the plaintiff had
refused to allow property owners a voice in attempting to influence the
proposed zoning change. That or a similar allegation and proof may explain
why the court held that "[a] reasonable fact-finder could determine from evi-
dence presented whether Yetman did, in fact, espouse and practice commu-
nist philosophy or tactics such as denying citizens the opportunity to petition
government officials." '689 In Phantom, if the only reasonable construction
of the defendant's language was that it was hyperbole, the result was cor-
rect. Yet if the language was reasonably understood to charge that the plain-
tiff was deliberately deceiving the public to believe that the production was
that of Andrew Lloyd Weber, then the charge would be susceptible of proof
of falsity. If the plaintiff alleged that the word "fraud" meant such deliberate
deception, then proof of falsity could be adduced.
Thus, it is untenable to deny plaintiffs the ability to reach the jury mere-
ly on the ground that the charge was ambiguous. If the plaintiff alleges a
factual meaning and the defamatory charge is capable of bearing the con-
struction alleged, the plaintiff should be entitled to reach the jury on the
issue of falsity.
2. The Risks to First Amendment Interests Posed by Ambiguity and the Need
for a Fault Requirement on Meaning
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court distinguished between the question
"whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the
Diadiun column impl[ied] an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured
himself in a judicial proceeding"6 a and the question whether "the connota-
tion that petitioner committed perjury [was] sufficiently factual to be sus-
ceptible of being proved true or false."69' Some courts, however, have not
kept these questions separate.
688 See, e.g., Haworth v. Feigon, 623 A.2d 150, 156-57 (Me. 1993) (rejecting
defendants' argument that statement "I hear you hired the drunk" had no factual content
and was susceptible to varying interpretations, and holding jury could find that state-
ment had factual connotation and bore defamatory meaning alleged by plaintiff). Cf
Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that in biog-
raphy of poet William Burroughs, statement that Burroughs "thought of himself as
'dark-horse Norse,' ignored and unpublished," was not capable of defamatory meaning
ascribed to it by plaintiff, i.e. that he was unpublished, but rather was description of
plaintiff's state of mind).
689 Yetman, 811 P.2d at 333 (footnote omitted).
690 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990).
691 Id.
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In particular, as discussed previously in this Article, some courts have
taken the view that ambiguous language is immune as opinion."' Addi-
tionally, at least one proposed test for making the fact/opinion distinction
would immunize ambiguity.693 This view conflates the issues of what
meaning a statement conveyed and whether a given meaning is objectively
verifiable. The problem with this approach is that it may protect the clever
defamer, rather than the innocent one.694 Granting immunity for all who
cast aspersions in ambiguous terms would allow easy circumvention of
defamation law. Immunity for ambiguous statements would impede rather
than advance First Amendment interests because of the polluting effect false
statements have on public discourse, and because of the inhibiting effect the
risk of defamation has on public speech. Ambiguous language may be sub-
ject to a reasonable construction as defamatory fact. If it is, and if the
speaker was at fault for the damaging nature of the statement and its falsity,
then there is no sound reason to deny a remedy to the person whose reputa-
tion has been damaged.
The crafty writer who deliberately couches defamatory facts in the cloak
of ambiguity should not be immune from liability. At the same time, the
passionate speaker should be allowed freedom in her choice of words.695
692 See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1303-04 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986) (holding that statement in question was opinion, in part
because it was "not precise"); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[S]tatements that are 'loosely definable' or 'variously interpretable' cannot in most
contexts support an action for defamation."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Cole
v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1025, 1027 (Mass.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1037 (1982) (holding that assertions that "Cole's dismissal was due to 'sloppy
and irresponsible reporting' and a 'history of bad reporting techniques"' were opinion,
in part, because "[t]he meaning of these statements is imprecise and open to specula-
tion"); see also discussion supra part IV.A.5.
693 See Hansen, supra note 541, at 73. Hansen also argues that "extending First
Amendment protection only to statements around which at least a substantial consensus
exists as to their verifiability criteria ensures that defendants will not effectively be
required to shoulder the expense of potentially defamatory speech that is legitimately
open to varying interpretations yielding disparate truth functions." Id. at 75.
694 Cf MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 343 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal. 1959) (rejecting
ambiguity as a test for classifying libel as per quod on the ground that such a test "pro-
tects, not the innocent defamer whose words are libelous only because of facts unknown
to him, but the clever writer versed in the law of defamation who deliberately casts a
grossly defamatory imputation in ambiguous language").
695 Professor Smolla states:
Constitutional protection for speech is not limited to its cognitive content alone,
but extends also to the emotional components of speech. Speech does not forfeit
the protection that it would otherwise enjoy merely because it is laced with pas-
sion or vulgarity. The emotion principle is one of the cardinal tenets of modem
First Amendment jurisprudence. Without that tenet, much of the First Amendment
as we know it would unravel.
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The history of the struggle for free speech rights in England includes an
argument for the protection of the use of inflammatory language of persua-
sion as early as the 16th century.696 Professor Schauer has observed that
"the choice of language may be as much a part of the freedom protected by
the First Amendment as is the choice of the underlying propositions which
that language expresses. 697 Schauer notes that "the ordinary use of words
is consensus, a linguistic majority rule, that is followed more for some
words than for others. '698 To convey new or unconventional ideas, the
speaker may need to use words in an unconventional way.699 And to per-
suade others to accept her strong political views, the speaker may wish to
exaggerate opposing viewpoints to appeal to the listeners' emotions.7"'
Thus, "[t]he distortion of language to emphasize a point-to express or to
elicit an emotion-is present in varying degrees in virtually all human dia-
logue."7 °1 Schauer argues:
Imposition of the majority consensus [on the meaning of
words] necessarily would restrict the speech of those not
sharing the consensus. The degree of this problem varies
inversely with the strength of a particular consensus, but in
each case there would be some who suffer. In light of this
danger, the first amendment may be construed to protect the
SMOLLA, supra note 46, at 46.
696 See Kenneth Campbell, The Origins and Development of a Philosophy for the
Protection of Opinion in Defamation Law 62-63 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill)).
697 Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in
Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263, 268 (1978).
698 Id. at 282.
699 Id. at 283.
'00 Id. at 284.
The very means of inducing another to feel strongly often involves comparing the
topic at hand with another idea about which the listeners are known to have
strong feelings. Because no comparison can ever be exact, this process by its very
nature involves distortions of the ordinary (majoritarian) use of language. For
example, a speaker wishing emphatically to denounce conservative philosophies
may label them as "fascist" or "Nazi," even though the comparison does not use
either of these words "properly." Similarly, a speaker may decry those ideas to
the left of his own by labelling them, in increasing degree of revulsion, "socialis-
tic," "socialist," "Socialist," "communistic," "communist," or even "Communist."
The use of political or financial pressure may become a "holdup," although the
actual conduct may bear no literal resemblance to an armed robbery. Comparison,
although perhaps less appealing intellectually than use of pure reason, has become
an accepted mode of contemporary political debate.
Id. at 284-85 (footnote omitted).
701 Id. at 285.
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use of language from majority control, for a right is virtually
meaningless unless it can be exercised against the majority.
This antimajoritarian concept, together with the privilege of
criticizing the government, in fact may be "at the very cen-
ter" of the first amendment.0 2
Ambiguity therefore presents opposing dangers to First Amendment
interests in defamation law. On the one hand, protecting the deliberate de-
famer because she has chosen ambiguous language would allow harm to
reputation without adequate First Amendment justification. On the other
hand, penalizing the critic because her passionate, creative, or even mistaken
use of language was misunderstood would dampen her willingness to ex-
press ideas that are central to free speech interests. Neither of these conflict-
ing risks can be eliminated without exacerbating the other, but a fault re-
quirement on the meaning of language would help to protect against both of
these dangers.
An additional ambiguity problem arises in cases applying the Restate-
ment analysis of "pure" opinion, which Milkovich adopted in part.7 3 The
determination whether a comment is based upon disclosed or undisclosed
facts is a difficult question, and courts have reached inconsistent results on
this issue.7M Professor Stem states:
In epistemic terms, a speaker cannot know (or even confi-
dently predict) whether the court-postulated average recipient
will draw "the reasonable conclusion that the derogatory
opinion expressed in the comment must have been based on
undisclosed defamatory facts." Yet, even if the recipient has
misunderstood the speaker's intent, she is still responsible for
that "reasonable," but incorrect, inference-a rule bordering
dangerously on strict liability. °5
A fault standard on the meaning of language should preclude this type of
"strict liability."
a. Public Official and Public Figure Plaintiffs
In Good Government Group v. Superior Court,0 the California Su-
preme Court imposed a fault standard on meaning in a case that showed the
702 Id. at 283 (footnotes omitted).
... See discussion supra part III.B.1.
" See Phillips, supra note 11, at 650-57; see also Stem, supra note 33, at 617-26.
705 Stem, supra note 33, at 617-18 (footnotes omitted).
706 586 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
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importance of having such a fault standard. Good Government involved a
heated political dispute between city councilmen and a civic organiza-
tion.7"7 In the course of this dispute, the defendant civic organization pub-
lished a charge that the plaintiff and two other city councilmen, referred to
as the "combine," had "extorted by blackmail" $100,000 from a develop-
er.708 The defendant maintained that the charge of "extortion by blackmail"
was merely an epithet derogatory of the city council's action requiring that a
developer pay $100,000 to the city in return for permission to proceed with
construction of an apartment project.7 9 The plaintiff argued that the public
reasonably understood the statement as a charge of criminal conduct.7 0
The court determined that whether the recipients reasonably could have
understood the charge as a factual assertion that the plaintiff had committed
blackmail or extortion was a question of fact. T' The court, however, also
held that the plaintiff could not establish knowledge of falsity merely by
reason of the defendants' admission that they knew the plaintiff had not
committed such acts; the plaintiff was required to show that the defendant
deliberately or recklessly conveyed the alleged defamatory import to the
reader." 2
707 Id. at 573.
708 Id.
"' Id. at 575.
710 Id.
71 Id. at 578.
712 The court reasoned:
If we were to accept [the plaintiffs] contention, it would mean that a defendant
who makes a statement which is ambiguous in the sense that it can reasonably be
viewed as either fact or opinion, but who neither intends the statement to bear a
factual meaning nor believes that it will be understood by the reader in that fash-
ion, will be guilty of libel if a jury later determines that the article was under-
stood in its factual, defamatory sense.
Such a holding would render a defendant liable for a defamatory statement
negligently made and would create precisely the chilling effect on speech which
the New York Times rule was designed to avoid. The Supreme Court made it clear
there that the reason for its ruling requiring a showing of malice in libel actions
involving the conduct of public officials is that otherwise "would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." Such a rule
"dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
If [the plaintiff] was to prevail in his view, the result would be a hobbling of
free speech by the continuing fear of liability for the use of inexact semantics.
The First Amendment protects not only the expression of a political opinion but
the choice of words used to convey that opinion.
It is clear that honest belief of the defendant is the touchstone of the privilege
enunciated in New York Times, and that a statement is entitled to constitutional
1994] 595
596 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 3:2
The Good Government fault requirement applied to an ambiguous state-
ment that could be interpreted as a literal charge of blackmail and extortion,
or as an epithet derogatory of the plaintiffs actions as a city councilman.
The same fault requirement should be applied to a statement that could be
understood as either a factual statement or an evaluative, immune opinion.
Debate on the merits of the performance of a public official would be undu-
ly dampened if the speaker were subject to liability for mere negligence
regarding the meaning that the recipients attached to his words.713 More-
protection if the words used are ambiguous but the defendant honestly and with-
out recklessness believes that they constitute an opinion or idea. We hold, there-
fore, that in order to find the requisite malice from the publication of ambiguous
words which could constitute either fact or opinion, the jury must find not only
that the words were reasonably understood in their defamatory, factual sense, but
also that the defendant either deliberately cast his statements in an equivocal
fashion in the hope of insinuating a defamatory import to the reader, or that he
knew or acted in reckless disregard of whether his words would be interpreted by
the average reader as defamatory statements of fact.
Id. at 577-78 (citation omitted).
... See Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 192 (1991). The court required knowledge of a defamatory in-
terpretation, or reckless disregard of that interpretation, in a case involving a public
figure plaintiff, although the court did not identify this requirement as separate from
that of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth:
Even if NBC had unintentionally left the impression that organized crime had
financed Newton's purchase of the Aladdin, the [trial] court concluded, it "should
have been foreseen" by NBC and the failure to foresee it "shows a reckless disre-
gard for the truth." The court also concluded that since NBC had "voluntarily
edited and combined the audio with the visual portions of the broadcast in a way
that created the defamatory impressions" and since those impressions were "clear
and unescapable," the jury could reject as incredible the testimony of the NBC
journalists that they had not intended to leave the false impression.... [This
ruling conflicts] with the principles of New York Times. ...
The district court erred in its ruling that an interpretation of the broadcast that
"should have been foreseen" by the NBC journalists can give rise to liability. The
district court's standard of what "should have been foreseen" is an objective neg-
ligence test while the actual malice test of New York Times is deliberately subjec-
tive. The relevant inquiry asks whether a journalist "realized that his statement
was false" or whether he "subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of
his statement." Negligence, weighed against an objective standard like the one
used by the district court, can never give rise to liability in a public figure defa-
mation case. "A 'reckless disregard' for the truth ... requires more than a depar-
ture from reasonably prudent conduct." Accordingly, the district court erred in
basing liability on an objective standard.
Id. at 680 (citations omitted); see also Franklin & Bussel, supra note 56, at 837 ("The
Supreme Court's concern with self-censorship cannot justifiably protect a defendant
who utters a statement that he knows will hurt another's reputation, yet fail to protect a
person who does not realize that his statement can be interpreted to damage another's
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over, placing the risk of being misunderstood on the speaker runs the risk of
"majoritarian restrictions on language becoming restrictions on conveying
the ideas themselves. '714
The defendant in Good Government was a civic organization, not a
professional media defendant.1 5 Use of the same rigorous test on meaning
for professional and nonprofessional writers alike is justifiable: "A subjec-
tive test of awareness puts all critics of public officials and public figures on
an equal footing with respect to First Amendment rights in a way that an
objective standard cannot. "716
Justice White has argued that a media defendant using such ambiguous
language as "blackmail," knowing that a potential meaning is false, should
be subject to liability under a lower standard than knowing or reckless insin-
uation.7 7 He asserts that, in this situation, the media defendant assumed
the risk of liability:
Absent protection for the nonreckless publication of "facts"
that subsequently prove to be false, the danger is that legit-
imate news and communication will be suppressed. But it is
quite a different thing, not involving the same danger of self-
censorship, to immunize professional communicators from
liability for their use of ambiguous language and their failure
to guard against the possibility that words known to carry
two meanings, one of which imputes commission of a crime,
might seriously damage the object of their comment in the
eyes of the average reader. I see no reason why the members
of a skilled calling should not be held to the standard of
their craft and assume the risk of being misunderstood-if
they are-by the ordinary reader of their publications.7 8
Justice White's argument has appeal. When a journalist chooses words,
the literal meaning of which is defamatory, it seems fair that he should bear
reputation.").
714 Schauer, supra note 697, at 287.
715 Good Gov't, 586 P.2d at 573.
716 Franklin & Bussel, supra note 56, at 837 n.40.
7 Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 21-24 (1970)
(White, J., concurring).
718 Id. at 23 (White, J., concurring). Like Good Government, Bresler involved a
charge of "blackmail." In contrast to the result in Good Government, however, the
Court in Bresler held that no reader could have thought that the defendants' use of the
word "blackmail" constituted a charge of criminal conduct. Id at 14. Justice White,
however, believed that the evidence supported a jury finding that an ordinary reader
could have understood the defendants' statement as a criminal charge. Id. at 22 (White,
J., concurring).
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the risk that readers will understand the words in their literal sense. Argu-
ably a jury should be allowed to find that, because the literal meaning of the
language was obvious, the author must have known it could be construed
literally. Yet writers frequently employ figures of speech and emotionally
charged language to attract attention and to dramatize their messages. More-
over, "[r]estricting the use of language may not only constrain the speaker's
choice of language; it also may prevent him from effectively communicating
original ideas and arguments.'' If the First Amendment encourages ro-
bust debate about public officials and public figures, it cannot discourage
robust expression about them. If professional communicators assumed the
risk of being misunderstood whenever they used language they knew was
ambiguous, the rational journalist with a deep pocket would avoid ambigu-
ity. The constitutional objective, however, is robust debate, not bland jour-
nalism.
The Court's decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc."2 supports a requirement that a public figure plaintiff prove
knowing or reckless insinuation regarding the factual connotation of am-
biguous language.72 Bose, which involved a public figure plaintiff and a
media defendant, 2 was a product disparagement action growing out of a
Consumer Reports article that evaluated the quality of a Bose loudspeaker
system." 3 The trial judge, sitting as the factfinder, found that the article
contained a false and disparaging fact about the speaker, namely, that "indi-
vidual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigan-
tic proportions and tended to wander about the room."2 4 The judge also
found that the author published this statement with actual malice because he
knew that the statement was false.725 The author testified that his statement
meant that the sound moved back and forth along the wall between the two
speakers. 6 The judge, however, found that the average reader would con-
strue the words to mean that the sounds did more than simply move back
and forth between the speakers, and that, as an intelligent person, the author
must have known that the words "wander about the room" were not an
719 Schauer, supra note 697, at 284.
720 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
72 Id. at 513-14.
722 The trial judge held that the plaintiff corporation was a public figure, and the
defendant did not contest this ruling before the court of appeals. Id. at 492. On certiora-
ri, the Supreme Court did not consider the question of the plaintiff's status. Id. at 492
n.8. As to the defendant's status, the Court observed that "respondent's publication of
Consumer Reports plainly would qualify it as a 'media' defendant in this action under
any conceivable definition of that term." Id. at 492-93 n.8.
723 Id. at 487-88.
724 Id. at 488.
725 Id. at 497.
726 Id. at 495.
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accurate description of what he heard.727
The Court held that the record did not contain clear and convincing
evidence that the article was published with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth: 28
Aside from Seligson's vain attempt to defend his statement
as a precise description of the nature of the sound move-
ment, the only evidence of actual malice on which the Dis-
trict Court relied was the fact that the statement was an
inaccurate description of what Seligson had actually per-
ceived. Seligson of course had insisted "I know what I
heard." The trial court took him at his word, and reasoned
that since he did know what he had heard, and he knew that
the meaning of the language employed did not accurately
reflect what he heard, he must have realized the statement
was inaccurate at the time he wrote it. "Analysis of this kind
may be adequate when the alleged libel purports to be an
eyewitness or other direct account of events that speak for
themselves."... Here, however, adoption of the language
chosen was "one of a number of possible rational interpreta-
tions" of an event "that bristled with ambiguities" and de-
scriptive challenges for the writer .... The choice of such
language, though reflecting a misconception, does not place
the speech beyond the outer limits of the First Amendment's
broad protective umbrella. Under the District Court's analy-
sis, any individual using a malapropism might be liable,
simply because an intelligent speaker would have to know
that the term was inaccurate in context, even though he did
not realize his folly at the time.
The statement in this case represents the sort of inaccu-
racy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to
which the New York Times rule applies .... "Realistical-
ly,... some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of sepa-
rating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York
Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit liability to
instances where some degree of culpability is present in
order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the
suppression of truthful material." ... "[E]rroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate, and ... must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that
727 Id. at 511.
728 Id. at 512.
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they 'need ... to survive.'729
The Court framed the issue as whether there was adequate evidence to
support a finding of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth.7 10 The holding signifies, however, that even when an author knows
that a defamatory connotation of his words is false, knowledge of that falsi-
ty cannot be found merely on the basis of the factfinder's inference that the
author, as an intelligent person, must have known that his words would
convey that connotation. It was clear from the author's own testimony that
he did not hear the sounds move away from the wall; thus, he knew the
defamatory connotation was false. The proof of actual malice failed, then,
because his description of the event in question was a rational interpretation
of an event that presented "descriptive challenges for the writer. '7 1
Bose leaves open several avenues by which a plaintiff may be able to
establish actual malice regarding the defamatory connotation of an ambigu-
ous statement. Bose did not involve direct evidence that the author knew or
expected that his words would be construed in the defamatory sense; thus, it
does not necessarily rule out liability in all cases in which the defendant's
statement was a rational interpretation of the event. Moreover, in some
situations, it may be permissible to infer actual malice on the ground that
the speaker "must have known" that he was conveying a defamatory mean-
ing. Bose suggests that a factfinder may infer actual malice regarding the
defamatory meaning of the words in a very clear case-when the defamato-
ry connotation must have been obvious to the speaker. 732 The Court in The
Santissima Trinidad 33 stated that the falsity of a witness's statement could
be regarded as deliberate "where the party speaks to a fact in respect to
which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country
of his birth, or his being in a vessel on a particular voyage, or living in a
particular place ... .
Good Government exemplifies another way in which a plaintiff may be
able to show actual malice on meaning. In that case, the court remanded,
729 Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted).
730 Id. at 513.
73 Id. at 512
As Bose demonstrates ... constitutional malice does not flow from a finding that
an "intelligent speaker" failed to describe the words he used as the finder of fact
did. Nor is it permissible to uphold the jury's verdict against NBC on the ground
that, because the defendants are trained journalists ... or because the broadcast
may be capable of supporting the impression Newton claims, NBC must therefore
have intended to convey the defamatory impression at issue here.
Newton, 930 F.2d at 681.
.3. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 512-13.
133 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822), cited in Bose, 466 U.S. at 512.
714 Id. at 339.
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holding that there was sufficient evidence to permit a finding "that the de-
fendant either deliberately cast his statements in an equivocal fashion in the
hope of insinuating a defamatory import to the reader, or that he knew or
acted in reckless disregard of whether his words would be interpreted by the
average reader as defamatory statements of fact." ' The evidence showed
that the plaintiff had complained to a civic association about the "grossly
libelous" nature of the association's charge that he had committed extortion
and blackmail."' As a result of this complaint, the association published a
retraction stating that its use of the terms "extorted" and "blackmail" were
not intended to imply that any of the persons mentioned in the article had
committed the crimes of blackmail or extortion.737 After the retraction,
members of the association, including the author of the original charge, dis-
tributed a flyer of the article as originally printed. 3 The court held that
the "jury could conclude from this evidence that at least some of the defen-
dants were aware that the words used in the article could be interpreted as
defamatory statements of fact instead of 'allegorical language ... voicing a
vigorous political opinion, in strident tones,' as defendants claim." '39
Therefore, the court made it clear that when an author acknowledges that
she is aware of the defamatory interpretation of her work, her refusal to
discontinue publication constitutes actual malice.
Could actual malice regarding the factual, defamatory connotation of the
publication in Milkovich be shown, absent an admission by Diadiun that he
knew his column would be construed as a factual charge of perjury?.. In
Milkovich the Court observed that the statement was "not the sort of loose,
figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that
the writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the crime of
... Good Gov't, 586 P.2d at 578.
736 Id. at 578.
737 id.
738 Id. at 578-79.
131 Id. at 579.
7' The following statement by the Court in Milkovich may establish such a fault
requirement:
[W]here a statement of "opinion" on a matter of public concern reasonably im-
plies false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials, those indi-
viduals must show that such statements were made with knowledge of their false
implications or with reckless disregard of their truth. Similarly, where such a
statement involves a private figure on a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must
show that the false connotations were made with some level of fault as required
by Gertz.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (footnote omitted) (emphasis add-
ed). Although the opinion is not entirely clear on this point, this statement may mean
that the Court intended to require fault as to the factual connotation carried by the lan-
guage, as well as fault regarding its falsity.
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perjury." '' Thus, the plaintiff might be able to show Diadiun's awareness
of the factual connotation from the language itself. It seems to me that there
was no ambiguity in the language. The issue before the Court essentially
was whether a statement is immune as opinion if, under the "four-factor"
Olman test, readers would understand that the charge was made, not as an
assertion based on certainty, but as Diadiun's belief based on what he had
observed. The Court held that a statement of Diadiun's deductive opinion
carried no immunity.742 On such facts, there is no reason why fault regard-
ing the defamatory connotation of the column could not be found from the
very clear language of the column itself, which asserted that the plaintiff
lied after taking a solemn oath.743
In contrast, however, Olman v. Evans"" presents a classic dilemma of
ambiguity: immunizing ambiguous language may protect the clever defamer,
but liability for such language may inhibit the use of dramatic, hyperbolic
language of persuasion that lies at the heart of First Amendment interests.
The Olman majority held that the defendants' statements about Professor
Ollman were not actionable.745 In my view, the majority incorrectly immu-
nized the defamatory charges, but a fault requirement on the meaning of the
language probably would have precluded liability. Under Bose, the court
could not have allowed an inference of actual malice on meaning on the
mere basis that the defendants must have known that readers could construe
the language in its literal sense.
In Oilman, Professor Bertell Ollman alleged that he was defamed by a
syndicated newspaper column written by Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak.4 A departmental search committee had nominated Professor
Ollman, a political science professor at New York University, to be chair-
man of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of
Maryland.747 The Evans and Novak column stated that a public debate
over the appointment of Ollman, a Marxist, was misdirected.74 The col-
umn asserted that defenders of academic freedom were justified in criticiz-
ing politicians who opposed Ollman's appointment because he was a
Marxist.749 The column further noted that neither side addressed the central
question of Ollman's intentions:
741 Id. at 21.
742 Id. at 18-19, 21.
741 The column stated that "[a]nyone who attended the meet... knows in his heart
that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to
tell the truth." Id. at 5.
7- 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
741 Id. at 990.
746 Id. at 971.
747 Id. at 971-972.
" See id. at 972-73.
'49 See id. at 972.
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His candid writings avow his desire to use the classroom as
an instrument for preparing what he calls "the revolution."
Whether this is a form of indoctrination that could transform
the real function of a university and transcend limits of aca-
demic freedom is a concern to academicians who are neither
McCarthyite nor know-nothing.75 °
Olman alleged that several passages in the column were false and de-
famatory. For example:
While Ollman is described in news accounts as a "respected
Marxist scholar," he is widely viewed in his profession as a
political activist. Amid the increasingly popular Marxist
movement in university life, he is distinct from philosophical
Marxists. Rather, he is an outspoken proponent of "political
Marxism."
He twice sought election to the council of the American
Political Science Association as a candidate of the "Caucus
for a New Political Science" and finished last out of 16
candidates each time. Whether or not that represents a pro-
fessional judgment by his colleagues, as some critics con-
tend, the verdict clearly rejected his campaign pledge: "If
elected ... I shall use every means at my disposal to pro-
mote the study of Marxism and Marxist approaches to poli-
tics throughout the profession. '
The following statement is also illustrative:
Ollman's principal scholarly work, "Alienation: Marx's
Conception of Man in Capitalist Society," is a ponderous
tome in adoration of the master (Marxism "is like a mag-
nificently rich tapestry"). Published in 1971, it does not
abandon hope for the revolution forecast by Karl Marx in
1848. "The present youth rebellion," he writes, by "helping
to change the workers of tomorrow" will, along with other
factors, make possible "a socialist revolution."
Such pamphleteering is hooted at by one political sci-
entist in a major eastern university, whose scholarship and
reputation as a liberal are well known. "Ollman has no status
750 Id. at 992.
751 Id.
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within the profession, but is a pure and simple activist," he
said. Would he say that publicly? "No chance of it. Our
academic culture does not permit the raising of such ques-
tions."7 2
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
these statements were not actionable. The court, however, could not produce
a majority opinion in the case.753 Under its "totality-of-the-circumstances"
test, the plurality held that the statements were opinion.5 Judge Bork con-
curred, construing the charges as hyperbole, essentially because the plaintiff
had entered a "public arena," '755 and because the charges were not suitable
for adjudication by a court.756 The dissenters, in a sounder analysis,
viewed the charge that Ollman had "no status within his profession" as a
factual assertion subject to verification.757
752 Id. at 994.
... In this six to five decision, a majority agreed that the four-part test was the cor-
rect standard, but disagreed on its application to the facts, especially in reference to the
"1no status" statement. Id. Judge Starr's plurality opinion took the view that the third and
fourth factors rendered the statement nonactionable. Id. at 989-92. Only Judges Tamm,
Wilkey, and MacKinnon concurred in this portion of Judge Starr's opinion. Id. at 989
n.38. Judge Bork believed that a "blunt distinction" between fact and opinion was "not
adequate to the task here." Id. at 994 (Bork, J., concurring). Reverting to "first princi-
ples," he concluded that the "no status" charge should not be actionable. Id. (Bork, J.,
concurring). He considered that the statement was "the kind of hyperbole that must be
accepted in the rough and tumble of political argument," id. at 998 (Bork, J., concur-
ring), noting that "[t]he individual who deliberately enters [a First Amendment] arena
must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal," id. at 1002 (Bork,
J., concurring). Judges Wilkey, Ginsburg, and MacKinnon joined in Judge Bork's opin-
ion. Id. at 993. In a separate concurrence, Judge MacKinnon observed that Judge Bork's
concept of a First Amendment arena should be factored into Judge Starr's four-part test.
Id. at 1016 (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Dissenting in part, Chief Judge Robinson dis-
tinguished between pure and hybrid opinions, the latter being actionable only if accom-
panied by supporting facts or if the omission or falsity of the supporting facts were
nonculpable. Id. at 1027-28 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting in part). He found that the "no
status" charge was a hybrid opinion, presenting an issue of fact as to whether there was
a culpable error or omission of supporting facts. Id. at 1029-30 (Robinson, C.J., dissent-
ing in part). Judge Wright joined in this opinion. Id. at 1016 (Wright, J., dissenting in
part). Judges Wald, Edwards, and Scalia accepted Judge Starr's four-point test of opin-
ion, but believed that the "no status" charge was precise and verifiable. See id. at 1032
(Wald, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1035 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1036
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
14 Id. at 970-92.
... Id. at 1004 (Bork, J., concurring).
756 Id. at 1005-06 (Bork, J., concurring).
... See id. at 1033 (Wald, J., dissenting in part) ("The statement that Ollman has no
status within his profession undoubtedly admits of a sufficiently ascertainable and stable
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The critical test in resolving the question of objective verifiability is
whether the charge of "no status" is the type of charge the soundness of
which should be tested only in the "marketplace of ideas." There is no rea-
son to conclude that it is. Like the issue of perjury, the status of one's repu-
tation is tried as a factual issue in many legal contexts."' Clearly, the Ev-
ans and Novak column addressed a matter of public interest and warranted
the substantial protection afforded by the erroneous fact privilege. Immuniz-
ing the defamatory statement about Ollman's reputation, however, would not
strike a proper balance between the First Amendment interest in speech and
the states' interest in protecting reputation.
Judge Bork would have immunized the statement because Ollman en-
tered "a first amendment arena."7 9 He reported at length upon the heated
core of meaning: a decisive majority of his fellow political scientists do not regard him
as a good scholar."); id. at 1035-36 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part) ("[I]t is untenable
even to suggest that [this charge] ... is an absolutely privileged 'opinion.' Indeed, as a
former member of the academic community, I am somewhat taken aback by the notion
that one's reputation within the profession (which is easily verifiable) may be so freely
and glibly libelled."); id. at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) ("Evans and Novak's
disparagement of Ollman's professional reputation seems to me a classic and cooly
crafted libel .... ).
758 Id. at 1032, 1034 n.1 (Wald, J., dissenting in part).
In many areas of the law, the factual nature of statements about reputation is
recognized and indeed taken for granted. Lay witnesses are generally allowed to
testify as to someone's reputation in the community for veracity or violence, for
example, although they cannot given their personal opinion as to those matters.
Expert witnesses are often asked in the course of their testimony whether other
authors, scholars or practitioners are generally regarded as authorities in the field,
and their own qualifications may be established or attacked on the basis of pro-
fessional reputation.
Similarly, as the plurality concedes, the law of libel has long recognized the
basically factual nature of attacks on reputation.
Id. at 1032 (Wald, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
[I]n assessing or mitigating damages, juries have historically been required to
determine what a plaintiffs reputation was before the libel in order to determine
how much the plaintiff has been injured by the libel. Indeed, the Supreme Court
clearly stated in Gertz, that defamation plaintiffs are entitled to damages, includ-
ing jury awarded damages, for "actual injury ... includ[ing] impairment or repu-
tation and standing in the community." The determination of actual injury ordi-
narily turns on an assessment of the status quo ante, and courts have routinely
upheld jury awards predicated on a libel plaintiff's prelibel reputation. It is there-
fore incomprehensible to me how both the plurality and the concurrences can so
glibly conclude that juries are inherently incapable of making such a determina-
tion.
Id. at 1034 n.1 (Wald, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
719 Id. at 1002 (Bork, J., concurring) ("Where politics and ideas about politics con-
tend, there is a first amendment arena . . ").
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controversy generated by Ollman's nomination to a department chairmanship
at the University of Maryland and correctly stated that the debate about his
candidacy was of legitimate public concern.7 61 The decision to immunize a
defamatory statement, however, must be based upon more than the
plaintiff's entry into "a first amendment arena" because that approach would
immunize all defamatory statements about public figures. The question is
whether the defendant's statement had such fundamental First Amendment
value as to deprive the defamed person of his day in court. Would a full and
robust debate about Ollman's qualifications be inhibited unduly by subject-
ing this type of defamatory charge to a trial of the issues of falsity, fault
with regard to falsity, and fault with regard to the conveyance of a factual,
defamatory meaning? Or would it be fully adequate to immunize comments
about such issues as whether his scholarship had merit, whether a Marxist
should hold a departmental chairmanship in a public institution, and whether
one who espouses indoctrination in the classroom is acting within the legiti-
mate protection areas of academic freedom? Does Ollman's entry into the
"first amendment arena" make him fair game for false charges about his
professional reputation?
Such a charge should be treated as an assertion of fact. False assertions
about Ollman's reputation would not advance a useful debate about his job
qualifications or about whether his published views are a threat to academic
freedom; such assertions would only impair the debate. Moreover, issues
concerning reputation conventionally are treated as issues of fact in litiga-
tion; consequently, there are developed measures of trying the issue. The
interest in reputation, like the interest in free speech, is a "basic of our con-
stitutional system" and warrants protection within the limits of the erroneous
fact privilege."' The law of defamation should protect good faith defama-
tory charges against public figures, but should not protect mere ambiguity
and insinuation, as such.
It is worth noting, as well, that the question of Ollman's reputation
would be difficult for defenders of Ollman to confront as an issue for debate
in the marketplace of ideas, given that Evans and Novak did not name the
source of the "no status" charge. Moreover, inhibitions upon "speech that
matters"7 62 under the First Amendment may be caused not only by subject-
ing the speaker to a defamation action, but also by depriving one who enters
a "first amendment arena" of any protection for his interest in reputation.
Some people no doubt are reluctant to espouse their ideas-especially un-
popular ones-knowing that, as a result, their reputations can be destroyed
'60 Id. at 1003-04 (Bork, J., concurring).
76' Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
762 This term is used in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The
First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech
that matters.").
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with impunity.763 First Amendment freedoms are important not only to the
maintenance of a vigorous press, but also to the maintenance of a vigorous
society. As Justice Stewart stated: "[I]f the 1950's taught us anything, they
taught us that the poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and de-
grade a whole society."7"
Under my analysis, however, the problem remains whether the plaintiff
could have reached the jury on the issue of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth and on the issue of knowledge or recklessness regard-
ing the factual connotation of the language. The facts of Olman, like those
of Bose, make these fault issues problematic. In one sense, it might have
been easy for Ollman to establish knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth. Evans and Novak might even have admitted that they knew,
from facts about Ollman that appeared in the article itself, that he possessed
significant status within his academic community. Just as the author in Bose
testified that he knew that the sounds from the speakers moved between the
speakers and not forward into the room, Evans and Novak might well have
testified that it was obvious to them that Ollman enjoyed respect as a schol-
ar and teacher. As in Bose, however, where the author said he had described
what he heard, Evans and Novak probably would have protested that they
did not expect to be understood as suggesting that Ollman, literally, had no
status. The very division among the judges in the Olman case on the ques-
tion whether the language was rhetorical hyperbole indicates that reasonable
minds could differ on the connotation of the language at issue. If reasonable
minds could differ, then the issue of the meaning of the language to the
ordinary reader should have been a jury issue. If reasonable minds could
differ on the meaning of the language, however, could the plaintiff have
established fault regarding its factual connotation? On the one hand, the
authors chose the wording, the literal meaning of which was "no status."
763 In discussing the social costs of the actual malice standard, Professor Anderson
has stated:
The actual malice rule obviously deters participation in public life. No rational
person can fail to take into account the reputational consequences of this rule
when deciding whether to run for public office. Though the full effect of the rule
and all its accoutrements is probably understood by very few lawyers, let alone
nonlawyers, virtually all potential candidates must have some awareness that it is
difficult for a public official or political candidate to recover for defamation....
The constitutional rules also create risks for other forms of citizen participation in
public matters-from the local PTA to religious controversies to the abortion
controversy and other great issues of the day. Although not everyone may realize
that the actual malice rule also applies to public figures, here, too, any observant
person can see that those who participate in public matters seem to receive little
protection from the law of defamation.
Anderson, supra note 4, at 531-32 (footnotes omitted).
" Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Arguably they bore the risk that readers would understand the words in their
literal sense, and a jury should have been allowed to find the authors must
have known that their words could be construed literally because the literal
meaning of the language they chose was obvious. On the other hand, writers
frequently employ figures of speech. Authors of columns, as opposed to
news reporters, often desire to make their points dramatically or memorably
or pointedly. They would be inhibited from making useful commentary if
they were held responsible, in all circumstances, for the literal meaning of
their words.
Allowing ambiguity to confer immunity may mean that clever writers
easily can avoid liability for severe harm to reputation simply by use of the
double entendre. Subjecting the colorful writer to liability, however, no
doubt would inhibit the very type of robust debate that the First Amendment
finds essential to a system of self-government. It would seem, then, that the
proper balance in actions by public officials and public figures would be
met if "actual malice" regarding the factual connotation of ambiguous lan-
guage could not be shown on the basis of the language alone. This approach
probably is required by Bose, and it is a defensible result. On the facts of
Olman, the plaintiff could have recovered a judgment against the defen-
dants only if he could have produced sufficient evidence to reach the jury
on falsity, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, and
knowledge or recklessness regarding the factual connotation of the defama-
tory charge. On the last issue, he should not have reached the jury on the
basis of the language alone, but only on independent evidence of the
author's state of mind.
In many cases, it is difficult if not impossible for a plaintiff to show
knowledge or recklessness regarding the factual connotation of a statement.
Bose indicates that ambiguous language, reasonably susceptible of more than
one construction, presents a significant difficulty in this respect. The plain-
tiff confronts high hurdles, indeed, because of the requirements of proof of
falsity, proof of fault regarding falsity, and proof of fault regarding the
factual connotation of ambiguous language. For this reason, there is consid-
erable appeal in Justice White's advocacy of an action in which the defamed
person could obtain an adjudication of falsity without proof of fault, recov-
ering only nominal damages or sufficient damages to cover the costs of the
proceeding.765 In such an action, the plaintiff at least could obtain some
vindication of his good name.
.65 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1985)
(White, J., concurring). For other proposals for a declaratory judgment action allowing a
determination of falsity, see generally REFORMING LIBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall
P. Bezanson eds., 1992).
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b. Private Figure Plaintiffs
Because the Court requires that private figure plaintiffs prove only negli-
gence regarding falsity, 66 it might seem logical for the Court to require
such plaintiffs to prove only negligence regarding the meaning of a com-
munication, as well. That position, however, is not necessarily defensible.
There are three possibilities for a fault standard on meaning for private
figure plaintiffs: an ordinary negligence standard, imposing liability when
the defendant should have known that her words might bear a defamatory,
factual connotation;7 67 a heightened negligence standard, imposing liability
when the defendant had reason to know that her words might bear such a
connotation;7 68 and an actual malice standard, imposing liability only for
knowing or reckless insinuation of such a connotation.769
There is dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,77° suggesting that the
Court would establish a standard greater than ordinary negligence:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defama-
tory falsehood injurious to a private individual .... At least
this conclusion obtains where, as here, the substance of the
defamatory statement "makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent." This phrase places in perspective the conclusion
we announce today. Our inquiry would involve consider-
ations somewhat different from those discussed above if a
State purported to condition civil liability on a factual mis-
T6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. f (1977).
767 See id. § 12.
The words "should know" are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the
superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the per-
formance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assump-
tion that such fact exists.
Id.
768 See id.
The words "reason to know" are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject
to denote the fact that the actor has information from which a person of reason-
able intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the
fact in question exists, or that such person would govern his conduct upon the as-
sumption that such fact exists.
Id.
769 See Good Gov't Group v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572, 578 (Cal. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
770 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
1994] 609
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
statement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent
editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential."'
In so qualifying its holding in Gertz, the Court recognized that a pub-
lisher may be innocent with regard to the damaging nature of a publication.
The Court implied that, in such a situation, the plaintiff would be required
to establish something more than negligence with regard to falsity. The
Court's subsequent citation to Time, Inc. v. Hill.77 suggests that the stan-
dard might be knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth The
Court's observation that in Gertz the damaging nature of the defamatory
statement was apparent, however, may leave open the possibility of a "rea-
son to know" standard, imposing liability if the speaker had information
from which a reasonable person would conclude that the communication
would be damaging.773
Franklin and Bussel have argued that an actual malice standard on
meaning should apply to public and private figure plaintiffs alike.7 Their
discussion of the problems that a negligence standard would pose implicitly
assumes an ordinary, or "should know," negligence test.7 For example,
they refer to "a duty upon a speaker to use due care to search for hidden
771 Id. at 347-48 (citing Curtis Publishing Co., v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967))
(footnotes omitted).
M 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Hill was an invasion of privacy action in which the private
figure plaintiffs alleged that the publisher of Life magazine published an article giving
the false impression that a play running on Broadway portrayed the actual experiences
of the plaintiffs' when they were held hostage in their home by escaped convicts. The
Court held that the plaintiffs could not recover damages in such an action without prov-
ing that the defendant published the article with knowledge of falsity or reckless disre-
gard of the truth. Id. at 387-88. The Court stated:
We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a
free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of
verifying to a certainty the facts associated in a news article with a person's
name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to non-defamatory matter. Even
negligence would be a most elusive standard, especially when the content of the
speech itself affords no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A
negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a
jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of
every reference to a name, picture or portrait.
Id. at 389.
... See supra note 768 (quoting Restatement definition of "reason to know").
... Franklin & Bussel, supra note 56, at 834-51. Franklin and Bussel call their stan-
dard an "awareness requirement," id. at 845, under which the plaintiff would have "to
establish with convincing clarity that the defendant was aware of, or blinded himself to,
the allegedly defamatory meaning of the statement that he was making," id. at 837
(footnote omitted).
771 Id. at 842-44.
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ambiguities, special characteristics of the proposed audience, or significant
extrinsic facts .... "776 They soundly argue that such a test "would seri-
ously dilute the protection afforded to a speaker." '777 They consider, how-
ever, only the inhibitions upon speech of a negligence standard and ignore
both the interests of the defamed private figure and the damage to First
Amendment interests resulting from false statements of fact. As the previous
section on public figure plaintiffs pointed out, an actual malice standard on
meaning appears extremely difficult to satisfy under Bose.77 Private figure
plaintiffs, however, are more vulnerable to reputational damage and more
deserving of protection than are public figures because, unlike public fig-
ures, they presumably have not assumed the risk of criticism and do not
have media access to refute false charges.779 An actual malice standard
that protects the use of ambiguous language, as long as the language is a
rational interpretation of the event, would virtually immunize its use. The
danger is that this standard will immunize the crafty defamer who delib-
erately casts her charge in double entendres. Although such a standard is
warranted in public figure cases, the more compelling need of private figure
plaintiffs for redress warrants a different standard.
A heightened negligence standard on meaning would strike an appro-
priate balance between the interest in speech and the interest in reputation
for private figure plaintiffs. Under this standard, the plaintiff would have to
establish that the defendant had information that would have led a reason-
able person to conclude that his statement could be construed in a defamato-
ry, factual sense.780 As Franklin and Bussel have noted, multiple meaning
problems apply in three types of situations: (1) when the defendant's state-
ment on its face has multiple meanings; (2) when different segments of the
potential recipient population construe the defendant's statement in different
ways; and (3) when the statement is nondefamatory on its face, but has a
defamatory meaning to a recipient who is aware of extrinsic facts affecting
the sense of the statement."' Under a heightened negligence standard, in
the first and second situations, the defendant would be subject to liability
only if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant knew his statement was
subject to a defamatory interpretation, and should have known that some of
the recipients reasonably would construe the statement in the defamatory
sense. For example, if a recent immigrant, unfamiliar with idiomatic Eng-
lish, reported in a neighborhood newspaper that "John Doe was stoned while
making a speech" (intending to mean literally that stones had been thrown at
176 Id. at 843.
777 Id.
778 See supra notes 720-34 and accompanying text.
771 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
780 See supra note 768 (quoting Restatement definition of "reason to know").
781' Franklin & Bussel, supra note 56, at 832-34.
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Doe), the writer would not be subject to liability for the implication that
Doe was drunk or high on drugs, unless the writer knew that the word
"stoned" could carry that implication. Additionally, there could be no liabili-
ty, even if the reporter knew of the potential defamatory meaning, unless the
reporter reasonably could foresee that, given the context of the language, the
word would be construed in its defamatory sense. In the third situation, the
defendant would be subject to liability only if the plaintiff could prove that
the defendant knew of the extrinsic facts that made the statement defamato-
ry, and should have known that the statement would be construed in a de-
famatory sense. For example, a newspaper whose social editor did not know
that Sally Smith and John Jones were married to Sam Smith and Jane Jones,
respectively, would not be subject to liability for publishing a false an-
nouncement sent to the newspaper stating that Sally Smith and John Jones
were engaged to be married."'
There are advantages for speakers and for defamed private figures in a
heightened negligence standard. The advantage to speakers is that they do
not have a duty to investigate the potential damaging nature of language or
the existence of extrinsic facts. Liability based upon a duty to investigate
would inhibit speech to an unacceptable degree. The advantage to defamed
private figures is that they have a remedy against speakers who were on
notice of potential reputational damage and acted unreasonably in using the
damaging language in light of that notice.
VI. THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE-A MATTER OF OPINION
On the assumption that the Supreme Court requires fault regarding the
meaning of language, the liability rules that the Court has developed. 3
leave defamation law with at least two major shortcomings-even if one
believes that the rules generally strike the right balance between the interests
in free speech and reputation.8 One shortcoming is that the Supreme
Court's rules provide minimum protections for speech, which state courts
may exceed.8 5 When lower courts extend greater protection for defamato-
ry speech than the Supreme Court has mandated, they do not necessarily
782 Franklin and Bussel note that "[a]t common law, the speaker was liable for such a
statement, although he may not have known or had reason to have known the extrinsic
fact giving rise to the statement's defamatory meaning." Id. at 829 (citing PROSSER,
supra note 682, at 748).
..3 These include: immunity for pure evaluative opinion; plaintiff's burdens of show-
ing falsity, fault as to falsity, and fault as to meaning; and rules on appellate review and
damages. For a review of these rules, see Anderson, supra note 4, at 493-510.
7' Of course not everyone believes that the Court's rules strike the proper balance.
See, e.g., id. (arguing that reputational interests receive too little protection under the
Court's scheme of rules).
785 See supra note 96.
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give greater protection to First Amendment interests; in fact, they diminish
First Amendment values in the aggregate. The second shortcoming in the
rules is that the fault requirements and other restrictions on recoveries by
the victims of defamation leave most defamed persons with no way to vindi-
cate their reputations. As discussed below, reform proposals under active
consideration allow vindication without an adverse impact on First Amend-
ment values. Unfortunately, strong media opposition gives these proposals
little chance for adoption. Moreover, even if adopted, broad construction by
the courts of what constitutes opinion would make the proposed vindication
actions unavailable to many defamed persons. The Supreme Court could
alleviate these difficulties somewhat by setting maximum protections for
defamatory speech.
A. Maximum Constitutional Protections for Speech
Decisions that give greater protection to opinion than the Supreme Court
extended in Milkovich immunize false and defamatory statements of fact.
The expression of ideas must receive immunity, but, as previously observed
in this Article, granting immunity to false and defamatory statements of fact
erodes First Amendment values by interfering with the truth-seeking func-
tion of the marketplace of ideas, and by exposing potential speakers to the
risk of severe harm.786 A great deal of "breathing space" for false state-
ments of fact already exists under the Supreme Court's defamation rules. To
exceed the requirements of those rules by labelling fact as opinion gives
First Amendment interests less protection rather than more. Protecting
speakers does not always advance First Amendment goals. No one who
recalls the McCarthy era can doubt that the freedom of some to defame can
suppress the expression of ideas by a great many others.787
786 See supra text accompanying notes 549-50, 555-58.
787 For a study of the falsity of some specific charges made by Senator Joseph Mc-
Carthy, and the reasons why libel law did not provide an effective remedy, see general-
ly Willard H. Pedrick, Senator McCarthy and the Law of Libel: A Study of Two Cam-
paign Speeches, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 135 (1953). Regarding the suppression of speech
that occurred during this era, see e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 152 (1986).
Meiklejohn was clearly aware of the reality of democratic intolerance and clearly
intended the protection [of the First Amendment] to extend to subversive speech.
He was writing in the immediate post-World War II years, at the beginning of the
Cold War. The period bore a close parallel to the climate of severe intolerance
during and immediately after World War I, when Holmes first dealt with the
subject of free speech. At the very beginning of the essay, in the preface,
Meiklejohn spoke to this reality of intolerance, noting that an extensive system of
internal security had been devised, with widespread public support, to uncover
"un-American" and "disloyal" activities and agents. Referring to Federal Bureau
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State courts have exceeded the Supreme Court's protections for speech
not only in defining opinion, but also in determining who is a public figure
and what level of fault a private figure plaintiff must establish.78 Although
state courts may interpret their own laws and constitutions to extend greater
protection to individual rights than the Federal Constitution provides,'89
such state rulings are invalid if they conflict with federal constitutional prin-
ciples.79 First Amendment interests would be advanced if the Court's def-
amation rules established maximum as well as minimum protections for de-
famers. Too much protection for false and defamatory speech interferes with
First Amendment values, just as too little does.
Strong principles of judicial federalism counsel against the Court's ex-
cessive intrusion into the realm of state substantive law.' Contemporary
of Investigation activities, he said:
And that procedure reveals an attitude toward freedom of speech which is
widely held in the United States. Many of us are now convinced that, under
the Constitution, the government is justified in bringing pressure to bear
against the holding or expressing of beliefs which are labeled dangerous.
Congress, we think, may rightly abridge the freedom of such beliefs.
These were "wretched days of postwar and, it may be, of course, prewar, hysteri-
cal brutality." The question to be answered, then, was should the society refrain
from employing legal coercion against these subversive ideas, against those who
would say that "the Constitution is a bad document," "that [war] is not justified,"
"that [conscription] is immoral and unnecessary," "that the [political systems] of
England or Russia or Germany are superior to ours." Even more pointedly, he
asks, "Shall we listen to ideas which... might destroy confidence in our form of
government," from those who "hate and despise freedom to those who, if they
had the power, would destroy our institutions?" Should we permit the publication
of Hitler's Mein Kampf, of Lenin's The State and the Revolution, or of Engels
and Marx's Communist Manifesto?
Id. (footnotes omitted). Meiklejohn is the author of the seminal work Free Speech and
its Relation to Self-Government. See BOLLINGER, supra at 258.
788 See infra note 833; Anderson, supra note 4, at 549.
789 See supra note 96.
" "[A] state constitutional ground is adequate if it is more protective of a right than
an analogous provision of the federal constitution-provided, of course, that protection
of the state constitutional right does not infringe a competing federal guarantee." TRIBE,
supra note 48, at 164 n.12 (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-
88 (1980) (holding that state constitutional right to exercise free speech and petition
rights in shopping center did not violate rights of shopping center owner under Federal
Constitution)).
7" Professor Tribe states:
Many [constitutional principles regarding federal judicial power] are important to
the moderation of conflict between the federal and state judiciaries and to prevent-
ing federal courts from intruding excessively on the constitutional role of the
states. The evolution of these doctrines today is guided in large part by the Su-
preme Court's renewed emphasis on what may be termed "judicial federalism"-a
view that federal courts must regard their power as tempered by a keen apprecia-
614 [Vol. 3:2
A MATTER OF OPINION
constitutional theory provides little room to argue that the Court may set
maximum protections for defamatory speech. A Supreme Court mandate that
the states provide adequate protection for reputation at first blush seems an
impermissible intrusion into the legitimate power of the states to develop
their own rules of tort and state constitutional law. Yet it seems clear that
First Amendment interests are ill served by the states' ability to give exces-
sive protection to defamation.
The Court has held that the interest in reputation is not in itself a liberty
or property interest protected against deprivation by governmental officials
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.792 The
Court's rationale in Gertz, however, provides reason to surmise that
reputational interests can claim some degree of constitutional protection. In
Gertz, the Court recognized that protection of reputational interests "reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liber-
ty."79 The Court further observed that, although the protection of reputa-
tion is left primarily to state law, "this does not mean that the right is enti-
tled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional
system."794 The Court also has recognized that "there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact." '795 These assertions give some support to
the argument that inadequate protection of reputation by state courts violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
Although the Court has held that the interest in reputation is not a liber-
ty or property interest protected against deprivation by governmental offi-
cials,797 the Court also has held that "a cause of action is a species of
property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.""79 The Court has recognized that rules of state tort law may not
be arbitrary and must bear a rational relationship to a permissible state ob-
jective.799 Justice Marshall elucidated the due process issues in Pruneyard
tion of the essential role of the states and their judicial system in our constitution-
al universe.
Id. at 195-96 (footnote omitted).
79 See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991) (Bivins action); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
" Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
79 Id.
791 Id. at 340.
796 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
7- See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234.
798 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982).
'99 See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1980).
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Shopping Center v. Robins:..
Appellants' claim in this case amounts to no less than a
suggestion that the common law of trespass is not subject to
revision by the State, notwithstanding the California Supreme
Court's finding that state-created rights of expressive activity
would be severely hindered if shopping centers were closed
to expressive activities by members of the public. If accept-
ed, that claim would represent a return to the era of Lochner
v. New York,... when common-law rights were also found
immune from revision by State or Federal Government. Such
an approach would freeze the common law as it has been
constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-century state of
development. It would allow no room for change in response
to changes in circumstance. The Due Process Clause does
not require such a result.
On the other hand, I do not understand the Court to
suggest that rights of property are to be defined solely by
state law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier to
the abrogation of common law rights by Congress or a state
government. The Constitutional terms "life, liberty, and
property" do not derive their meaning solely from the provi-
sions of positive law. They have a normative dimension as
well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which gov-
ernment is bound to respect. Quite serious constitutional
questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish
certain categories of common-law rights in some general
way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on
governmental authority to abolish "core" common-law rights,
including rights against trespass, at least without a compel-
ling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable
alternative remedy.8"'
Under these due process principles, the Court could establish maximum
protections for false and defamatory speech on the ground that greater
protections are arbitrary restrictions on the plaintiffs protected interest in
the defamation action. Such restrictions are arbitrary because they do not
bear a rational relationship to the state court's objective of protecting free
speech interests. To the contrary, they cause pollution of the marketplace of
ideas and suppression of speech. State law cannot go so far in restricting the
defamation action as to infringe unduly upon both freedom of speech inter-
800 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
801 Id. at 93-94 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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ests in the aggregate and the interest in reputation, which "reflect[s] no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.
802
The toleration required by free speech principles is itself undermined by
undue protection of false and defamatory speech.8"3
Use of the due process clause to invalidate substantive rules of state tort
law has not been successful in the recent past.804 It seems plausible, never-
theless, that the Supreme Court could prohibit state courts from granting
greater protection to defamatory speech than the Court has mandated, on the
802 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring)).
'0' Bollinger states:
We may ... raise one important consideration in the matter of whether to make
an exception for libel [from protections for speech]. It arises from the fact that a
single individual has been harmed by the speech act. When one person tends to
bear the major brunt of the harm of speech activity, rather than the larger commu-
nity, the central purposes of the free speech principle are not so likely to be real-
ized by the insistence on toleration. For the tolerance function of free speech
focuses primarily on the reform of those who possess social power, on the com-
munity as a whole or on those who because of their numbers or position effec-
tively hold (or have a reasonable chance of holding) the reins of authority. This is
the primary audience that people like Holmes and Meiklejohn, as well as so many
others, were addressing as they tried to identify the intellectual character that
ought to guide social interaction. Now, in the libel case, the community is actually
implementing a system of coercion and punishment (unofficial, of course, but
nonetheless, as we have noted before, of substantial power) against the defamed
plaintiff. To then insist on toleration of the speech act as a means of mastering re-
straint is, to say the least, anomalous; this is especially so when, as sometimes
occurs with defamatory accusations, the community's coercive response is itself
excessive and when, apart from legal adjudication, there is small likelihood that
the community response will be ameliorated by any other means ("the truth rarely
catches up with the lie," it is frequently said of defamatory statements).
BOLLINGER, supra note 787, at 186.
804 See, e.g., Martinez, 444 U.S. at 281-83 (holding that state law granting immunity
to parole officers from tort liability did not deprive plaintiffs of due process by defeat-
ing their cause of action for wrongful death of decedent, who was murdered by sex of-
fender released from custody by defendant parole officers, and that state law had ratio-
nal relationship to objective of protecting decision-making process in parole program);
New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-08 (1917) (holding that New
York Workman's Compensation Law did not violate Due Process Clause by abrogating
common law rules governing liability of employers to employees); cf Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978) (holding that
liability limitations in Price-Anderson Act do not violate Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause by abolishing common-law rights of recovery); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117,
122 (1929) (holding that state guest statute, denying nonpaying automobile passenger
from recovering damages from owner or operator for negligence, does not violate Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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ground that the state rulings do not serve free speech interests, but instead
impair First and Fourteenth Amendment values. In the absence of maximum
constitutional protections for speakers and minimum protections for the
defamed, however, state judges should consider carefully the damage they
may do to public discourse by further eroding protection for reputation.
B. Reform Proposals
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the current state of defamation
law. Professor Anderson aptly describes a host of shortcomings: costly and
protracted litigation; excessive jury awards that exact a toll on speech, even
though they usually are reduced or overturned on appeal; intrusion into the
editorial process of media defendants through discovery on the actual malice
issue; diversion of the trial issues away from the question of truth or falsity;
prejudice to media defendants that results from the trial's focus on actual
malice; and substantial reputational and social costs that result from the
barriers to recovery by defamed persons." 5
In response to this general dissatisfaction, several reform proposals have
emerged."0 6 Most of these propose legislation authorizing a declaratory
judgment action in which the plaintiff can obtain a determination of falsity.
Although the proposals vary regarding the conditions for obtaining the de-
claratory judgment, generally they provide that a plaintiff who seeks a de-
claratory judgment cannot recover damages, and if the plaintiff elects to
seek damages, those available are more limited than the damages allowed by
the Supreme Court.!0 7 It should be noted that adoption of vindication ac-
805 Anderson, supra note 4, at 510-36.
806 For a compilation of reform proposals, see generally REFORMING LIBEL LAW, su-
pra note 765.
" The proposal of Professor Franklin requires the plaintiff to prove that the charge
was false and defamatory by clear and convincing evidence, and the defendant may
assert common-law privileges. See Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alterna-
tive to Current Libel Law, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW, supra note 765, at 70-72. To re-
cover damages, all plaintiffs must prove falsity and actual malice by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Id. Under certain conditions, the court is to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. Id. at 68, 70-72. The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal is similar to
Professor Franklin's, but in addition it prevents the plaintiff from pursuing an action for
damages if the defendant elects to convert it to a declaratory judgment action, and, in
the unlikely event that the damages action proceeded, the plaintiff could recover only
for actual injuries. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, in
REFORMING LIBEL LAW, supra note 765, at 229, 230-36. The December 6, 1991, Com-
mittee Draft of the Uniform Defamation Act would allow the plaintiff to obtain a de-
claratory judgment on proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
published a false and defamatory statement that harmed the plaintiffs reputation. Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Defamation Act,
in REFORMING LIBEL LAW, supra note 765, at 328. The defendant may not claim a con-
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tions would not solve the problem of courts' using overly broad definitions
of opinion. All proposals for declaratory judgments of falsity properly re-
quire that the defamatory charge at issue be one of fact. 8 Lower courts
that define opinion more broadly than does the Supreme Court would de-
prive deserving plaintiffs of vindication in a declaratory judgment action.
Whatever merit these proposals may have, there is no constituency to
promote them and, consequently, they have virtually no chance of
adoption. 9 Until recently, it seemed that a Uniform Defamation Act under
consideration by a drafting committee of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on State Laws might hold some promise as the product of an
organization of prestige. 10 In March 1993, however, the drafting commit-
tee decided to recommend to the National Conference that the Act be with-
drawn and that the Conference consider instead a proposed "uniform correc-
tion and clarification of defamation" act."' Given the media's opposition
ditional privilege. Id. at 342. If the plaintiff elects to bring an action for damages, the
plaintiff cannot recover presumed damages. Id. at 334. An alternative committee pro-
posal prohibits the award of punitive damages. Id. The defendant may terminate the
damages action by offering to stipulate that it does not assert the truth of the charge in
question, to pay reasonable attorneys' fees, and to publish a retraction. Id. at 334-40. A
plaintiff who does not accept an offer to terminate can recover only pecuniary damages.
Under certain conditions, in both the declaratory judgment and damages actions, the
prevailing party may be awarded attorneys' fees. See id. at 323, 324-35.
808 See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 807, at 229, 230-31; National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 807, at 323, 326-27.
" Professor Anderson states:
The principal interest groups affected by libel law are the media and their lawyers
and insurers. Nonmedia defendants and plaintiffs are too randomly distributed to
have a collective voice, and there is no organized plaintiffs' bar. Libel law reform
therefore has no political constituency unless the media and their allies support it.
So far they have not done so.
Anderson, supra note 4, at 546 (footnote omitted). Anderson concludes that the media
prefer the status quo to reform because "[t]he present law, for all its shortcomings,
gives media considerable control over the risks they fear most: high litigation costs and
windfall verdicts. Reform offers uncertain benefits and guaranteed uncertainty." Id. at
546-50,
810 Professor Anderson observes that "[i]ndependent law reform entities such as the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws have continuity and credibility, but whether legislators will embrace their
recommendations in the absence of any political impetus is questionable." Id. at 549.
811 Uniform Act Withdrawn, Correction Act is Possibility, 21 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
(June 8, 1993). This article states:
In a May 18 letter to Dwight A. Hamilton, president of the conference, and Rich-
ard C. Hite, chair of the executive committee, Dean Harvey Perlman of the Uni-
versity of Nebraska College of Law said that the drafting committee's "efforts at
compromise and consensus" in creating a uniform defamation act "are unavail-
ing."
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to any form of vindication action, the committee could not find a proposal
satisfactory to defamation victims and to the press. 12
If the state courts defined opinion in a reasonable manner, federal and
state courts together could provide a fairly effective vindication action with-
out legislation."1 3 Where declaratory judgment actions are available, courts
probably could permit them in defamation actions, allowing plaintiffs to
prevail on proof of falsity by a preponderance of the evidence. 14 If such
actions were heard promptly, they could provide vindication and minimize
injury to reputation.8t5
A truly effective vindication action, however, would require legislation
to expedite such actions.8"6 In addition, courts would need legislative au-
"Our efforts over the past year have been directed toward forging a compro-
mise that would be acceptable to both victims of defamation and the press,"
Perlman said in his letter, adding that "the media, particularly, are stridently op-
posed to our provisions relating to a vindication action and are unalterably op-
posed to broad defamation legislation of any kind."
812 Id.
83 See James H. Hulme & Steven M. Sprenger, Vindicating Reputation: An Alter-
native to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW, supra note
765, at 152, 159 ("By adopting a liberal interpretation of the [federal and state declara-
tory judgment acts], the courts could create a new defamation remedy and avoid the
need for legislation establishing such a remedy."); Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-
Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW,
supra note 765, at 211, 212 ("[A no-damages] action exists within the current legal
framework without the need for legislation.").
8"4 See Hulme & Sprenger, supra note 813, at 152, 162-64 (arguing, plausibly, that
Sullivan and Gertz were concerned with the chilling effect of damages on First
Amendment interests and that those cases do not prohibit a vindication action).
815
In a libel case ... where the loss is an injury to reputation caused by the
defendant's false statement, the court repairs the damaged reputation to some
degree by the mere act of finding that the defamatory statement was false. In fact,
were it not for the lapse of time between the publication of the libel and the find-
ing of falsity (during which time the plaintiffs reputation suffers) and the possible
failure of the court's finding to reach all the people whose opinion was influenced
by the false libel, the finding of falsity would undo the harm and render an award
of money damages superfluous. One can well imagine a respectable legal system
that would not award money damages for libel-unless, perhaps, a monetary loss
was proven (such as a loss of employment)-but would restrict the plaintiffs
available relief for intangible harm to a declaration of falsity of the libel.
Leval, supra note 813, at 215-16 (footnotes omitted).
8"6 In their proposed "Alternative Defamation Action," Hulme and Sprenger provide:
Vindication Actions shall be granted docket priority and, absent consent of the
parties, shall be adjudicated in a court or court-annexed proceeding not more than
one hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the complaint, unless the court
makes a finding on the record that such an expedited trial is impracticable under
the circumstances.
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thority to order defendants either to publish declaratory judgments in favor
of plaintiffs or pay the costs of such publication, and to order the payment
of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. Without such authority, there
would be little incentive for defamed persons to bring declaratory judgment
actions or for lawyers to take their cases."7 Unfortunately, there is no lob-
by for such legislation. Although the plaintiffs' bar might recognize the
benefits of the action and form such a lobby, the media opposition to vindi-
cation actions may be too strong to allow the plaintiffs' bar to make much
headway.
Professor Anderson argues that only the Supreme Court can reform
defamation law.8"' Given the lack of promise of the reform proposals, his
conclusion seems correct. Although Anderson does not recommend a de-
tailed set of reforms that the Court should implement, he does make several
suggestions." 9 Some would give greater protection to defendants than
presently exists, including the provision of greater authority to judges to
grant summary judgment and to limit damages. 2 Others would give great-
er protection to plaintiffs, including a decree that plaintiffs could obtain a
declaration of falsity without showing fault, and a reduction in plaintiffs'
Hulme & Sprenger, supra note 813, at 174-75.
817
A vindication action must provide attorneys' fees for the plaintiff who has been
the victim of a false statement and for the defendant who is determined to have
published the truth .... Because the prevailing plaintiff receives no damage award
by which to pay his attorney, the attorneys' fees provision is an essential part of
the action. Similarly, a potential award of attorneys' fees against a plaintiff will
discourage frivolous claims.
Id. at 172 (footnote omitted).
Professor Anderson opposes the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party on
the ground that "[s]uch a rule increases the stakes for both sides, when the objective
should be to reduce them." Anderson, supra note 4, at 544. He believes that plaintiffs'
lawyers often overestimate their chance of prevailing, and that media defendants "may
overspend in particular cases to achieve long term benefits in other cases." Id. He ob-
serves, however, that if only plaintiffs could receive attorneys' fees, a plaintiffs libel
bar would develop, "which would make the level of expertise more nearly equal on
each side and thus make the system work more aesthetically and perhaps more justly."
Id. He also argues, however, that a one-way rule on fees could encourage press harass-
ment. Id. This view, however, is misguided. The better view is that, with the award of
fees to the prevailing party, harassment would be avoided, and plaintiffs' attorneys
would be more cautious in estimating their chances of prevailing. Under current rules, a
plaintiff's lawyer may be willing to take considerable risk for a contingent fee from a
very large award; under the vindication action, the plaintiffs lawyer should not be so
tempted to gamble because the only award available is reasonable attorneys' fees.
818 Anderson, supra note 4, at 552-54.
819 Id. at 537-41, 552-54.
820 Id. at 554.
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burdens with corresponding restrictions on damages.82'
In most respects, Anderson's proposals are sound. Two bear closer ex-
amination, however. The first concerns the public figure category, and the
second concerns the courts' pretrial screening of nonfactual statements.
Anderson believes that the public figure category is too broad. 22 He
would restrict it to persons analogous to public officials. 23 He is critical of
the self-help and assumption of risk rationales the Court used in Gertz to
justify the requirement that public figures prove actual malice.8 24 Like An-
derson, I believe that the public figure category is too broad, but I would
not restrict it to those analogous to public officials. More convincing than
the self-help and assumption of risk rationales in Gertz is the justification
for the public figure category expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts.8 25 He justified the requirement that public figures
prove actual malice on the ground that they "often play an influential role in
ordering society." '26 Because of their power, uninhibited debate about their
conduct and views is as important as is debate about public officials, and
even more so because they are not subject to the restraints of the political
process.127 In reference to the self-help and assumption of risk rationales,
the Court in Gertz explained that "[e]ven if the foregoing generalities do not
obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on
the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily ex-
posed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood
821 Id.
822 See id. at 500, 524.
823 Id. at 526-30, 538.
824 Id. at 527-30.
825 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
826 Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
[M]any who do not hold public office ... are nevertheless intimately involved in
the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape
events in areas of concern to society at large.
Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not subject to
the restraints of the political process, "public figures," like "public officials,"
often play an influential role in ordering society. And surely as a class these
"public figures" have as ready access as "public officials" to mass media of com-
munication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and
activities. Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of
such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their
involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of "public
officials." The fact that they are not amenable to the restraints of the political
process only underscores the legitimate and substantial nature of the interest, since
it means that public opinion may be the only instrument by which society can
attempt to influence their conduct.
Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
827 Id.
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concerning them." 2 '
In my view, the overly broad treatment of public figures derives, not
from the Supreme Court's definition thereof, but from lower courts' exceed-
ing that definition. There are three strands to the public figure discussion in
Gertz. One is the rationale for treating public figures and private figures
differently-the rationale of self-help and assumption of risk. 29 The sec-
ond is a restrictive definition of public figures. 3° The third is a loose defi-
nition of public figures that is too inclusive in light of the holding in Gertz
itself.8 3' In its subsequent decisions, the Court has employed its restrictive
definition of public figures. 32 In contrast, many lower courts have not fol-
828 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (emphasis added).
829 Id. at 344-45.
830 Id. at 345.
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through
no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status
have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public fig-
ures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment.
Id.
831 Id. at 351.
[The designation of public figure] may rest on either of two alternative bases. In
some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly,
an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public con-
troversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In
either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.
Id. (emphasis added). In holding that Gertz was not a public figure, the Court relied
upon its restrictive definition, rather than the looser one, stating:
[Gertz] played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, and his participation relat-
ed solely to his representation of a private client. He took no part in the criminal
prosecution of Officer Nuccio. Moreover, he never discussed either the criminal
or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he en-
gage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
832 See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979) (holding that
plaintiffs failure to respond to grand jury subpoena and subsequent citation for con-
tempt did not render him public figure for purposes of defendant's book naming him as
a Soviet agent because plaintiff did not '"voluntarily thrust' or ['inject'] himself into the
forefront of the public controversy surrounding the investigation of Soviet espionage in
the United States"); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (holding that
plaintiff, who had received public funds to support his research, was not a public figure
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lowed the restrictive definition, but instead have employed the self-help and
assumption of risk rationales, or the loose definition, finding plaintiffs to be
public figures who would not qualify under the Court's restrictive ap-
proach.833 Anderson correctly observes that "[t]he lower courts have tend-
for purposes of Senator Proxmire's "Golden Fleece" award because he "did not thrust
himself or his views into public controversy to influence others"); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976) (holding that plaintiff, who had received a great
deal of media attention incident to divorce proceeding, was not public figure because
she "did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society ... and
she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved . . . " and that plaintiff's filing of
complaint for separate maintenance did not make her public figure, as "[s]he was com-
pelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of
matrimony").
833 See, e.g., Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 742 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding that air-traffic controller was involuntary public figure for purposes of
discussion of airplane crash that occurred while he was on duty), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1141 (1986); Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1239, 1253-55 (5th Cir.
1980) (determining that husband and wife plaintiffs with careers in sports and entertain-
ment, respectively, may not have been either "all-purpose" or "limited purpose" public
figures under Court's definition of those categories, but were public figures because
their activities had invited public attention), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981); Holt v.
Cox Enterprises, 590 F. Supp. 408, 412 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that college football
player was public figure for purposes of statements about his performance as a player);
White v. Mobile Press Register, Inc., 514 So. 2d 902, 904 (Ala. 1987) ("White's prior
association with E.P.A., and his choice of a career as a high level executive in an in-
dustry that is the subject of much public interest and concern show a voluntary decision
to place himself in a situation where there was a likelihood of public controversy.");
Lewis v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 832 P.2d 1118, 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff became public figure not only by filing civil suit against the store,
but also by her attorney's attendance at public meeting where he spoke on her behalf);
Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 738 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Kan. 1987) ("An indi-
vidual may not choose whether or not to be a public figure. Public figure status is rath-
er the result of acts or events which by their nature are bound to invite comment.");
Elm Medical Laboratory, Inc. v. RKO General, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 679, 680 (Mass.
1989) (holding that plaintiff medical laboratory was public figure in its action based on
defendant's partially erroneous reports on governmental news release warning that
plaintiff had misread large number of laboratory tests); Warner v. Kansas City Star Co.,
726 S.W.2d 384, 385-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding, on basis of assumption of risk
and self help, that fired outdoor writer for newspaper was public figure in his libel
action for charges that he had violated newspaper's code of ethics by accepting free use
of vehicle and misrepresenting arrangement by which he had obtained it); Gomez v.
Murdoch, 475 A.2d 622, 625 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding that assumption
of risk and media access made professional jockey public figure for purposes of charge
that he deliberately had prevented his horse from giving its best effort in race); cf.
Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083, 1090, 1093-95 (N.J. 1986) (holding that former
bank official had to prove actual malice in action for newspaper's charge that he had
obtained undercollateralized loans from bank because although plaintiff was not public
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ed to view both the public official and public figure categories expansive-
ly. "' 34 The Court could correct much of the problem that Anderson identi-
fies, not by a redefinition of public figures, but by prohibiting lower courts
from exceeding the protections it has extended to this category of plain-
tiffs. 835
Anderson also suggests that the Court "might explicitly authorize trial
judges to decide at the outset whether the challenged statement was suffi-
ciently factual, harmful, and remote from truth to be justifiably burdened by
further litigation. 8 36 This suggestion is sound, but only if trial courts de-
fine opinion in a reasonable way. Many recent lower court decisions define
opinion too broadly, removing from jury consideration factual issues regard-
ing the meaning of the defendant's charges.837 In this state of adjudication,
explicit authorization to screen nonfactual statements might only encourage
further unwarranted restrictions on legitimate causes of action.
VII. CONCLUSION
A satisfactory balance between the fundamental interests in reputation
and freedom of speech seems impossible to achieve. One interest or the
other must give way with every publication of defamatory speech. I believe,
however, that the Supreme Court achieved an appropriate balance in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. in holding, by implication at least, that
pure deductive opinion is actionable, but that pure evaluative opinion is
not.838 This holding serves a central goal of First Amendment jurispru-
dence-judicial neutrality regarding community values. 39
Milkovich, however, has not engendered a consensus among lower
courts as to the appropriate treatment of defamatory opinion. To the con-
figure under Supreme Court decisions, state common-law rules required plaintiff to
show actual malice because plaintiff had assumed risk of publicity on matter of legit-
imate public interest).
83 Anderson, supra note 4, at 500.
835 Such a ruling by the Court would not solve one of the problems that troubles
Anderson-the treatment of celebrities as public figures and the "politics of scandal"
that the actual malice standard promotes. See id. at 533-34. Many celebrities do use the
power of their status to influence issues, and without doubt they seek the public's atten-
tion; hence, they should be held to the actual malice standard. The only way in which
defamation law might diminish the politics of scandal is by allowing a declaratory judg-
ment of falsity without proof of fault. If courts, on their own authority, allowed such
declaratory judgments, many celebrities could obtain vindication without legislation
authorizing an order to pay the costs of publication of the judgment, court costs, and
attorneys' fees.
836 Id. at 554.
837 See discussion supra parts IV.A.3-5.
838 See discussion supra part III.B.
839 See discussion supra part V.B.
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trary, lower court decisions reflect widely divergent approaches to what
constitutes immune opinion. This disparate treatment makes outcomes un-
predictable and may induce the national media and others to conform to the
standards of those courts that give inadequate protection to nonfactual
speech.84 Equally troubling to First Amendment interests are lower court
decisions that grant greater protection to opinion than the Supreme Court
extended in Milkovich. Such decisions impair First Amendment interests.
They immunize false and defamatory statements of fact, which impair the
truth-seeking functions of public discourse, 4 and they unnecessarily dis-
courage participation in public debate by denying any recourse to persons
falsely maligned. 42 Decisions that extend overly broad protection include
those that immunize pure deductive opinion, expressions of points of view
on factual matters, and ambiguous charges.
Pure deductive opinions that are false are not entitled to immunity be-
cause they may be as damaging to public discourse and to the persons de-
famed as any other false factual charges. 43 The same is true of expres-
sions of points of view on factual matters; additionally, immunizing points
of view enables speakers to defame with impunity merely by prefacing false
charges with such words as "in my opinion."' 44 The treatment of ambigu-
ous statements as opinion also is unjustified. 45 If an ambiguous charge is
reasonably understood in the alleged defamatory and factual sense, and if
the speaker was at fault in conveying that false connotation, then the speak-
er should bear responsibility.846 Like protection of points of view on factu-
al matters, immunization of ambiguity gives the deliberate defamer a license
to harm.847 Considerable leeway for imaginative and colorful language is
necessary to protect First Amendment values, but the requirement that plain-
tiffs prove fault as to the factual meaning conveyed sufficiently protects the
use of such language. 48 Immunization of speech merely because it is am-
biguous deprives defamed persons of a remedy for harm to reputation with-
out advancing First Amendment interests.
Lower court decisions that extend protection to these categories of de-
famatory speech fail to recognize that the basis for distinguishing between
fact and opinion in defamation law must rest on a recognition that First
Amendment interests can be harmed by both too little and too much protec-
tion of speakers. Both courses threaten the existence of judicial neutrality
o See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
841 See supra notes 550-51 and accompanying text.
842 See supra notes 555-56 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra part V.B.
84 See discussion supra part V.C.
845 See discussion supra part V.D.
846 See discussion supra part V.B.2 (concerning the applicable fault standards).
See supra note 694 and accompanying text.
848 See discussion supra part V.D.2.
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among competing community values.849 Although the distinction between
fact and opinion is elusive, to protect the neutrality of public discourse, it is
appropriate to define defamatory opinions as normative claims that do not
imply the existence of supporting defamatory facts. Such claims should not
be subject to a judicial validity test because they advance public discourse.
Use of a judicial validity test would impose the norms of one community on
another. Defamatory facts, however, are claims that should be subject to a
judicial validity test because they impede the search for truth. Immunizing
such claims does not provide a level playing field for competition for alle-
giance to a community; instead it allows oppressive behavior by those with
the greater power of speech or greater popularity. Immunization of factual
claims unnecessarily inhibits speech by those who fear defamatory attack
without any recourse. Thus, excessive protection of defamatory factual
claims harms rather than advances First Amendment goals. 5
The highly disparate lower court approaches to defamatory opinion too
often are inimical to First Amendment interests. A viable solution is for the
Supreme Court to prescribe maximum as well as minimum protections for
defamatory speech."' Although some will respond that such a step would
constitute a forbidden federal intrusion into the realm of state substantive
law, in fact expansive lower court holdings are intrusions into the realm of
federal constitutional law that impair First Amendment interests. F o u r -
teenth Amendment jurisprudence would allow the Supreme Court to pre-
scribe maximum protections for defamatory speech. The Court has recog-
nized that the states' interest in providing a remedy for harm to reputation
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth
of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of or-
dered liberty." '852 It also has recognized that common law claims are a spe-
cies of property interest and that there are some limits under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states' power to deprive persons of those claims. 53 Ex-
cessive protection of defamation is an arbitrary restriction on the defamed
person's interest in a remedy. An inadequate remedy ignores "the essential
dignity and worth of every human being," and bears no rational relationship
to the goal of protecting freedom of speech. When the deprivation of the
remedy in fact harms those interests, it seems incontrovertibly arbitrary.
Absent maximum protections for speech, and without any realistic hope of
reform that would provide a vindication remedy for defamed persons,854
lower courts should reconsider their approaches to the protection of opinion.
84 See discussion supra part V.A.2.b.
850 Id.
' See discussion supra part VI.A.
852 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J. concurring)).
.53 See supra notes 778-801 and accompanying text.
854 See discussion supra part VI.B.
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There is a threat to freedom of speech itself when, under a free speech
banner, the courts ignore the insidious effects of false and defamatory
speech on the kind of public discourse required to foster a self-governing
and multi-cultural society.
